The following is a review of David Streckfuss' new book Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté. London: Routledge, 2011.
Full Version Available at http://criticalasianstudies.org/issues/vol43/no1/truth-on-trial-in-thailand.html
David Streckfuss's Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lese majeste builds on what was already an extraordinarily accomplished PhD dissertation taken at Wisconsin-Madison (1998) under the supervision of Alfred McCoy and Thongchai Winichakul. The original material has been revised and expanded in the context of Thailand's regime-shaking struggles since the 2006 coup d'etat that felled Thaksin Shinawatra and the accompanying excess of defamation and lse-majest claims. Truth in Thailand is also marked by the author's recent engagement with the theorists of the “state of exception,” Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.1
It is with Agamben and Schmitt that Streckfuss can claim that Thailand's legalization of “abnormal times” since the 1950s entails a permanent suspension of constitutional order—or a state of exception in which sovereign power defines the possible. The ghost of Foucault is also present, though more as a disposition than an explicitly referenced master. Introduced briefly on the matter of “regimes of truth” (43-47), Foucault then largely fades from view, but the idea of productive discourse shadows the entire book. How could it be otherwise when Streckfuss aims to make sense of the order of things—of Thai-ness, of monarchy, and of nation, and the power that works through them?
Streckfuss thinks through these matters with ruthless clarity. Under his scholarly scrutiny the way in which Thai law has regulated the “characterisation of things” across a dispiriting one hundred years is laid bare. Central to this project has been what Streckfuss calls the “defamation regime”: “a social and political formation that over time develops a kind of 'defamation thinking' and 'impulse' that focuses on the insult of the defamatory statement, often at the expense of the truth” (xv). His expert narrative shows how courts, inspired by wider state discourses, try to establish the intent of those who have allegedly defamed the nation, the monarchy, or Thai-ness—and in so doing make visible the logic of the regime's self-image. In shining a spotlight on these legal moments Streckfuss is illuminating the underlying collective logic by which power has been consolidated in Thailand.
The book's thirteen chapters are rich in detail and observation, and many Old Thai Hands will learn much from each of them. Thematically organized, the chapters offer an incomparable history of lse-majest, law and Thai-ness, public opinion, and the science of traitorology. Of especial relevance given the recent discussion of the judicialization of politics in Thailand is Streckfuss's remarkable account in chapter 5 of the institutionalization of the “state of exception” by Thai courts working in conjunction with the police and military. Tracing the use of “indistinct, legal concepts such as 'peace and order' or 'threat to national security'” (113) and working through court transcripts, Streckfuss shows the essential reasoning behind the constitutional standing of the hundreds of coup decrees that have the status of law. No one hoping to understand the hybrid nature of Thailand's authoritarian-liberal mix can ignore this chapter, even if some (including me) will take exception to his argument that the country has been in varying states of exception for decades. Even if technically correct in the sense that extra-constitutional acts found Thai political order and shadow it—and that such acts announce themselves with disturbing frequency—the idea of a permanent “state of exception” can lead to overgeneralization. It can gloss, for example, Thailand's shifting regime forms since the 1950s and the differential relationship each has to law.
Many readers will be intrigued by Streckfuss's attempt to explain with Buddhist logic the actions that precede and follow coups d'etat, more than ten of which Thailand has witnessed since 1932. He writes:
This pattern [of a coup d'etat and self-issued amnesty and constitution] seems inexplicable unless we look at the practise as ritual purification—a public act certified by Thai Theravada Buddhism that recognizes a sacrifice (staging a coup), acknowledges a necessary murder (the killing of a constitution), and rewards giving (a new constitution, a new political order). (122)
Some might read as overly culturalist this account of coups d'etat as purification rituals that establish the pure intent of their protagonists (following a Buddhist inclination to stress right intent). At the very least the argument is provocative and offers original insights that expand our ways of thinking through the cultural aspects of Thai politics. Indeed, those hoping to understand the thinking of the Thai establishment and its social intermediaries may well feel they can finally name what has been hitherto a vague sense of Thai elite mentality. Streckfuss's desire to understand, and his dedicated patience in doing so, allows him to render visible the authenticity of a conservative Thai worldview that is often forgotten or cynically understood as mere venal interest. In short, Streckfuss has captured, on a political rather than aesthetic register, what Raymond Williams calls a “structure of feeling” and its practical consciousness.2 This is what Streckfuss means when he speaks of a “defamation regime.”
It remains to be said that if a certain ironical grin accompanies Streckfuss's extensive and persuasive documentation of the defamation regime, present also is horror at the human cost that this regime extracts. Such sentiment hints at the deep humanism that drives his scholarship. No one can read the book's last page on the “Ghosts of Forgotten History,” reminiscent of Walter Benjamin's portrayal of the Angel of Progress, and not shudder at the thought of future Thai troubles on the way to democracy. When the “'Ghosts' of the Duson-nyor massacre, 6 October, Black May, and Tak Bai” (315) are finally granted an audience, Thailand will not be the same.
This monumental volume is destined to take a leading place in the field of critical studies of Asia.
The review appears in the: Connors MK and Streckfuss, D (2011) 'Michael K. Connors in conversation with David Streckfuss, author of Truth on Trial in Thailand', Critical Asian Studies, 43:1, 139 - 149
Showing posts with label Coup. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Coup. Show all posts
November 17, 2009
Working Paper on Human Rights
Please see the new working paper on "Ambivlalent about rights" regarding Thailand at the Southeast Asian Research Centre's working paper series
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/doc.aspx
The paper explores the conditions that give rise to human rights abuses in Thailand.
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/doc.aspx
The paper explores the conditions that give rise to human rights abuses in Thailand.
November 28, 2008
The politics of coups in Thailand 2008
Comment on the crisis in Thailand
"Consequently, we also need to disaggregate Thaksin's pro-poor policies and realise that the brilliance of his strategy was to appeal to middle layers of farmers - what once might have been called the petty bourgeoisie. Such class elements are open to various political projects, and Thaksin won them to his."
Who knows how the military will settle, and on what side (?), after the seizure of Bangkok's international airport by the People's Alliance for Democracy on 25 November. This latest militant attack on the government by PAD is a consequence both of its own desire to bring the crisis to a climax (having failed to do so previously) and to halt constitutional amendments that would turn the political clock to the pre-coup period.
PAD ideologues continue to fashion a hybrid civic, liberal-conservative, royalist and corporatist rhetoric to justify its claims and actions. Its essential argument being that in the face of an illegitimate government, civil disobedience is a right and a duty. Yet, as was manifestly clear from Sondhi's speeches in June 2008 and the espousal of "new politics", sections of the PAD leadership effectively wish to replace the imperfect but majoritarian electoral democracy currently in place with one that returns Thailand to the "semi-democracy" of the 1980s, although one reconfigured as more virtuous and wise. This is the only solution some elitist liberals and conservatives can envisage in the face of the electoral strength of the pro-Thaksin forces. The willingness of those forces to develop Thailand in a manner that departs from the liberal-conservative compromise that characterised the 1990s is an added incentive to turn back the clock.
As flagged previously, a Bonapartist solution to the prolonged crisis is not out of the question. Such a solution would deal a death blow to both currents in the drama now playing itself on the streets of Bangkok, and would lead to a regime hostile to the politics of both camps.
Speculation on which side the military will fall is just that, and perhaps if a coup occurs in the next few hours or days it will be one of those rare events when the military turns on itself.
Below is an extract on coup-regimes in Thailand from a paper to be published next year. The paper examines the origins of the current crisis by looking at competition between regime framers (liberal, statist and plutocratic). It argues that the current conflict is not simply a consequence of succession politics or intra-elite conflict over capture of state power, but is fundamentally about competition over regime form. Why liberals and statists in Thailand have pacted against Thaksin and his political populism requires explanation beyond the popular idea that the conservative and liberal elite were so against the pro-poor policies of the Thaksin regime that they overthrew it. The politics of the 2006 coup, and subsequently, reflect fundamentally a conflict over regime form rather than differing orientations to the "poor". It is arguable that the forces antagonistic to Thaksin can accommodate the "pro-poor" policies of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party, evidenced by the Democrat Party's outdoing of TRT's policies in the 2005 election.
In place of the idea that this is a conflict between poor and rich, city and province, consider that the Thaksin regime progressively threatened an elite settlement between liberals and conservatives (in form since the 1980s) that envisaged a generational programme of regime change in a liberal political direction; a settlement that protected both the military and the palace. Class and geographical politics were certainly part of the equation in the 2006 conflict that led to the coup, but it is the subsequent conflict that has brought them to the fore.
Consequently, we also need to disaggregate Thaksin's pro-poor policies and realise that the brilliance of his strategy was to appeal to middle layers of farmers - what once might have been called the petty bourgeoisie. Such class elements are open to various political projects, and Thaksin won them to his.
The extract below attempts to explain the nature of "decisionist regimes", and suggests that the 2006-2007 decisionist regime was significantly different than previous episodes because of its implicit pacting with liberal elements.
**********************************************************
"Liberalism, authoritarianism and the politics of decisionism in Thailand" (forthcoming) Pacific Review
Michael K. Connors
Decisionist regimes
Decisionist regimes are centred on junta control of state apparatuses, with real or nominal support from the palace. They are premised on the fact that a state of exception, one which the existing constitutional order cannot resolve, is held to exist (by them). Decisionist regimes suspend the existing order and assume effective sovereignty. In deciding that a state of exception exists a junta declare themselves, by their actions if not in name, sovereign, in accordance with Carl Schmitt’s (1988: 5) anti-liberal formula that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. As Heiner Bielefeldt (1998: 26) notes, “the state of exception in which the entire legal order is at stake, reveals the factual primacy of ‘rule of man’ over ‘rule of law’”. In rupturing the messy and emergent expressions of liberal or other forms of political legitimacy by a political decision that suspends existing order, a decisionist phase is the moment when all political actors can see who holds sovereign-might to regulate social order. Recurrent decisionist phases in Thai politics indicate the fragility of constitutional order and the persistence of authoritarianism in the military and palace. This is codified in Thai law and enables decrees and a constitution issued by military junta to enduring force of law. This ‘convention’ was given legal precedent in a Supreme Court ruling in 1952 that concluded that a government established by a coup d’etat may not at first be legally legitimate, until people come to accept the new government. This acceptance bestows effective legitimacy. It concluded this had occurred, and ruled the Phibun government legitimate (see Somchai 2007: 193-95). This has provided a legal basis for all subsequent coup regimes and the laws they issue.
In some senses, the regularity of decisionist interventions in Thai politics has meant that the ability to define states of exception is in part seen by the political classes as one more component of the arsenal of state power that lies above regime form. Whether welcomed or not, it forms an overarching possibility that structures political behaviour. It also explains the strategic compulsion requiring that Thaksin staff the military with loyalists. While a state of exception is far from the norm, the mobilisation by statist forces to threaten or indeed act in a decisionist manner is a long term feature of Thai politics and accounts for constant coup rumours, even during the liberal-conservative period (1988-2000). When non-negotiable statist military and palace preferences are ignored the use of a reserve veto is often the penultimate stage before the exercise of a state exception. Veto is largely exercised in unknown dealings of power brokers. Decisionist intervention may be understood as a consequence of certain political boundaries being transgressed and vetos ignored or defied. The politics of 2005-2006 witnessed an extraordinary exercise in brinkmanship, with Thaksin testing how far he could go - emboldened by popular support - in entrenching a new power balance between statists, liberals and pluto-populists. In that sense he provoked a decisionist intervention.
