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Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts

May 23, 2016

The politics of the General Will in Thailand

Excerpts from
Michael K. Connors
International Journal of Cultural Policy        2016.

Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10286632.2016.1184656

From cultural enforcer to networker: the Cultural Surveillance Centre (Ministry of Culture)

Despite its seemingly Orwellian appellation, the CSC’s activities are not unlike those practised by other nationally-based cultural guardians – either state or societal – who doubt the moral and political competencies of their respective cultural charges. Given the work of the CSC to constantly remind people of Thainess through its newsletters, public exhibitions, workshops, media appearances, a case may be made that the CSC is merely an add-on to the cultural infrastructure that functions to banally remind people, as Billig (1995)) describes, to be self-conscious of the nation-root of identity, of which subjectivity should be an expression. Such a view places the CSC in a stream of hegemonic politics whereby the coupling of self-nation identification has historically served a broader hegemony of the dominant power bloc of senior bureaucracy, palace and business (Thongchai 2008;Reynolds 2002); this hegemonic bloc emerged through the twentieth Century, although events since the coup of September 2006 have led to a fracturing of that hegemony and splits in its conceptualisation (Glassman 2011).

Viewing the CSC as a persistent ‘identity reminder’ also entails recognising that its cultural surveillance work seeks to generate real-life manifestations of embedded ‘modest’ and ‘decent’ social norms among Thai citizens in market capitalism. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the agency is attempting to nurture and embed national identity as a public good, embodied in officially endorsed notions of culture as a way of life (which agencies seek to shape). As a public good, national identity acts as a normative institution that tempers the possessive individualism of capitalism. This understanding of culture – as a public good/general will – consciously derives, in part, from UNESCO’s instrumental elevation of culture as a prime resource that drives sustainable development, an understanding that has demonstrably shaped MOC policies (Connors 2005;        Surapan, Chareonsap. 2011 ;UNESCO 1998) As Miller and Yudice (2002, pp. 12–15) have pointed out, cultural policy is in part an iterance of the foundational position of all educational projects: that the subject is ethically incomplete and requires reform; and taken in a national context that reform serves simultaneously the nurturing of a civilised individual and nation.




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The CSC aims to extend the legislative capacity of ‘the people’ to rule themselves through the principle of the general will – which can only ever be understood as a decision about what is the right way to live together. It is evident that to the iterative Legislator (any usurping governmental agency tasked with constituting the people-body), an enabling capacity for making that decision means engagement in the bio-politics of Thainess, or varied governmental intervention. Thainess works to authorise legislation without an electoral democratic mandate, for it is the enabling condition of the assumed social contract between the Thai state and its subjects, at least among conservatives. Here then we find at its rawest the mentality of many in the moral reform agencies of the Thai state. Its logic in the cultural realm is mirrored in the political realm. In the absence of a capacity to form a general will, in the presence of fractious politics of interest and ideology, limited forms of democracy are viewed as necessary so that the people can be led towards the general will. If one were seeking to find the general tenor of politics informing the justification for suspending Thailand’s electoral democracy, it may be found in embryonic form in the CSC and other pedagogical agencies of state and society. Its surveillance activities form one channel through which a general will may appear and citizens ‘forced’ to be free. That Thailand has, since 1932, never succeeded in embedding any constitutional form (in 2015 and 2016 it deliberated its 20th constitution) means that the figure of the iterative legislator (military coup, government agency, monarchy, etc.) is constant in the modern period.

March 4, 2013

Understanding Lese Majeste - intent and crime

Understanding Lese Majeste in Thailand - intent and crime

One of the most outstanding features of the masterful  Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté (London: Routledge, 2011) by David Streckfuss is its unprecedented attempt to lay bare the logic of thinking by those who protect Thainess through the monarchy (or the monarchy through Thainess). Streckfuss's  idea of a "defamation regime" is not a casual shot at coining a nice easy term, but is a systematic  rendering, informed by deep theory, of the logic of the Thai state.

I had the pleasure of interviewing David Steckfuss about his book and the edited transcript was published in Critical Asian Studies in 2011. As we ponder why people like  labour and red-shirt activist Somyot Prueksakasemsuk  and others are locked behind bars for what amount to thought and speaking crimes, the temptation is to blame the sheer callousness of the authorities.  That doesn't add up. As commentator after commentator notes, the thoughtless and ruthless application of the lese-majeste law  and the inhumane sentencing that occurs  might sensibly be thought to diminish the position of the monarchy in Thailand - any cost/benefit analysis would suggest as much.

Something else is going on so that the lese majeste  machine sentences and imprisons at will.  And it has come  recently in Somyot's case to  more explicitly expand its rationale for imprisonment  to the supposed  "intention" of the accused.  Sentencing  doesn't go through a cost/benefit committee charged with protecting the image and reputation of the monarchy.   There are other reasons behind what is happening other  than sheer instrumental repression. Truth and Trial in Thailand is a conceptually rich that book gives us deep insights  into this ghostly machine. Critical Asian Studies has made the full transcript and accompanying book review available here .  

At a minimum government agencies such as Thailand's   Office of the Attorney General, government and opposition spoke-persons  and public intellectuals ought express a preference for bail,  lighter sentencing and stricter thresholds for prosecution. The idea that  the issue is too sensitive to address openly  is a convenient infantilization of Thailand's public sphere and a misguided attempt to reconcile with something that isn't tangible.



April 16, 2011

Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté.

The following is a review of David Streckfuss' new book Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse-majesté. London: Routledge, 2011.

Full Version Available at http://criticalasianstudies.org/issues/vol43/no1/truth-on-trial-in-thailand.html

David Streckfuss's Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lese majeste builds on what was already an extraordinarily accomplished PhD dissertation taken at Wisconsin-Madison (1998) under the supervision of Alfred McCoy and Thongchai Winichakul. The original material has been revised and expanded in the context of Thailand's regime-shaking struggles since the 2006 coup d'etat that felled Thaksin Shinawatra and the accompanying excess of defamation and lse-majest claims. Truth in Thailand is also marked by the author's recent engagement with the theorists of the “state of exception,” Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.1

It is with Agamben and Schmitt that Streckfuss can claim that Thailand's legalization of “abnormal times” since the 1950s entails a permanent suspension of constitutional order—or a state of exception in which sovereign power defines the possible. The ghost of Foucault is also present, though more as a disposition than an explicitly referenced master. Introduced briefly on the matter of “regimes of truth” (43-47), Foucault then largely fades from view, but the idea of productive discourse shadows the entire book. How could it be otherwise when Streckfuss aims to make sense of the order of things—of Thai-ness, of monarchy, and of nation, and the power that works through them?

Streckfuss thinks through these matters with ruthless clarity. Under his scholarly scrutiny the way in which Thai law has regulated the “characterisation of things” across a dispiriting one hundred years is laid bare. Central to this project has been what Streckfuss calls the “defamation regime”: “a social and political formation that over time develops a kind of 'defamation thinking' and 'impulse' that focuses on the insult of the defamatory statement, often at the expense of the truth” (xv). His expert narrative shows how courts, inspired by wider state discourses, try to establish the intent of those who have allegedly defamed the nation, the monarchy, or Thai-ness—and in so doing make visible the logic of the regime's self-image. In shining a spotlight on these legal moments Streckfuss is illuminating the underlying collective logic by which power has been consolidated in Thailand.

The book's thirteen chapters are rich in detail and observation, and many Old Thai Hands will learn much from each of them. Thematically organized, the chapters offer an incomparable history of lse-majest, law and Thai-ness, public opinion, and the science of traitorology. Of especial relevance given the recent discussion of the judicialization of politics in Thailand is Streckfuss's remarkable account in chapter 5 of the institutionalization of the “state of exception” by Thai courts working in conjunction with the police and military. Tracing the use of “indistinct, legal concepts such as 'peace and order' or 'threat to national security'” (113) and working through court transcripts, Streckfuss shows the essential reasoning behind the constitutional standing of the hundreds of coup decrees that have the status of law. No one hoping to understand the hybrid nature of Thailand's authoritarian-liberal mix can ignore this chapter, even if some (including me) will take exception to his argument that the country has been in varying states of exception for decades. Even if technically correct in the sense that extra-constitutional acts found Thai political order and shadow it—and that such acts announce themselves with disturbing frequency—the idea of a permanent “state of exception” can lead to overgeneralization. It can gloss, for example, Thailand's shifting regime forms since the 1950s and the differential relationship each has to law.