Decisionist phases are not particularly amenable to structural analysis, but are rather impelled by the particular mix of institutional and voluntarist elements that play themselves out at crisis moments (in some senses, these may be seen as pent up demand from structuralist pressures) when state actors utilise positions to usurp regime forms. The 1991-1992 decisionist phase that attempted to restore the liberal bureaucratic-authoritarian status quo of the 1980s, was occasioned by military and bureaucratic actors threatened by the rise of capitalist control over the state. Statist forces utilised the networks of village heads around the nation to support their re-entrenchment, gathering millions signatures in support of the pro-military 1991 constitution (Amon 1992: 82). This ended with the persistence of cross-class protests demanding an expanded democratic space and a non-political role for the military (see Hewison 1993). Blocked and defeated, the military withdrew from excessive public intervention for some years, but not until the massacre of May 1992. In this decisionist phase a military installed government passed numerous laws favouring business interest and regulation. At the head of that government was Thailand’s most renowned liberal, Anand Panyarachun, who was the main protagonist of an authoritarian legislative process for the purpose of capital interest. This liberal-statist alliance during a decisionist phase is indicative of Thai liberalism’s ability to pragmatically work with statist regime framers.
The decisionist regime of 2006-2007, the building of which re-activated the social base of statist regime framers, involved the wholesale suspension of the 1997 settlement, the imposition of martial law across the country, draconian restriction on political activity, overwhelming media control and the mobilisation of state resources for the political objectives of destroying the Thaksin regime. This objective entailed direct deployment of power by circumvention of the formal process in the representative realm. Yet, the 2006-2007 decisionist regime was in some senses liberal-regarding, reflecting elements of the social base that supported the coup.
The regime’s interim constitution of October 2006 declared a commitment to the international norms of human rights, while ensuring the process of governing and re-constitutionalisation of power was under its control. The “permanent constitution” of 2007 - put to a highly manipulated referendum and passed in August 2007 - sanctioned the reproduction of key elements of the 1997 constitution, including the liberal agenda of rights and the independent agencies of the state. In effect, notwithstanding the odious curtailing of political activity and its flagrant abuse of human rights and the international norms it pledged to uphold (Asian Human Rights Commission 2006), the regime put in a place a constitution that promised the maintenance of liberal historic gains. It did so while opportunistically re-asserting the position of the bureaucracy and military through a semi-appointed senate and by passing a new draconian Internal Security Act. It also enhanced the power of judicial oversight, at a time when that judiciary was judged to be politicised and corrupt. The regime returned the country to electoral rule in just over a year, and reluctantly accepted the December 2007 election that returned pro-Thaksin forces to power. This decisionist regime is best understood as occasioning a pragmatic understanding between erstwhile competing liberal and statist regime framers to offset Thaksin. The constitutional settlement of 2007, in the unlikely event that it survives for long, is the ground upon which new statist/liberal contests will be played out – assuming that residual elements of the electoral populist regime are dealt with. Until that time more statist-liberal alliances can be expected.
"Consequently, we also need to disaggregate Thaksin's pro-poor policies and realise that the brilliance of his strategy was to appeal to middle layers of farmers - what once might have been called the petty bourgeoisie. Such class elements are open to various political projects, and Thaksin won them to his."
Who knows how the military will settle, and on what side (?), after the seizure of Bangkok's international airport by the People's Alliance for Democracy on 25 November. This latest militant attack on the government by PAD is a consequence both of its own desire to bring the crisis to a climax (having failed to do so previously) and to halt constitutional amendments that would turn the political clock to the pre-coup period.
PAD ideologues continue to fashion a hybrid civic, liberal-conservative, royalist and corporatist rhetoric to justify its claims and actions. Its essential argument being that in the face of an illegitimate government, civil disobedience is a right and a duty. Yet, as was manifestly clear from Sondhi's speeches in June 2008 and the espousal of "new politics", sections of the PAD leadership effectively wish to replace the imperfect but majoritarian electoral democracy currently in place with one that returns Thailand to the "semi-democracy" of the 1980s, although one reconfigured as more virtuous and wise. This is the only solution some elitist liberals and conservatives can envisage in the face of the electoral strength of the pro-Thaksin forces. The willingness of those forces to develop Thailand in a manner that departs from the liberal-conservative compromise that characterised the 1990s is an added incentive to turn back the clock.
As flagged previously, a Bonapartist solution to the prolonged crisis is not out of the question. Such a solution would deal a death blow to both currents in the drama now playing itself on the streets of Bangkok, and would lead to a regime hostile to the politics of both camps.
Speculation on which side the military will fall is just that, and perhaps if a coup occurs in the next few hours or days it will be one of those rare events when the military turns on itself.
Below is an extract on coup-regimes in Thailand from a paper to be published next year. The paper examines the origins of the current crisis by looking at competition between regime framers (liberal, statist and plutocratic). It argues that the current conflict is not simply a consequence of succession politics or intra-elite conflict over capture of state power, but is fundamentally about competition over regime form. Why liberals and statists in Thailand have pacted against Thaksin and his political populism requires explanation beyond the popular idea that the conservative and liberal elite were so against the pro-poor policies of the Thaksin regime that they overthrew it. The politics of the 2006 coup, and subsequently, reflect fundamentally a conflict over regime form rather than differing orientations to the "poor". It is arguable that the forces antagonistic to Thaksin can accommodate the "pro-poor" policies of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party, evidenced by the Democrat Party's outdoing of TRT's policies in the 2005 election.
In place of the idea that this is a conflict between poor and rich, city and province, consider that the Thaksin regime progressively threatened an elite settlement between liberals and conservatives (in form since the 1980s) that envisaged a generational programme of regime change in a liberal political direction; a settlement that protected both the military and the palace. Class and geographical politics were certainly part of the equation in the 2006 conflict that led to the coup, but it is the subsequent conflict that has brought them to the fore.
Consequently, we also need to disaggregate Thaksin's pro-poor policies and realise that the brilliance of his strategy was to appeal to middle layers of farmers - what once might have been called the petty bourgeoisie. Such class elements are open to various political projects, and Thaksin won them to his.
The extract below attempts to explain the nature of "decisionist regimes", and suggests that the 2006-2007 decisionist regime was significantly different than previous episodes because of its implicit pacting with liberal elements.
**********************************************************
"Liberalism, authoritarianism and the politics of decisionism in Thailand" (forthcoming) Pacific Review
Michael K. Connors
Decisionist regimes
Decisionist regimes are centred on junta control of state apparatuses, with real or nominal support from the palace. They are premised on the fact that a state of exception, one which the existing constitutional order cannot resolve, is held to exist (by them). Decisionist regimes suspend the existing order and assume effective sovereignty. In deciding that a state of exception exists a junta declare themselves, by their actions if not in name, sovereign, in accordance with Carl Schmitt’s (1988: 5) anti-liberal formula that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. As Heiner Bielefeldt (1998: 26) notes, “the state of exception in which the entire legal order is at stake, reveals the factual primacy of ‘rule of man’ over ‘rule of law’”. In rupturing the messy and emergent expressions of liberal or other forms of political legitimacy by a political decision that suspends existing order, a decisionist phase is the moment when all political actors can see who holds sovereign-might to regulate social order. Recurrent decisionist phases in Thai politics indicate the fragility of constitutional order and the persistence of authoritarianism in the military and palace. This is codified in Thai law and enables decrees and a constitution issued by military junta to enduring force of law. This ‘convention’ was given legal precedent in a Supreme Court ruling in 1952 that concluded that a government established by a coup d’etat may not at first be legally legitimate, until people come to accept the new government. This acceptance bestows effective legitimacy. It concluded this had occurred, and ruled the Phibun government legitimate (see Somchai 2007: 193-95). This has provided a legal basis for all subsequent coup regimes and the laws they issue.
In some senses, the regularity of decisionist interventions in Thai politics has meant that the ability to define states of exception is in part seen by the political classes as one more component of the arsenal of state power that lies above regime form. Whether welcomed or not, it forms an overarching possibility that structures political behaviour. It also explains the strategic compulsion requiring that Thaksin staff the military with loyalists. While a state of exception is far from the norm, the mobilisation by statist forces to threaten or indeed act in a decisionist manner is a long term feature of Thai politics and accounts for constant coup rumours, even during the liberal-conservative period (1988-2000). When non-negotiable statist military and palace preferences are ignored the use of a reserve veto is often the penultimate stage before the exercise of a state exception. Veto is largely exercised in unknown dealings of power brokers. Decisionist intervention may be understood as a consequence of certain political boundaries being transgressed and vetos ignored or defied. The politics of 2005-2006 witnessed an extraordinary exercise in brinkmanship, with Thaksin testing how far he could go - emboldened by popular support - in entrenching a new power balance between statists, liberals and pluto-populists. In that sense he provoked a decisionist intervention.
Decisionist phases are not particularly amenable to structural analysis, but are rather impelled by the particular mix of institutional and voluntarist elements that play themselves out at crisis moments (in some senses, these may be seen as pent up demand from structuralist pressures) when state actors utilise positions to usurp regime forms. The 1991-1992 decisionist phase that attempted to restore the liberal bureaucratic-authoritarian status quo of the 1980s, was occasioned by military and bureaucratic actors threatened by the rise of capitalist control over the state. Statist forces utilised the networks of village heads around the nation to support their re-entrenchment, gathering millions signatures in support of the pro-military 1991 constitution (Amon 1992: 82). This ended with the persistence of cross-class protests demanding an expanded democratic space and a non-political role for the military (see Hewison 1993). Blocked and defeated, the military withdrew from excessive public intervention for some years, but not until the massacre of May 1992. In this decisionist phase a military installed government passed numerous laws favouring business interest and regulation. At the head of that government was Thailand’s most renowned liberal, Anand Panyarachun, who was the main protagonist of an authoritarian legislative process for the purpose of capital interest. This liberal-statist alliance during a decisionist phase is indicative of Thai liberalism’s ability to pragmatically work with statist regime framers.
The decisionist regime of 2006-2007, the building of which re-activated the social base of statist regime framers, involved the wholesale suspension of the 1997 settlement, the imposition of martial law across the country, draconian restriction on political activity, overwhelming media control and the mobilisation of state resources for the political objectives of destroying the Thaksin regime. This objective entailed direct deployment of power by circumvention of the formal process in the representative realm. Yet, the 2006-2007 decisionist regime was in some senses liberal-regarding, reflecting elements of the social base that supported the coup.
The regime’s interim constitution of October 2006 declared a commitment to the international norms of human rights, while ensuring the process of governing and re-constitutionalisation of power was under its control. The “permanent constitution” of 2007 - put to a highly manipulated referendum and passed in August 2007 - sanctioned the reproduction of key elements of the 1997 constitution, including the liberal agenda of rights and the independent agencies of the state. In effect, notwithstanding the odious curtailing of political activity and its flagrant abuse of human rights and the international norms it pledged to uphold (Asian Human Rights Commission 2006), the regime put in a place a constitution that promised the maintenance of liberal historic gains. It did so while opportunistically re-asserting the position of the bureaucracy and military through a semi-appointed senate and by passing a new draconian Internal Security Act. It also enhanced the power of judicial oversight, at a time when that judiciary was judged to be politicised and corrupt. The regime returned the country to electoral rule in just over a year, and reluctantly accepted the December 2007 election that returned pro-Thaksin forces to power. This decisionist regime is best understood as occasioning a pragmatic understanding between erstwhile competing liberal and statist regime framers to offset Thaksin. The constitutional settlement of 2007, in the unlikely event that it survives for long, is the ground upon which new statist/liberal contests will be played out – assuming that residual elements of the electoral populist regime are dealt with. Until that time more statist-liberal alliances can be expected.
July 15, 2008
Thailand: Coup? New Politics? Rule of Law?
Thai politics six months from now?
Some people have given up trying to understand current events in Thailand. They figure, I suppose, that they will pick up the thread once it’s all sorted.
That thread has several possible endings.
It might be a Democrat Party led coalition government in power, aided by military machinations of some form. Thaksin Shinawatra would be in exile (if he can get away), with ex-prime minister Samak sunk by allegations of corruption relating to the time he served as Bangkok Mayor. This possibility emerges on the assumption that the various court cases against Thaksin and the government proceed, and the coalition government splinters in the face of indictments and the dissolution of pro-Thaksin political influence.
Another possibility would be a resurgent People’s Power Party (PPP) government (sans Samak?). This outcome would require more of the counter demonstrations that are breaking out across the country against the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). This is the so-called “Udon model”, which entails breaking up PAD rallies wherever they occur in the provinces. Empowered by the mass mobilisation of its support base, the government would simultaneously amend the constitution and in doing so end the cases on corruption and party dissolution. This outcome would assume significant military support to offset anti-Thaksin forces in the military.
To get that outcome would require a judicial revolution of its own. It would mean invalidating the work of the Assets Examination Committee (which was the body that forwarded some of the corruption cases to the courts) by claiming that it had no legitimate legal status because it was established by the coup group. But for sixty years, laws that have been issued by military juntas have been judged legally binding by the Supreme Court. Such decrees and laws remain in force today. The status of ‘coup law’ was recently re-affirmed by the Constitution Court in regard to the AEC. However, in the face of mass mobilisation - and one assumes some degree of military backing to the government - the courts might revisit the question.
Alternatively, pressure may be applied to have the various cases withdrawn, thus avoiding a legal challenge that might unravel the entire system. For that to occur some deal might be done that brings about a political truce. Not many people can imagine a truce right now.
Another possibility is a coup d’etat against the government. It is hard to imagine such a coup d’etat merely restoring the situation preceding the elections in 2007. This is where PAD’s ideas of recasting politics into a “functional democracy” of occupational representation comes to the fore. By appointing most representatives to parliament in the post-coup environment, and making this permanent in accordance with PAD's New Politics , pro-Thaksin forces would be marginalised. Such a system could only emerge with immense acts of repression and endure with the same.
There is a less destabilising possibility.
The PPP government could muddle through in its own way, surviving or stumbling according to parliamentary convention. An agreement could be reached on a constitutional amendment that abolishes Article 237 (see below) dealing with party dissolution, and which currently looms over the Coalition government. In return, the cases relating to corruption would proceed. All parties would pledge to non-interference in the courts and support a fair trial.
Undoubtedly, something else will happen.
******************************************************************
Article on Party Dissolution in 2007 Constitution
"Section 237. Any candidate in an election, who has committed, created or supported any person to commit any act in violation of the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators or orders and announcements of the Election Commission, causing the election not to be proceeded in an honest and fair manner, shall be deprived of his or her voting rights in accordance with the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators.
If any such act of person under paragraph one appears to have convincing evidence that the leader or an executive member of his or her political party has acknowledged or ignored that action or has known of the act but failed to prevent or rectify it in order to ensure an honest and fair election, that political party is assumed to have sought to gain power in state administration by means other than what is provided in Section 68 of the Constitution, and in case the Constitutional Court consequently orders its dissolution, the voting rights of its leader and executive board members shall be revoked for a period of 5 years as from the date of issuance of the party dissolution order."
Taken from an unofficial translation of the constitution.
Some people have given up trying to understand current events in Thailand. They figure, I suppose, that they will pick up the thread once it’s all sorted.
That thread has several possible endings.
It might be a Democrat Party led coalition government in power, aided by military machinations of some form. Thaksin Shinawatra would be in exile (if he can get away), with ex-prime minister Samak sunk by allegations of corruption relating to the time he served as Bangkok Mayor. This possibility emerges on the assumption that the various court cases against Thaksin and the government proceed, and the coalition government splinters in the face of indictments and the dissolution of pro-Thaksin political influence.
Another possibility would be a resurgent People’s Power Party (PPP) government (sans Samak?). This outcome would require more of the counter demonstrations that are breaking out across the country against the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). This is the so-called “Udon model”, which entails breaking up PAD rallies wherever they occur in the provinces. Empowered by the mass mobilisation of its support base, the government would simultaneously amend the constitution and in doing so end the cases on corruption and party dissolution. This outcome would assume significant military support to offset anti-Thaksin forces in the military.
To get that outcome would require a judicial revolution of its own. It would mean invalidating the work of the Assets Examination Committee (which was the body that forwarded some of the corruption cases to the courts) by claiming that it had no legitimate legal status because it was established by the coup group. But for sixty years, laws that have been issued by military juntas have been judged legally binding by the Supreme Court. Such decrees and laws remain in force today. The status of ‘coup law’ was recently re-affirmed by the Constitution Court in regard to the AEC. However, in the face of mass mobilisation - and one assumes some degree of military backing to the government - the courts might revisit the question.
Alternatively, pressure may be applied to have the various cases withdrawn, thus avoiding a legal challenge that might unravel the entire system. For that to occur some deal might be done that brings about a political truce. Not many people can imagine a truce right now.
Another possibility is a coup d’etat against the government. It is hard to imagine such a coup d’etat merely restoring the situation preceding the elections in 2007. This is where PAD’s ideas of recasting politics into a “functional democracy” of occupational representation comes to the fore. By appointing most representatives to parliament in the post-coup environment, and making this permanent in accordance with PAD's New Politics , pro-Thaksin forces would be marginalised. Such a system could only emerge with immense acts of repression and endure with the same.
There is a less destabilising possibility.
The PPP government could muddle through in its own way, surviving or stumbling according to parliamentary convention. An agreement could be reached on a constitutional amendment that abolishes Article 237 (see below) dealing with party dissolution, and which currently looms over the Coalition government. In return, the cases relating to corruption would proceed. All parties would pledge to non-interference in the courts and support a fair trial.
Undoubtedly, something else will happen.
******************************************************************
Article on Party Dissolution in 2007 Constitution
"Section 237. Any candidate in an election, who has committed, created or supported any person to commit any act in violation of the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators or orders and announcements of the Election Commission, causing the election not to be proceeded in an honest and fair manner, shall be deprived of his or her voting rights in accordance with the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators.
If any such act of person under paragraph one appears to have convincing evidence that the leader or an executive member of his or her political party has acknowledged or ignored that action or has known of the act but failed to prevent or rectify it in order to ensure an honest and fair election, that political party is assumed to have sought to gain power in state administration by means other than what is provided in Section 68 of the Constitution, and in case the Constitutional Court consequently orders its dissolution, the voting rights of its leader and executive board members shall be revoked for a period of 5 years as from the date of issuance of the party dissolution order."
Taken from an unofficial translation of the constitution.
July 9, 2008
The Law is an Ass-et. Coups, Law and Corruption Cases
The Asset Examination Committee/Asset Scrutiny Committee
คณะกรรมการตรวจสอบการกระทำที่ก็ให้เกิดความเสียหายต่อภาครัฐ
In late June 2008 the Asset Examination Committee/Asset Scurtiny Committee (depending on the translation) wound up its activities. Vilified and loved in the same measure, the AEC was commissioned in the aftermath of the 2006 September coup against the caretaker Thaksin government to investigate losses to the state during the Thaksin administration. Some of its members were well known anti-Thaksin figures and their impartiality was quite reasonably questioned. However, the AEC had no authority to determine guilt, but merely to investigate. Its evidence had to be forwarded to the appropriate authorities and courts.
Recently, the Constitutional Court ruled the Committee was a lawful organization, after lawyers argued its coup-origins made it an illegitimate body. This was always going to be a long shot: Thai law proceeds on the premise, and has done for nearly 60 years, that coups are legal once the resulting government has, de facto, established its right to rule. This then enshrines all coup decrees as legal. Of course, the new constitution also verifies that "fact" - hence the layered, complex mess that is Thai law.
It is worth noting that the cases that are now before the courts, including the Rachadapisek land purchase) are merely the tip of the iceberg. Below, for the purposes of information, I summarise the cases that the AEC have determined should be pursued. Only a few are now in process. The ASC claims that the 21 cases it examined involve a loss to state revenue of 1.8 saen laan baht The information comes from Vote Magazine, July 2008 issue.
Summary
The cases acted on by the Asset Examination Committee are classified into four types:
1. Those currently in progress in the courts
1.1 Tax avoidance in transferring Shinawat Computer Inc. Communications involving Khun Ying Pojaman Shinawat –Bannaphot Damaphong Case number : 1149/2550 commenced 26 March 2007
1.2 The sale of land in the Rachadapisek district by the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) to KY. Pojaman Shinawat. Both Thaksin and Pojaman are defendants
1.3 The case regarding the 2/3 number lottery project by the The Government Lottery Office. 32 political office holders and 16 officials.
2 Those cases which have been sent to the office of the auditor general but which were not decided by the Attorney General before the ASC ended its tenure:
2.1 Projects regarding electrical cable laying at Suwannaphum airport involving former Minister of Transport Suriya Jungrungreangkit and a top official in the Ministry of Transport
2.2. Case involving baggage systems and CTX 9000 scanners at S.Airport involving 26 politicians, civil servants, officials of state enterprises, juristic persons, and entrepreneurs. Loss to the state estimated at 6, 937 million baht.
2.3 Case involving “loan irregularities loan irregularities extended to the Krisda Mahanakorn Group” by the Krung Thai group. The case involves Thaksin, his son Panthongtae and 31 (former) board members of Krung Thai Bank.
2.4 Five cases that allege the former prime minister Thaksin used his position to benefit his own businesses, causing loss to state assets.
2.4.1 Case on the order to convert mobile phone operator concessions to an excise tax, leading to a loss of the Telephone organization of Thailand of 30, 667 million baht.
2.4.2 Case regarding reducing revenue share paid to TST ทศท from prepaid mobile services from 25 to 20% leading to a state loss of 70, 872 million baht.
2.4.3 Case relating to AIS and its reduction of payments by treating networks separately for payment purposes to TOT. Loss of 18970579711 baht during the term of the concession. This gain enabled rise in Shin Corp before its sale.
2.4.4 Various breaks given by the Board of Investment for IPSTAR satellite projects within Thailand.
2.4.5 Case regarding Treasury officials in tax negotiations regarding the sale of Shin Corp.
3. Those cases under consideration by the AEC but not forwarded to the OAG before 30th June.
3.1 Case regarding Sky Train Airport link with losses to the state of 1, 200 million baht.
3.2 Three Cases regarding Ua Athon housing project that involves builders, officials (3.2.1/3.2.2/3.2.3 )
3.3 A case involving the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and its dealings with private companies worth 300 million baht.
3.4 The case involving the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s purchase of fire trucks involving a loss to the state of 1, 900 million baht.
3.5 The cause of unusual wealth in Thaksin’s purchase of Manchester City
4. Those cases which have been returned after the Attorney General determined not to proceed.
4.1 The Export-Import Bank and the loan to Burma (which involved purchase of Shin Corp products). Claimed loss of state amounting to 670,436,201 baht (EXIM) 140,349,000 (Treasury). Gains to Shin Corp 593,492,815 baht.
4.2 Case involving Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and rubber plantations project. Loss to the state of 1, 400 million baht Case involves 44 people including Newin Chidchop, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Various accused are being asked to pay compensation of 1,109 million baht.
5. Those cases sent to the Tax office to recoup tax.
5.1 Pojaman Shinawat and Banaphot Damaphong transferred shares with no tax. Tax outstanding approximately 546 million baht.
5.2 Thaksin’s children Phongthongtae and Thongtha Shinawat bought shares in Shin Corp from Ample Rich Invesment (164.6 million each) at a cost of 1 baht before they sold it to Temasak at 49.25 baht, which is subject to tax. In August 2550 requested Tax Department to seek payment of 11, 809, 294, 773 baht in tax.
5. 3. Ample Rich tax issue, as it was active in Thailand for four years, but never paid tax.
คณะกรรมการตรวจสอบการกระทำที่ก็ให้เกิดความเสียหายต่อภาครัฐ
In late June 2008 the Asset Examination Committee/Asset Scurtiny Committee (depending on the translation) wound up its activities. Vilified and loved in the same measure, the AEC was commissioned in the aftermath of the 2006 September coup against the caretaker Thaksin government to investigate losses to the state during the Thaksin administration. Some of its members were well known anti-Thaksin figures and their impartiality was quite reasonably questioned. However, the AEC had no authority to determine guilt, but merely to investigate. Its evidence had to be forwarded to the appropriate authorities and courts.
Recently, the Constitutional Court ruled the Committee was a lawful organization, after lawyers argued its coup-origins made it an illegitimate body. This was always going to be a long shot: Thai law proceeds on the premise, and has done for nearly 60 years, that coups are legal once the resulting government has, de facto, established its right to rule. This then enshrines all coup decrees as legal. Of course, the new constitution also verifies that "fact" - hence the layered, complex mess that is Thai law.
It is worth noting that the cases that are now before the courts, including the Rachadapisek land purchase) are merely the tip of the iceberg. Below, for the purposes of information, I summarise the cases that the AEC have determined should be pursued. Only a few are now in process. The ASC claims that the 21 cases it examined involve a loss to state revenue of 1.8 saen laan baht The information comes from Vote Magazine, July 2008 issue.
Summary
The cases acted on by the Asset Examination Committee are classified into four types:
1. Those currently in progress in the courts
1.1 Tax avoidance in transferring Shinawat Computer Inc. Communications involving Khun Ying Pojaman Shinawat –Bannaphot Damaphong Case number : 1149/2550 commenced 26 March 2007
1.2 The sale of land in the Rachadapisek district by the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) to KY. Pojaman Shinawat. Both Thaksin and Pojaman are defendants
1.3 The case regarding the 2/3 number lottery project by the The Government Lottery Office. 32 political office holders and 16 officials.
2 Those cases which have been sent to the office of the auditor general but which were not decided by the Attorney General before the ASC ended its tenure:
2.1 Projects regarding electrical cable laying at Suwannaphum airport involving former Minister of Transport Suriya Jungrungreangkit and a top official in the Ministry of Transport
2.2. Case involving baggage systems and CTX 9000 scanners at S.Airport involving 26 politicians, civil servants, officials of state enterprises, juristic persons, and entrepreneurs. Loss to the state estimated at 6, 937 million baht.
2.3 Case involving “loan irregularities loan irregularities extended to the Krisda Mahanakorn Group” by the Krung Thai group. The case involves Thaksin, his son Panthongtae and 31 (former) board members of Krung Thai Bank.
2.4 Five cases that allege the former prime minister Thaksin used his position to benefit his own businesses, causing loss to state assets.
2.4.1 Case on the order to convert mobile phone operator concessions to an excise tax, leading to a loss of the Telephone organization of Thailand of 30, 667 million baht.
2.4.2 Case regarding reducing revenue share paid to TST ทศท from prepaid mobile services from 25 to 20% leading to a state loss of 70, 872 million baht.
2.4.3 Case relating to AIS and its reduction of payments by treating networks separately for payment purposes to TOT. Loss of 18970579711 baht during the term of the concession. This gain enabled rise in Shin Corp before its sale.
2.4.4 Various breaks given by the Board of Investment for IPSTAR satellite projects within Thailand.
2.4.5 Case regarding Treasury officials in tax negotiations regarding the sale of Shin Corp.
3. Those cases under consideration by the AEC but not forwarded to the OAG before 30th June.
3.1 Case regarding Sky Train Airport link with losses to the state of 1, 200 million baht.
3.2 Three Cases regarding Ua Athon housing project that involves builders, officials (3.2.1/3.2.2/3.2.3 )
3.3 A case involving the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and its dealings with private companies worth 300 million baht.
3.4 The case involving the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s purchase of fire trucks involving a loss to the state of 1, 900 million baht.
3.5 The cause of unusual wealth in Thaksin’s purchase of Manchester City
4. Those cases which have been returned after the Attorney General determined not to proceed.
4.1 The Export-Import Bank and the loan to Burma (which involved purchase of Shin Corp products). Claimed loss of state amounting to 670,436,201 baht (EXIM) 140,349,000 (Treasury). Gains to Shin Corp 593,492,815 baht.
4.2 Case involving Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and rubber plantations project. Loss to the state of 1, 400 million baht Case involves 44 people including Newin Chidchop, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Various accused are being asked to pay compensation of 1,109 million baht.
5. Those cases sent to the Tax office to recoup tax.
5.1 Pojaman Shinawat and Banaphot Damaphong transferred shares with no tax. Tax outstanding approximately 546 million baht.
5.2 Thaksin’s children Phongthongtae and Thongtha Shinawat bought shares in Shin Corp from Ample Rich Invesment (164.6 million each) at a cost of 1 baht before they sold it to Temasak at 49.25 baht, which is subject to tax. In August 2550 requested Tax Department to seek payment of 11, 809, 294, 773 baht in tax.
5. 3. Ample Rich tax issue, as it was active in Thailand for four years, but never paid tax.
June 11, 2008
Thailand: Away from the brink
Comment:
As talk of violence, another coup d'etat, and mass confrontation continues to haunt the Thai political landscape, the maligned "no to the coup, no to Thaksin" position continues to gain credibility in Thailand, offering ways of rethinking the crisis and ways out of the current conjuncture of polarised adversaries. It is alarming that some Nation columnists are more or less accepting that violence will now be the only way of out the crisis.
Away from the headlines, and the casual bile of much commentary on webboards on Thai politics, the internal debates are much more complex and nuanced than some commentators would allow. The full discussion on the Prachatai website involves criticism of the use of lese majeste, and a recognition that all sections of the upper echelons of Thai society are largely free from scrutiny. The debate is now moving in the direction of a fuller reappraisal of Thai society. If authoritarian populism or elite liberalism are to be transcended, the the question requiring urgent attention, and which is now being posed by popular sentiment, is "where are the masses in the political equation?".
Below, part of the transcript of a seminar held several days ago in Chiang Mai is reproduced from the excellent website prachatai.com
**********************************************************
Seminar at Chiang Mai (Part 1): The blind men and the elephant; different thinking makes you an enemy’
Prachatai
11 June 2008
News
On 4 June 2008, the Democracy for a Welfare State Group, Midnight University, and various Chiang Mai-based civil society organizations jointly organized a seminar on the Thai political crisis, coup d’état, and solutions at the 4th floor Meeting Room, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University.
The speakers were Associate Professor Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak (Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University), Mr. Chamnan Chanruang (Midnight University Academic), Mr. Somsak Yo-inchai (Northern Farmers Coalition), Mr. Suchart Trakulhutip (Friends of Women Foundation), Assistant Professor Somchai Preechasilpakul (Dean of the Faculty of Law, Chiang Mai University), and Associate Professor Somkiat Tangnamo (Rector of Midnight University). The seminar was moderated by Mr. Suepsakul Kijjanukorn (Masters Degree Student, Department of Social Development, Chiang Mai University).
This is the transcript of the seminar:
1.
Atajak Satayanurak
Faculty of History, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai
“Creating a new environment and situation or constitutional amendment through the broad participation of the people should be the best solution. The conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups. Different groups will then understand each other more.”
The proposal of the Midnight University, which I regard as the most neutral one, is to create a new environment and situation by amending the constitution. Broad popular participation must take place. This should be the best solution as the conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement to each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups.
The current political situation is not just a conflict among the ruling class, although we see it as a conflict between the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and its leaders and Thaksin and his nominees.
In reality, the conflict is rooted deep in the society. The National Social and Economic Development plans throughout the past 40 years have created an army of the poor. The poor in the past did not feel that they were poor, but now they do think that they are.
Being poor is not as important as knowing that you are poor. The recognition of class politics has moved from ‘class by itself’ to ‘class for itself’. It is through this process that the question arises as to what the conflict between the classes will lead to.
I think that both sides will not back down because it is a political struggle for their respective classes. The poor people might think of Thaksin, but it does not mean that Thaksin is the leader. However, it is Thaksin who gives them hope and shows them a new perspective on the world.
Under these circumstances, the conflict between the two sides will lead to a higher level of pressure as neither side will back down. I believe that the anti-PAD movement in the provinces is multiplying. Although many claim that this is done in an organized way, but without a reason it cannot emerge here and there. An anti-PAD network was created in Chiang Mai yesterday, and I foresee more in other parts of the country.
Similarly, PAD is also organizing groups in support of them. These activities are present in Chiang Mai and also in Southern Thailand. It is more difficult to come up with a solution under these circumstances.
The proposal of the Midnight University, which I regard as the most neutral one, is to create a new environment and situation by amending the constitution. Broad popular participation must take place. This should be the best solution as the conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement to each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups. Different groups will then understand each other more. This proposal has been put forward by 137 academics.
I think that this would be a good solution under the current situation. Different classes will see each other more clearly and understand one another better. I hope that in this way, emotions and anger will decrease.
The political paradigm that we are facing now is an outcome of development policies where the poor have been suppressed. A coup d’état cannot be the answer and it should not be necessary to explain why a coup d’état is not good. But definitely a coup d’état can never solve this problem.
Translated by Pokpong Lawansiri
Read More
As talk of violence, another coup d'etat, and mass confrontation continues to haunt the Thai political landscape, the maligned "no to the coup, no to Thaksin" position continues to gain credibility in Thailand, offering ways of rethinking the crisis and ways out of the current conjuncture of polarised adversaries. It is alarming that some Nation columnists are more or less accepting that violence will now be the only way of out the crisis.
Away from the headlines, and the casual bile of much commentary on webboards on Thai politics, the internal debates are much more complex and nuanced than some commentators would allow. The full discussion on the Prachatai website involves criticism of the use of lese majeste, and a recognition that all sections of the upper echelons of Thai society are largely free from scrutiny. The debate is now moving in the direction of a fuller reappraisal of Thai society. If authoritarian populism or elite liberalism are to be transcended, the the question requiring urgent attention, and which is now being posed by popular sentiment, is "where are the masses in the political equation?".
Below, part of the transcript of a seminar held several days ago in Chiang Mai is reproduced from the excellent website prachatai.com
**********************************************************
Seminar at Chiang Mai (Part 1): The blind men and the elephant; different thinking makes you an enemy’
Prachatai
11 June 2008
News
On 4 June 2008, the Democracy for a Welfare State Group, Midnight University, and various Chiang Mai-based civil society organizations jointly organized a seminar on the Thai political crisis, coup d’état, and solutions at the 4th floor Meeting Room, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University.
The speakers were Associate Professor Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak (Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University), Mr. Chamnan Chanruang (Midnight University Academic), Mr. Somsak Yo-inchai (Northern Farmers Coalition), Mr. Suchart Trakulhutip (Friends of Women Foundation), Assistant Professor Somchai Preechasilpakul (Dean of the Faculty of Law, Chiang Mai University), and Associate Professor Somkiat Tangnamo (Rector of Midnight University). The seminar was moderated by Mr. Suepsakul Kijjanukorn (Masters Degree Student, Department of Social Development, Chiang Mai University).
This is the transcript of the seminar:
1.
Atajak Satayanurak
Faculty of History, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai
“Creating a new environment and situation or constitutional amendment through the broad participation of the people should be the best solution. The conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups. Different groups will then understand each other more.”
The proposal of the Midnight University, which I regard as the most neutral one, is to create a new environment and situation by amending the constitution. Broad popular participation must take place. This should be the best solution as the conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement to each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups.
The current political situation is not just a conflict among the ruling class, although we see it as a conflict between the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and its leaders and Thaksin and his nominees.
In reality, the conflict is rooted deep in the society. The National Social and Economic Development plans throughout the past 40 years have created an army of the poor. The poor in the past did not feel that they were poor, but now they do think that they are.
Being poor is not as important as knowing that you are poor. The recognition of class politics has moved from ‘class by itself’ to ‘class for itself’. It is through this process that the question arises as to what the conflict between the classes will lead to.
I think that both sides will not back down because it is a political struggle for their respective classes. The poor people might think of Thaksin, but it does not mean that Thaksin is the leader. However, it is Thaksin who gives them hope and shows them a new perspective on the world.
Under these circumstances, the conflict between the two sides will lead to a higher level of pressure as neither side will back down. I believe that the anti-PAD movement in the provinces is multiplying. Although many claim that this is done in an organized way, but without a reason it cannot emerge here and there. An anti-PAD network was created in Chiang Mai yesterday, and I foresee more in other parts of the country.
Similarly, PAD is also organizing groups in support of them. These activities are present in Chiang Mai and also in Southern Thailand. It is more difficult to come up with a solution under these circumstances.
The proposal of the Midnight University, which I regard as the most neutral one, is to create a new environment and situation by amending the constitution. Broad popular participation must take place. This should be the best solution as the conflicting groups could see the positions which could complement to each other in this political society. Broad participation means that each group can put forward their political demands and understand the needs of other groups. Different groups will then understand each other more. This proposal has been put forward by 137 academics.
I think that this would be a good solution under the current situation. Different classes will see each other more clearly and understand one another better. I hope that in this way, emotions and anger will decrease.
The political paradigm that we are facing now is an outcome of development policies where the poor have been suppressed. A coup d’état cannot be the answer and it should not be necessary to explain why a coup d’état is not good. But definitely a coup d’état can never solve this problem.
Translated by Pokpong Lawansiri
Read More
June 4, 2008
Thailand: The Resilience of the Third Force
Comment
In recent weeks as the politics of the People's Power Party have become clearer (ensure no revisiting of the accountability agenda of 2004-2006) and as the impasse politics of the People's Alliance for Democracy have intensified, the "no-to the two-camps" position of 2006 is emerging as a tangible third force in the Thai political equation. The position that democracy means more than submission to crown and khaki or capital, which is what was on offer, remains resilient and relevant to those seeking a way that lies beyond elite liberalism or authoritarian populism.
Below, find reproduced two indications of this emergence. A viable politics that has at its centre genuine democratic deliberation in free conditions is emerging. It looks vibrant when set againt the compromised positions of the pro-coup or pro-Thaksin positions.
FROM Prachatai English Site.
Academic advisor for the poor talks about the PAD
Thai Post
04 June 2008
News
Prapart Pintobtang, lecturer at Chulalongkorn’s Political Science Faculty and advisor to the Assembly of the Poor, speaks frankly about the latest moves by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Years of having supported the causes of the poor have made him no stranger at all to some PAD leading members who are from the so-called ‘people’s sector’. Yet, finally, he touches on issues which in the past couple of years have become acrimonious among NGOs and people’s movements, and on which many ‘people’s sector’ insiders have chosen to have reservations.
Prapart was among 137 academics who recently proposed the drafting of a whole new constitution as an alternative to the polarized politics. As one among people with ‘2 No’s’—No Thaksin and No Coup—he earlier signed a petition against the Samak government’s unfair transfers of civil servants, while he was also among 130 academics who condemned the Manager Group for instigating human rights violations. (See 130 activists and academics condemn Manager media group)
Now he talks about the PAD rally in such a way that the PAD will probably see him as yet another enemy, because he does not want to see another coup.
Backward and fanatically nationalistic
He went to see the PAD rally on May 25.
‘I felt what I saw was a war of hatred. The theme was the monarchy, or the trinity of Nation, Religion, and Monarchy, with all the rest being linked to this theme. Under this theme, anybody who doesn’t identify with the PAD is pushed to the other side among those who are destroying this ideology and are trying to build what the PAD calls a republic.’
Read More
From the Bangkok Post
Change, yes. Now, no.
June 4, 2008
By Nidhi Eoseewong
For Thai society, there is no worse moment to amend the constitution than now. Even though a consensus has been more or less reached about whether we should change the charter, some blood was shed on the streets. If we actually get down to rewriting the text, we could be butchering one another
...
At this juncture, I see no plausible way to end this conflict other than to allow the whole society to take part in drafting the new charter themselves. We will have to resort to having a public hearing on each important aspect of the constitution, for example how the electorate should be divided? One-person-one-vote? Small constituencies or large ones?
I hope that the process of arguing and discussing these important issues regarding the constitution would divert society to a more reasonable conflict than the trading of accusations that we are facing at present. We can have legal hands do the actual rewriting of the charter, but the concept must come from the results of public hearings.
Read full article
In recent weeks as the politics of the People's Power Party have become clearer (ensure no revisiting of the accountability agenda of 2004-2006) and as the impasse politics of the People's Alliance for Democracy have intensified, the "no-to the two-camps" position of 2006 is emerging as a tangible third force in the Thai political equation. The position that democracy means more than submission to crown and khaki or capital, which is what was on offer, remains resilient and relevant to those seeking a way that lies beyond elite liberalism or authoritarian populism.
Below, find reproduced two indications of this emergence. A viable politics that has at its centre genuine democratic deliberation in free conditions is emerging. It looks vibrant when set againt the compromised positions of the pro-coup or pro-Thaksin positions.
FROM Prachatai English Site.
Academic advisor for the poor talks about the PAD
Thai Post
04 June 2008
News
Prapart Pintobtang, lecturer at Chulalongkorn’s Political Science Faculty and advisor to the Assembly of the Poor, speaks frankly about the latest moves by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Years of having supported the causes of the poor have made him no stranger at all to some PAD leading members who are from the so-called ‘people’s sector’. Yet, finally, he touches on issues which in the past couple of years have become acrimonious among NGOs and people’s movements, and on which many ‘people’s sector’ insiders have chosen to have reservations.
Prapart was among 137 academics who recently proposed the drafting of a whole new constitution as an alternative to the polarized politics. As one among people with ‘2 No’s’—No Thaksin and No Coup—he earlier signed a petition against the Samak government’s unfair transfers of civil servants, while he was also among 130 academics who condemned the Manager Group for instigating human rights violations. (See 130 activists and academics condemn Manager media group)
Now he talks about the PAD rally in such a way that the PAD will probably see him as yet another enemy, because he does not want to see another coup.
Backward and fanatically nationalistic
He went to see the PAD rally on May 25.
‘I felt what I saw was a war of hatred. The theme was the monarchy, or the trinity of Nation, Religion, and Monarchy, with all the rest being linked to this theme. Under this theme, anybody who doesn’t identify with the PAD is pushed to the other side among those who are destroying this ideology and are trying to build what the PAD calls a republic.’
Read More
From the Bangkok Post
Change, yes. Now, no.
June 4, 2008
By Nidhi Eoseewong
For Thai society, there is no worse moment to amend the constitution than now. Even though a consensus has been more or less reached about whether we should change the charter, some blood was shed on the streets. If we actually get down to rewriting the text, we could be butchering one another
...
At this juncture, I see no plausible way to end this conflict other than to allow the whole society to take part in drafting the new charter themselves. We will have to resort to having a public hearing on each important aspect of the constitution, for example how the electorate should be divided? One-person-one-vote? Small constituencies or large ones?
I hope that the process of arguing and discussing these important issues regarding the constitution would divert society to a more reasonable conflict than the trading of accusations that we are facing at present. We can have legal hands do the actual rewriting of the charter, but the concept must come from the results of public hearings.
Read full article
January 11, 2008
Thailand: Coup by Stealth or Something Else?
A pre-edit copy of piece that appears in Asia Sentinel (11 January, 2008).
Coup by stealth or something else
Michael Connors
Last week the international media was awash with stories of a ‘Thai stealth coup’. They portrayed the Council for National Security, the military grouping that deposed the care-taker government of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006, as thwarting the formation of a government by the People’s Power Party (PPP) which won a plurality in the December 23 elections.
In news coverage and commentary, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was presented as a stooge of the Council of National Security (CNS). The Thaksin PR machine could not have hoped for more.
Various commentators, and the PPP itself, have claimed that the investigation of 83 cases of potential electoral irregularity, 65 by the PPP, is nothing more than an attempt to disenfranchise the Thai electorate by disqualifying PPP winners, thereby allowing an anti Thaksin Democrat Party-led coalition to be formed. They also point to the various cases that are currently working their way through the courts that may see PPP dissolved, just as its predecessor Thai Rak Thai (TRT) was in 2007. All of this, they claim, is in line with a ‘secret’ CNS four-step plan to eliminate Thaksin
The capitalist and political forces in PPP that showed little regard for the rule of law during the Thaksin period (2001-2006), now find themselves at the end of a very unpleasant stick; it is understandable that they should seek the very real protections offered by the rule of law.
Is the ECT a stooge?
The ECT is most likely being pressured to act in the interests of the coup group and its allies. It is also likely that it is being pushed to act in the interests of PPP. ECT Commissioner Sodsri Sattayatham said as much on Thai national television on 6 January, when she spoke of “being caught between two poles of power”. The ECT also has officials, as do most Thai state agencies, who will be trying to discharge their duties without fear or favour.
People with a short memory assume the current ECT commissioners were chosen by the CNS. The current commissioners were actually appointed to the ECT while Thaksin was acting as care-taker prime minister. In early September 2006, pro-Thaksin members of the care-taker Senate voted as a bloc to select the five commissioners from ten forwarded by the judiciary. The bloc-vote ensured that anti-Thaksin nominations for the ECT were eliminated.
For reasons that remain unclear, a day after the 19 September 2006 Coup d’etat the military endorsed the Senate selection of the ECT commissioners. One might surmise, rather generously, that the coup group acted thus because the ten nominees forwarded to the Senate by the judiciary were chosen in the shadow of the king’s appeal to judicial integrity, and thus they could be expected to act with caution and impartiality. Of course, in the conditions of post-coup Thailand such integrity is entirely contingent on a range of threats, beliefs, and professionalism.
Now, given this history, and the fact that the ECT is a conflicted organization in which there remain many Thaksin supporters, one might ask whether it is accurate to claim that it is an instrument of a ‘stealth coup’.
It may be preferable to see the situation in different terms. The coup remains a work in progress inasmuch as those who launched it still wield power. Its objectives are transparent (elimination of Thaksin) and are hardly advanced in a secretive mode. Consider for example that Samak Sundaravej, leader of the PPP, sought to pre-empt CNS machinations by declaring himself ready for government on the last day of 2007, claiming 254 seats. Yet the CNS remains in place as does its appointed government, and Samak has gone to ground. Whatever one thinks of the PPP and its spurious claim to represent the democrat will of the people, its claims of a plot against it surely have some substance.
But why should it be otherwise? In a war, one force uses the instruments open to its influence. From this perspective, it is indeed surprising that not more has been done to eliminate the Thaksin threat. In these circumstances it is obvious that the Council for National Security (CNS) might seek to influence the ECT. However, whether the CNS succeeds is a matter for empirical investigation.
Democracy?
Although the struggle between strategically relevant opposing forces in Thailand is presented through the idiom of democracy, the opposing forces are actually an inter-sectoral mix of business, bureaucracy, police, military and royalists who care little for genuine democracy. As these inter-sectoral forces fight for state control they do so in a partial “state of exception” whereby, for the most part, force determines outcomes rather than law, persuasion or a democratic mandate. This is actually the same situation that held in the later Thaksin years, although the balance of forces has reversed.
The acute state of Thai politics at this present time has little to do with democracy. An elite struggle that goes back at least a decade is manifest: a new brand of capitalism that seeks to break from the quasi-feudalistic hold of monarchy is in motion, but it is a force that dares not declare its name. Enlightened Thaksin forces want a bourgeois revolution against the current way the monarchy and networks surrounding it work, but they dare not declare their mission. These forces – a mix of the old left, old right, capitalists and technocrats - mobilise forces under a banner of right wing populism, including Buddhist chauvinism, but they have yet to elaborate any genuinely ideological position to challenge the force that thwarts their emergence. They are also hostile to liberal forms of democracy.
So where is the ‘left’ in all of this? Some serve the stealth bourgeois revolution of the pro-Thaksin forces. They are beholden to a version of objective history that pits “progressive capitalism” against quasi-feudalistic monarchy and aristocracy. They have been unrelenting in their claim of Thaksin’s democratic mandate, willing to ignore that democracy means so much more than a mark on a ballot paper. Such belief in the march of objective history has led to many historical calamities and it is not hard to see Thaksin as one of them. The killings of Tak Bai and the War on Drugs surely count as modern equivalents of the descent into governmental barbarism.
Others on the left and a range of political liberals have sought to use the monarchy as a buffer against the political authoritarianism represented by Thaksin. In doing so they have found comfort in myths about the monarchy, tradition and elite democratization. They have supported the use of extra-constitutional power to overthrow the Thaksin regime. Beholden to a subjectivist view of history (good versus evil), such forces are willing to turn a blind eye to the palace’s history, and its privileged economic position. They seek the return of ‘royal liberalism’, in which the monarchy stands as the supreme ombudsman, supporting the emergence of constitutional rule.
At this moment in time it appears that the contending fractions of the Thai elite are about to enter the final round of a long struggle. It remains to be seen if they will step back from the brink and instead embrace compromise. One thing, however, is certain: as long as contending elites fail to agree to any rules of the game and instead wage open political warfare for complete victory, Thailand’s chance of returning to some form of liberal democracy are slim.
Coup by stealth or something else
Michael Connors
Last week the international media was awash with stories of a ‘Thai stealth coup’. They portrayed the Council for National Security, the military grouping that deposed the care-taker government of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006, as thwarting the formation of a government by the People’s Power Party (PPP) which won a plurality in the December 23 elections.
In news coverage and commentary, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was presented as a stooge of the Council of National Security (CNS). The Thaksin PR machine could not have hoped for more.
Various commentators, and the PPP itself, have claimed that the investigation of 83 cases of potential electoral irregularity, 65 by the PPP, is nothing more than an attempt to disenfranchise the Thai electorate by disqualifying PPP winners, thereby allowing an anti Thaksin Democrat Party-led coalition to be formed. They also point to the various cases that are currently working their way through the courts that may see PPP dissolved, just as its predecessor Thai Rak Thai (TRT) was in 2007. All of this, they claim, is in line with a ‘secret’ CNS four-step plan to eliminate Thaksin
The capitalist and political forces in PPP that showed little regard for the rule of law during the Thaksin period (2001-2006), now find themselves at the end of a very unpleasant stick; it is understandable that they should seek the very real protections offered by the rule of law.
Is the ECT a stooge?
The ECT is most likely being pressured to act in the interests of the coup group and its allies. It is also likely that it is being pushed to act in the interests of PPP. ECT Commissioner Sodsri Sattayatham said as much on Thai national television on 6 January, when she spoke of “being caught between two poles of power”. The ECT also has officials, as do most Thai state agencies, who will be trying to discharge their duties without fear or favour.
People with a short memory assume the current ECT commissioners were chosen by the CNS. The current commissioners were actually appointed to the ECT while Thaksin was acting as care-taker prime minister. In early September 2006, pro-Thaksin members of the care-taker Senate voted as a bloc to select the five commissioners from ten forwarded by the judiciary. The bloc-vote ensured that anti-Thaksin nominations for the ECT were eliminated.
For reasons that remain unclear, a day after the 19 September 2006 Coup d’etat the military endorsed the Senate selection of the ECT commissioners. One might surmise, rather generously, that the coup group acted thus because the ten nominees forwarded to the Senate by the judiciary were chosen in the shadow of the king’s appeal to judicial integrity, and thus they could be expected to act with caution and impartiality. Of course, in the conditions of post-coup Thailand such integrity is entirely contingent on a range of threats, beliefs, and professionalism.
Now, given this history, and the fact that the ECT is a conflicted organization in which there remain many Thaksin supporters, one might ask whether it is accurate to claim that it is an instrument of a ‘stealth coup’.
It may be preferable to see the situation in different terms. The coup remains a work in progress inasmuch as those who launched it still wield power. Its objectives are transparent (elimination of Thaksin) and are hardly advanced in a secretive mode. Consider for example that Samak Sundaravej, leader of the PPP, sought to pre-empt CNS machinations by declaring himself ready for government on the last day of 2007, claiming 254 seats. Yet the CNS remains in place as does its appointed government, and Samak has gone to ground. Whatever one thinks of the PPP and its spurious claim to represent the democrat will of the people, its claims of a plot against it surely have some substance.
But why should it be otherwise? In a war, one force uses the instruments open to its influence. From this perspective, it is indeed surprising that not more has been done to eliminate the Thaksin threat. In these circumstances it is obvious that the Council for National Security (CNS) might seek to influence the ECT. However, whether the CNS succeeds is a matter for empirical investigation.
Democracy?
Although the struggle between strategically relevant opposing forces in Thailand is presented through the idiom of democracy, the opposing forces are actually an inter-sectoral mix of business, bureaucracy, police, military and royalists who care little for genuine democracy. As these inter-sectoral forces fight for state control they do so in a partial “state of exception” whereby, for the most part, force determines outcomes rather than law, persuasion or a democratic mandate. This is actually the same situation that held in the later Thaksin years, although the balance of forces has reversed.
The acute state of Thai politics at this present time has little to do with democracy. An elite struggle that goes back at least a decade is manifest: a new brand of capitalism that seeks to break from the quasi-feudalistic hold of monarchy is in motion, but it is a force that dares not declare its name. Enlightened Thaksin forces want a bourgeois revolution against the current way the monarchy and networks surrounding it work, but they dare not declare their mission. These forces – a mix of the old left, old right, capitalists and technocrats - mobilise forces under a banner of right wing populism, including Buddhist chauvinism, but they have yet to elaborate any genuinely ideological position to challenge the force that thwarts their emergence. They are also hostile to liberal forms of democracy.
So where is the ‘left’ in all of this? Some serve the stealth bourgeois revolution of the pro-Thaksin forces. They are beholden to a version of objective history that pits “progressive capitalism” against quasi-feudalistic monarchy and aristocracy. They have been unrelenting in their claim of Thaksin’s democratic mandate, willing to ignore that democracy means so much more than a mark on a ballot paper. Such belief in the march of objective history has led to many historical calamities and it is not hard to see Thaksin as one of them. The killings of Tak Bai and the War on Drugs surely count as modern equivalents of the descent into governmental barbarism.
Others on the left and a range of political liberals have sought to use the monarchy as a buffer against the political authoritarianism represented by Thaksin. In doing so they have found comfort in myths about the monarchy, tradition and elite democratization. They have supported the use of extra-constitutional power to overthrow the Thaksin regime. Beholden to a subjectivist view of history (good versus evil), such forces are willing to turn a blind eye to the palace’s history, and its privileged economic position. They seek the return of ‘royal liberalism’, in which the monarchy stands as the supreme ombudsman, supporting the emergence of constitutional rule.
At this moment in time it appears that the contending fractions of the Thai elite are about to enter the final round of a long struggle. It remains to be seen if they will step back from the brink and instead embrace compromise. One thing, however, is certain: as long as contending elites fail to agree to any rules of the game and instead wage open political warfare for complete victory, Thailand’s chance of returning to some form of liberal democracy are slim.
September 24, 2007
Thailand: Standing in neither camp: the coup a year on
Standing in neither camp
Michael Connors
A year after the September 2006 coup d’etat debate still rages on whether the anti-Thaksin movement is in part responsible for inviting the military to stage a coup. A quite legitimate but difficult question is being asked of those who opposed Thaksin for his undemocratic, or at least illiberal politics, and for his abuse of power: why not level your charges elsewhere (?), meaning most obviously the palace and those surrounding it. This is a bold challenge.
For several years there has been a steady advance in critical writings on the palace, both in English and in Thai. The Thai material is especially brave, for it courts royal-nationalist hysteria and legal sanction. It doesn’t matter that in December 2005 the king said he can do wrong and that he welcomes criticism (interesting to see how that defence would work out in a court of law), lèse majesté law remains on the books. Moreover, the yellow-shirt mentality is merely a surface expression of something deeply rooted. This might partly explain the muted response to the challenge.
There may of course be other reasons, including a genuine belief that for all its faults the monarchical institution has indeed played the safety valve role attributed to it, being the ‘Supreme Ombudsman” as various people have described the monarchy. Some in Thailand are seeking, mistakenly in my opinion, to embed liberal forms of rule by deploying the monarchy in a manner that reads it as the original liberal institution. I have taken up this issue elsewhere, arguing that this represents an elite liberal reading of the monarchy and involves substantial mythicising.
The monarchy in Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with special powers; anyone who imagines that Walter Bagehot has said all there is to say about its functioning ("the right to be consulted, the right to advise, and the right to warn”) is missing the extraordinary conventional powers that have accrued to the institution, a product of both design and historical evolution. Neither the design nor the evolution would have occurred without a particular constellation of forces, including the demobilisation of radical forces in the 1970s, in which the monarchy played a key role, and the continuing elevation of the institution into the metaphoric soul of the nation.
To recognise and analyse the role of the monarchy in Thai politics is not to endorse that role. It is, however, to appreciate how the balance of forces in Thailand are constituted beyond normative appeals to ‘democracy.’ The monarchy and the military are enduring historical institutions in Thailand. Deeply rooted in various networks, ideologically and culturally embedded, and organizationally present. These are powerful institutions, as former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra learned. While some are now trying to script Thaksin as a bourgeois revolutionary he was always too poorly equipped and lacking in vision to play that role. Thaksin played an insider’s game and lost. Many supporters want to paint him as a democratic martyr; his actions suggest a terrible authoritarian in the making. Any legitimacy he may have had as a consequence of being selected prime minister by elected representatives was negated by his actions in that position.
Does Thaksin’s authoritarianism justify a more insidious authoritarianism in the form of the military coup? No. Other channels were available to restrain or fell Thaksin: further popular protest, the weakening of his parliamentary dominance, the use of legal measures. The military intervened, pre-empting these possibilities, to remind all that behind the flow of contested politics a ‘state of exception’ always lurks. The instrument of that state of exception, the military, bluntly and arrogantly inserted its own solution, showing up the fiction that lies behind people-sovereignty.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul has noted that some who would normally be identified as progressive activists or democrats feel indifferent to Thaksin’s fall and feel no outrage at the military’s actions. I was against the coup, but I can not claim to have felt especially angry. At that time my opinion was that Thaksin was worse than the military – a coup d’etat, the construction of national security complexes and human rights abuses are to be expected from a military steeped in the kind of history the Thai military has. The military was living its soul. And of course it continues to do so , pressing for national security laws and the continued imposition of martial law, thereby illustrating that some of its claimed reasons for the coup to have been excuses or self-delusional. Certainly, the military, at least sections of it, as the instrument of force for national unity was concerned about disunity and apparent slights on the monarchy; but its stated concerns for the health of Thailand’s democracy and the level of corruption have purchase only if we suspend good judgement. The military did in 2006, and does now, what the military can be expected to do.
Thaksin was worse because one might have expected better from the first prime minister elected under the reform constitution. As an elected politician Thaksin de-instutionalised the political system (protected by his hegemonically constructed majoritarianism), aggrandised wealth and power, engaged in intimidation of those against him, and recklessly and with fatal consequences abandoned the rule of law in the war on drugs, thus negating the social compromise effected in the 1997 constitution – however flawed that constitution was. To those who scoff the rule of law as a bourgeois abstraction, consider it from the perspective of those who never had a chance to plead “not guilty” during the wave of extra judicial killings in 2003.
What is implied, but never stated, by those who see a direct line of causality between the anti-Thaksin camp and the coup is that progressive forces should have endured the Thaksin era because it was a popularly elected regime. This is a retrospective argument, made in the light of the coup. So too is the argument that organizing opposition against Thaksin laid the basis for a conservative military backlash. This is a retro-subjectivist view of history, putting hindsight at the steering wheel. It is to say that history is made by will, intent and prudent choices. In part maybe, but not wholly.
The anti-Thaksin movement was a legitimate movement, and like all movements it attracted attention from forces with other agendas and interests who sought to manipulate it for other purposes. By the time that movement was demobilised as a consequence of its misconceived and politically opportunist dependence on Article 7 in April 2006, the game moved to the elite sphere. Social forces on the ground were not sufficiently organized to determine the political outcome. In that context the “no to the two camps” (สองไม่เอา) position makes sense. It opposes the coup and forces arrayed behind it and it equally opposes the deepening authoritarianism represented by Thaksin.
I happen to believe that wellbeing and social justice, democratic socialism, are secured by deepening both the democratic and liberal gains of historical struggle – something neither Thaksin, the monarchy nor the military have intended to do.
Michael Connors
A year after the September 2006 coup d’etat debate still rages on whether the anti-Thaksin movement is in part responsible for inviting the military to stage a coup. A quite legitimate but difficult question is being asked of those who opposed Thaksin for his undemocratic, or at least illiberal politics, and for his abuse of power: why not level your charges elsewhere (?), meaning most obviously the palace and those surrounding it. This is a bold challenge.
For several years there has been a steady advance in critical writings on the palace, both in English and in Thai. The Thai material is especially brave, for it courts royal-nationalist hysteria and legal sanction. It doesn’t matter that in December 2005 the king said he can do wrong and that he welcomes criticism (interesting to see how that defence would work out in a court of law), lèse majesté law remains on the books. Moreover, the yellow-shirt mentality is merely a surface expression of something deeply rooted. This might partly explain the muted response to the challenge.
There may of course be other reasons, including a genuine belief that for all its faults the monarchical institution has indeed played the safety valve role attributed to it, being the ‘Supreme Ombudsman” as various people have described the monarchy. Some in Thailand are seeking, mistakenly in my opinion, to embed liberal forms of rule by deploying the monarchy in a manner that reads it as the original liberal institution. I have taken up this issue elsewhere, arguing that this represents an elite liberal reading of the monarchy and involves substantial mythicising.
The monarchy in Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with special powers; anyone who imagines that Walter Bagehot has said all there is to say about its functioning ("the right to be consulted, the right to advise, and the right to warn”) is missing the extraordinary conventional powers that have accrued to the institution, a product of both design and historical evolution. Neither the design nor the evolution would have occurred without a particular constellation of forces, including the demobilisation of radical forces in the 1970s, in which the monarchy played a key role, and the continuing elevation of the institution into the metaphoric soul of the nation.
To recognise and analyse the role of the monarchy in Thai politics is not to endorse that role. It is, however, to appreciate how the balance of forces in Thailand are constituted beyond normative appeals to ‘democracy.’ The monarchy and the military are enduring historical institutions in Thailand. Deeply rooted in various networks, ideologically and culturally embedded, and organizationally present. These are powerful institutions, as former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra learned. While some are now trying to script Thaksin as a bourgeois revolutionary he was always too poorly equipped and lacking in vision to play that role. Thaksin played an insider’s game and lost. Many supporters want to paint him as a democratic martyr; his actions suggest a terrible authoritarian in the making. Any legitimacy he may have had as a consequence of being selected prime minister by elected representatives was negated by his actions in that position.
Does Thaksin’s authoritarianism justify a more insidious authoritarianism in the form of the military coup? No. Other channels were available to restrain or fell Thaksin: further popular protest, the weakening of his parliamentary dominance, the use of legal measures. The military intervened, pre-empting these possibilities, to remind all that behind the flow of contested politics a ‘state of exception’ always lurks. The instrument of that state of exception, the military, bluntly and arrogantly inserted its own solution, showing up the fiction that lies behind people-sovereignty.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul has noted that some who would normally be identified as progressive activists or democrats feel indifferent to Thaksin’s fall and feel no outrage at the military’s actions. I was against the coup, but I can not claim to have felt especially angry. At that time my opinion was that Thaksin was worse than the military – a coup d’etat, the construction of national security complexes and human rights abuses are to be expected from a military steeped in the kind of history the Thai military has. The military was living its soul. And of course it continues to do so , pressing for national security laws and the continued imposition of martial law, thereby illustrating that some of its claimed reasons for the coup to have been excuses or self-delusional. Certainly, the military, at least sections of it, as the instrument of force for national unity was concerned about disunity and apparent slights on the monarchy; but its stated concerns for the health of Thailand’s democracy and the level of corruption have purchase only if we suspend good judgement. The military did in 2006, and does now, what the military can be expected to do.
Thaksin was worse because one might have expected better from the first prime minister elected under the reform constitution. As an elected politician Thaksin de-instutionalised the political system (protected by his hegemonically constructed majoritarianism), aggrandised wealth and power, engaged in intimidation of those against him, and recklessly and with fatal consequences abandoned the rule of law in the war on drugs, thus negating the social compromise effected in the 1997 constitution – however flawed that constitution was. To those who scoff the rule of law as a bourgeois abstraction, consider it from the perspective of those who never had a chance to plead “not guilty” during the wave of extra judicial killings in 2003.
What is implied, but never stated, by those who see a direct line of causality between the anti-Thaksin camp and the coup is that progressive forces should have endured the Thaksin era because it was a popularly elected regime. This is a retrospective argument, made in the light of the coup. So too is the argument that organizing opposition against Thaksin laid the basis for a conservative military backlash. This is a retro-subjectivist view of history, putting hindsight at the steering wheel. It is to say that history is made by will, intent and prudent choices. In part maybe, but not wholly.
The anti-Thaksin movement was a legitimate movement, and like all movements it attracted attention from forces with other agendas and interests who sought to manipulate it for other purposes. By the time that movement was demobilised as a consequence of its misconceived and politically opportunist dependence on Article 7 in April 2006, the game moved to the elite sphere. Social forces on the ground were not sufficiently organized to determine the political outcome. In that context the “no to the two camps” (สองไม่เอา) position makes sense. It opposes the coup and forces arrayed behind it and it equally opposes the deepening authoritarianism represented by Thaksin.
I happen to believe that wellbeing and social justice, democratic socialism, are secured by deepening both the democratic and liberal gains of historical struggle – something neither Thaksin, the monarchy nor the military have intended to do.
September 9, 2007
Thailand: When the Dogs Howl
Dictatorship threatens to bury Thai democracy
Michael Connors
Canberra Times
May 4, 2007
IT'S NOT the kind of Thailand you will see in travel brochures advertising "Amazing Thailand", but even casual observers can sense the nation is on the edge of a political meltdown.
Last year, the world's longest serving monarch, 79-year-old King Bhumipol Adulyadej called it "the worst crisis in the world", referring to the political crisis that wracked Thailand. The then prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, was fighting for his political survival amid mass demonstrations, military machinations, charges of lese majeste, corruption, and abuses of human rights.
He lost.
In September Thaksin was overthrown in a coup and by year's end a military appointed government was in place.
A Constitutional Drafting Assembly was formed to draft Thailand's 18th constitution since 1932.
No one has great hopes the new constitution currently being drafted under the shadow of the military will solve the country's woes.
The fragility of constitutional rule in Thailand has as much to do with vested and conflicting interests between old and new wealth as it does with flawed constitutional design.
And this is why it is possible to speak of meltdown.
During Thaksin's five years in office the government was charged with policy corruption that benefited his private business interests at the expense of rivals. While prime minister, his family firm invested heavily in AirAsia to compete against the national carrier, Thai Airways. He won tax concessions on his media activities, and the Export-Import Bank of Thailand provided soft loans to the Burmese regime to contract Thaksin's satellite and telecommunications firms.
As Thaksin's cronyism intensified, different groupings of business interests began to mobilise against him. They rallied under the convenient, though not completely inaccurate, cry that Thaksin was challenging the power of the king.
The current military-backed Government is now moving against Thaksin's wealth, and thus his political power. Last week, Thaksin's children were ordered to return half a billion dollars to the tax office. As more cases of corruption come before the courts, pro-Thaksin forces in Thailand are mobilising protests against the Government while Thaksin, in exile, claims disinterest in politics.
Whether the crisis will end in compromise, or will be fought to the end, is unclear.
So what of the prospects of democracy in Thailand? The Government promises an election will be held at year's end under the newly-drafted constitution. But pro-democratic and some pro-Thaksin forces are calling for the constitution to be rejected.
A rejection could be interpreted as condemnation of the coup and support for Thaksin paving the way for his political comeback in some form. Others fear that should an election be held pro-Thaksin forces will win anyway.
That's why some people have given up on democracy all together, saying the rural masses in Thailand are not ready for it. Instead a mixed system that incorporates the people, the aristocracy, and the king should be devised until the masses are ready to act like democratic citizens.
Such criticism of the electoral process betrays aristocratic disdain for the masses; and it might suggest that one of South-East Asia's most liberal of democracies (from the 1980s-1990s) might be headed down the road of Singaporean guided-democracy.
The principal charge against the masses is that they sell their votes to opportunist and corrupt politicians for less than 1000 baht ($A40) and have no regard for public interest. They elect corrupt governments that plunder the public purse, so what's the point of democracy?
Thais have dubbed pre-election nights "the night the dogs howl" because vote-canvassers make late-night visits to those they have paid to ensure they vote appropriately. Their nocturnal meanderings stir sleeping dogs and whole villages wake up to the howling: an apt sound for an aching democracy.
The question of succession is another potential site of meltdown. There is no doubt that without the presence of the current king, who has immense moral power in Thailand, political order in the interests of the old elite will be hard to guarantee. And this is where the political divide on regime form among the Thai elites opens up as they decide on a form of right wing electoral populism as exercised by Thaksin or someone like him, or a guided-democracy under the tutelage of the old establishment. Between both, the promise of Thai liberalism appears to be diminished.
The third significant site of meltdown centres on the continuing insurgency in the Muslim-majority provinces in the south of Thailand. Thaksin's demise was supposed to bring an end to the daily killings by insurgents and para-military state apparatuses. It was believed his insensitive incompetence had fuelled the insurgency. Instead, the killings have intensified, and taken on a more sectarian nature between Buddhist and Muslim.
The current Government appears no more competent than Thaksin's in dealing with the crisis. The three thousand lives lost in the last three years of the insurgency may be small compared with what may soon come.
Looking at the bleak prospect of Thai politics in the coming year it is hard not to conclude that it is more than just the dogs who will be howling.
Michael Connors
Canberra Times
May 4, 2007
IT'S NOT the kind of Thailand you will see in travel brochures advertising "Amazing Thailand", but even casual observers can sense the nation is on the edge of a political meltdown.
Last year, the world's longest serving monarch, 79-year-old King Bhumipol Adulyadej called it "the worst crisis in the world", referring to the political crisis that wracked Thailand. The then prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, was fighting for his political survival amid mass demonstrations, military machinations, charges of lese majeste, corruption, and abuses of human rights.
He lost.
In September Thaksin was overthrown in a coup and by year's end a military appointed government was in place.
A Constitutional Drafting Assembly was formed to draft Thailand's 18th constitution since 1932.
No one has great hopes the new constitution currently being drafted under the shadow of the military will solve the country's woes.
The fragility of constitutional rule in Thailand has as much to do with vested and conflicting interests between old and new wealth as it does with flawed constitutional design.
And this is why it is possible to speak of meltdown.
During Thaksin's five years in office the government was charged with policy corruption that benefited his private business interests at the expense of rivals. While prime minister, his family firm invested heavily in AirAsia to compete against the national carrier, Thai Airways. He won tax concessions on his media activities, and the Export-Import Bank of Thailand provided soft loans to the Burmese regime to contract Thaksin's satellite and telecommunications firms.
As Thaksin's cronyism intensified, different groupings of business interests began to mobilise against him. They rallied under the convenient, though not completely inaccurate, cry that Thaksin was challenging the power of the king.
The current military-backed Government is now moving against Thaksin's wealth, and thus his political power. Last week, Thaksin's children were ordered to return half a billion dollars to the tax office. As more cases of corruption come before the courts, pro-Thaksin forces in Thailand are mobilising protests against the Government while Thaksin, in exile, claims disinterest in politics.
Whether the crisis will end in compromise, or will be fought to the end, is unclear.
So what of the prospects of democracy in Thailand? The Government promises an election will be held at year's end under the newly-drafted constitution. But pro-democratic and some pro-Thaksin forces are calling for the constitution to be rejected.
A rejection could be interpreted as condemnation of the coup and support for Thaksin paving the way for his political comeback in some form. Others fear that should an election be held pro-Thaksin forces will win anyway.
That's why some people have given up on democracy all together, saying the rural masses in Thailand are not ready for it. Instead a mixed system that incorporates the people, the aristocracy, and the king should be devised until the masses are ready to act like democratic citizens.
Such criticism of the electoral process betrays aristocratic disdain for the masses; and it might suggest that one of South-East Asia's most liberal of democracies (from the 1980s-1990s) might be headed down the road of Singaporean guided-democracy.
The principal charge against the masses is that they sell their votes to opportunist and corrupt politicians for less than 1000 baht ($A40) and have no regard for public interest. They elect corrupt governments that plunder the public purse, so what's the point of democracy?
Thais have dubbed pre-election nights "the night the dogs howl" because vote-canvassers make late-night visits to those they have paid to ensure they vote appropriately. Their nocturnal meanderings stir sleeping dogs and whole villages wake up to the howling: an apt sound for an aching democracy.
The question of succession is another potential site of meltdown. There is no doubt that without the presence of the current king, who has immense moral power in Thailand, political order in the interests of the old elite will be hard to guarantee. And this is where the political divide on regime form among the Thai elites opens up as they decide on a form of right wing electoral populism as exercised by Thaksin or someone like him, or a guided-democracy under the tutelage of the old establishment. Between both, the promise of Thai liberalism appears to be diminished.
The third significant site of meltdown centres on the continuing insurgency in the Muslim-majority provinces in the south of Thailand. Thaksin's demise was supposed to bring an end to the daily killings by insurgents and para-military state apparatuses. It was believed his insensitive incompetence had fuelled the insurgency. Instead, the killings have intensified, and taken on a more sectarian nature between Buddhist and Muslim.
The current Government appears no more competent than Thaksin's in dealing with the crisis. The three thousand lives lost in the last three years of the insurgency may be small compared with what may soon come.
Looking at the bleak prospect of Thai politics in the coming year it is hard not to conclude that it is more than just the dogs who will be howling.
Thailand: The Fall of Thaksin
Thailand’s Future
Michael Connors
Canberra Times
September, 2006
Deposed Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra said earlier this year that when the King whispered he would leave office. The king whispered several times, but Thaksin kept coming back like the proverbial ghost that haunts Thai villages.
Thaksin has thick skin. He was nonplussed when King Bhumiphol lectured him about the need to accept criticism. In 2003, after the UN condemned his human rights record he said ‘the UN is not my father.’ Thaksin now says he might head a government in exile – from London - and he’s called for elections supervised by the UN. He must have a good sense of humour, too.
Like some cheap cinematic ghost thriller that many Thais love, this is a man addicted to serial re-appearance. With his wealth – trebled since his time in office – he may well head an exile government from London simply to keep himself in the limelight and to counter expected exposes of corruption during his term in office.
As foreign observers, including the Australian government, condemn the coup – which is easy enough to do, one wonders why the Howard government was not critical of Thaksin’s assault on democracy and human life while he was in office. Basically, democracy and human rights were put in customs quarantine while our government negotiated and then implemented a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand. Alexander Downer’s condemnation of the coup is mere diplomatic ritual, steeped in hypocrisy.
Thaksin’s human rights abuses included the normalization of extra-judicial murder during the war on drugs, with over 2000 people killed and horrendous abuses in the South of Thailand where a separatist insurgency is taking place. When over a 1000 protesters were arrested and placed in military trucks in October 2004, 78 died en-route to a military camp. Thaksin basically said the deaths were an honest mistake, the same excuse he used when he was exposed for illegally concealing millions of dollars worth of shares in the bank accounts of his domestic servants.
When human rights activists exposed the existence of mass graves in the South of Thailand in November last year, his government ignored calls to launch an inquiry. Provincial officials say the mass graves of over 200 people are most likely Cambodian immigrants who like to ‘fight when they get drunk’. Others wonder if they are related to extra-judicial killings. Islamic Councils in the South have indicated that exhumation for the purposes of autopsy would be acceptable, but Thai forensic scientists efforts to undertake an investigation has been frustrated by bureaucratic stone-walling over budget allocation and jurisdiction.
Those who bemoan the loss of Thaksin because he was poor-friendly should note that according to the United Nations World Development Report, Thailand’s Human Development Index world ranking dropped from 66 in 2002 to 73 in 2005. What is more, income disparities between rich and poor have remained largely the same under Thaksin. His pro-poor policies were selectively targeted, smartly packaged and poorly funded. Budgetary allocations to education declined under Thaksin. Health spending as a proportion of budget allocation in 2005, was at 1999 levels. Thaksin’s inventiveness was to paint the public budget as his personal benevolent purse.
Those who think Thaksin had a democratic mandate should keep in mind that his minders manipulated the Electoral Commission of Thailand to his advantage. His government also played games with the National Counter Corruption Commission – keeping it dysfunctional so that thousands of corruption cases were put on hold. State lottery funds were allegedly plundered to fund party activities. The coup was not against a democratic government as such. Thaksin’s hold on to power was about ensuring his own survival – knowing full well how vulnerable he would be to prosecution without political power.
Thaksin’s record does not excuse the military coup. They have not moved against Thaksin because of corruption and human rights abuses, but because it was clear that Thaksin was basically challenging the power of the palace and stacking almost all institutions with his own supporters. When the military says they launched the coup for the sake of democracy, they mean constitutional monarchy. Democracy can mean very different things.
The military looks like it will, in cooperation with other establishment forces, move Thailand towards a more conservative law and order democracy. Their reported approach to former Senate President Meechai Ruchaphan to head a Constitution Drafting Committee is a sign of the future. Meechai opposed a number of the progressive clauses in the now annulled 1997 Constitution.
The future of Thailand is now unclear. Some of those who fought for
Thaksin's removal in order to restore democracy are now turning towards fighting the military and its appointees.
On Friday they defied martial law and organized a protest against the coup.
Despite the ban on poltiical gatherings of more than five people, no one was arrested.
Now student groups are calling for a people's assembly. Some may have guiltily enjoyed last Wednesday's coup holiday, but as the struggle against the military unfolds the hangover may last a long time.
Michael Connors
Canberra Times
September, 2006
Deposed Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra said earlier this year that when the King whispered he would leave office. The king whispered several times, but Thaksin kept coming back like the proverbial ghost that haunts Thai villages.
Thaksin has thick skin. He was nonplussed when King Bhumiphol lectured him about the need to accept criticism. In 2003, after the UN condemned his human rights record he said ‘the UN is not my father.’ Thaksin now says he might head a government in exile – from London - and he’s called for elections supervised by the UN. He must have a good sense of humour, too.
Like some cheap cinematic ghost thriller that many Thais love, this is a man addicted to serial re-appearance. With his wealth – trebled since his time in office – he may well head an exile government from London simply to keep himself in the limelight and to counter expected exposes of corruption during his term in office.
As foreign observers, including the Australian government, condemn the coup – which is easy enough to do, one wonders why the Howard government was not critical of Thaksin’s assault on democracy and human life while he was in office. Basically, democracy and human rights were put in customs quarantine while our government negotiated and then implemented a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand. Alexander Downer’s condemnation of the coup is mere diplomatic ritual, steeped in hypocrisy.
Thaksin’s human rights abuses included the normalization of extra-judicial murder during the war on drugs, with over 2000 people killed and horrendous abuses in the South of Thailand where a separatist insurgency is taking place. When over a 1000 protesters were arrested and placed in military trucks in October 2004, 78 died en-route to a military camp. Thaksin basically said the deaths were an honest mistake, the same excuse he used when he was exposed for illegally concealing millions of dollars worth of shares in the bank accounts of his domestic servants.
When human rights activists exposed the existence of mass graves in the South of Thailand in November last year, his government ignored calls to launch an inquiry. Provincial officials say the mass graves of over 200 people are most likely Cambodian immigrants who like to ‘fight when they get drunk’. Others wonder if they are related to extra-judicial killings. Islamic Councils in the South have indicated that exhumation for the purposes of autopsy would be acceptable, but Thai forensic scientists efforts to undertake an investigation has been frustrated by bureaucratic stone-walling over budget allocation and jurisdiction.
Those who bemoan the loss of Thaksin because he was poor-friendly should note that according to the United Nations World Development Report, Thailand’s Human Development Index world ranking dropped from 66 in 2002 to 73 in 2005. What is more, income disparities between rich and poor have remained largely the same under Thaksin. His pro-poor policies were selectively targeted, smartly packaged and poorly funded. Budgetary allocations to education declined under Thaksin. Health spending as a proportion of budget allocation in 2005, was at 1999 levels. Thaksin’s inventiveness was to paint the public budget as his personal benevolent purse.
Those who think Thaksin had a democratic mandate should keep in mind that his minders manipulated the Electoral Commission of Thailand to his advantage. His government also played games with the National Counter Corruption Commission – keeping it dysfunctional so that thousands of corruption cases were put on hold. State lottery funds were allegedly plundered to fund party activities. The coup was not against a democratic government as such. Thaksin’s hold on to power was about ensuring his own survival – knowing full well how vulnerable he would be to prosecution without political power.
Thaksin’s record does not excuse the military coup. They have not moved against Thaksin because of corruption and human rights abuses, but because it was clear that Thaksin was basically challenging the power of the palace and stacking almost all institutions with his own supporters. When the military says they launched the coup for the sake of democracy, they mean constitutional monarchy. Democracy can mean very different things.
The military looks like it will, in cooperation with other establishment forces, move Thailand towards a more conservative law and order democracy. Their reported approach to former Senate President Meechai Ruchaphan to head a Constitution Drafting Committee is a sign of the future. Meechai opposed a number of the progressive clauses in the now annulled 1997 Constitution.
The future of Thailand is now unclear. Some of those who fought for
Thaksin's removal in order to restore democracy are now turning towards fighting the military and its appointees.
On Friday they defied martial law and organized a protest against the coup.
Despite the ban on poltiical gatherings of more than five people, no one was arrested.
Now student groups are calling for a people's assembly. Some may have guiltily enjoyed last Wednesday's coup holiday, but as the struggle against the military unfolds the hangover may last a long time.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