Many readers will be intrigued by Streckfuss's attempt to explain with Buddhist logic the actions that precede and follow coups d'etat, more than ten of which Thailand has witnessed since 1932. He writes:

This pattern [of a coup d'etat and self-issued amnesty and constitution] seems inexplicable unless we look at the practise as ritual purification—a public act certified by Thai Theravada Buddhism that recognizes a sacrifice (staging a coup), acknowledges a necessary murder (the killing of a constitution), and rewards giving (a new constitution, a new political order). (122)

Some might read as overly culturalist this account of coups d'etat as purification rituals that establish the pure intent of their protagonists (following a Buddhist inclination to stress right intent). At the very least the argument is provocative and offers original insights that expand our ways of thinking through the cultural aspects of Thai politics. Indeed, those hoping to understand the thinking of the Thai establishment and its social intermediaries may well feel they can finally name what has been hitherto a vague sense of Thai elite mentality. Streckfuss's desire to understand, and his dedicated patience in doing so, allows him to render visible the authenticity of a conservative Thai worldview that is often forgotten or cynically understood as mere venal interest. In short, Streckfuss has captured, on a political rather than aesthetic register, what Raymond Williams calls a “structure of feeling” and its practical consciousness.2 This is what Streckfuss means when he speaks of a “defamation regime.”

It remains to be said that if a certain ironical grin accompanies Streckfuss's extensive and persuasive documentation of the defamation regime, present also is horror at the human cost that this regime extracts. Such sentiment hints at the deep humanism that drives his scholarship. No one can read the book's last page on the “Ghosts of Forgotten History,” reminiscent of Walter Benjamin's portrayal of the Angel of Progress, and not shudder at the thought of future Thai troubles on the way to democracy. When the “'Ghosts' of the Duson-nyor massacre, 6 October, Black May, and Tak Bai” (315) are finally granted an audience, Thailand will not be the same.

This monumental volume is destined to take a leading place in the field of critical studies of Asia.

The review appears in the: Connors MK and Streckfuss, D (2011) 'Michael K. Connors in conversation with David Streckfuss, author of Truth on Trial in Thailand', Critical Asian Studies, 43:1, 139 - 149

April 11, 2010

Brief Report 11/4/10.


Last night as news of the crackdown at Rachadamnern and Dok Wua spread, pictures of the dead were shown on the massive screen at the Rachaprasong rally, to gasps of horror and curses. The mood was both solemn and militant.

This morning I attended the Rachaprasong site and caught Arisman speaking from the stage. Families of those killed were asked to attend the Baan 111 Foundation (the foundation set up in the name of the 111 TRT executives banned from politics in 2007) to prepare court action, national and international against the Aphisit government.

The cars that had lined Ploenjit Road (occupying 4 lanes of 6) last night were mostly gone, and the numbers thinner than yesterday (quite reasonably)- it was a hot morning and numbers swell in the evening. People may have been deployed elsewhere.

I spoke to UDD spokesperson Sean Boonpracong. Some of what I report below comes from him, some from other sources.

The UDD sees the next 24 hours as crucial and the top leadership were in a planning meeting, with Veera as the brains and Arisman as the "best worst boy we have" as a smart tactician.

There are suggestions that some of the violence last night was military on military. Asked about the grenade that hit the military last night, I was informed by a UDD source that some 'watermelon soldiers' were deployed by rival commanders to attack the regiment was that was enforcing the crackdown. The source named the regiments and expected more conflict. This of course is unproven, but if true suggests that there may be more military action later.

I head back to Australia this afternoon so will not be posting on the rallies after this.

April 8, 2010

Double Standards and Political Positions

Double Standards and Political Positions


"Whoever has been killed in this manner [unnaturally], their relatives may bring their grievances to the prime minister, because we have central [agencies] that can go down and ensure justice, but [I] believe that [the relatives] will not be so brave because today the majority of those killed have experience [in the drug trade]"

Thaksin, responding to criticism that innocent people were being killed during the war on drugs.

See full discussion at
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Data/FileUpload/296/WP102_09_MConnors.pdf


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The Reds have a bandanna; from memory it says "everything I do is wrong and everything you do is right". It is a perfect statement of the double standards the reds have attempted to expose in Thai society.

That double standards exist is doubtless. But they are not the double standards of colours, but of class, hierarchy, connection and position. They are diffused throughout the system and were as rampant under Thaksin as they were/are under any government. They are systematic and are not the product of one leader, although leadership has a role in determining how acceptable they are.

Daniel Unger’s piece in Asia Times “Bewildered in Bangkok” also brings up another double standard, and that is of truth: The ease with which news is twisted and turned to suit political agendas. This issue is fundamental because it goes to the question of the place of honesty in social change, and the way in which views of the past are set by prejudice upon prejudice. This post is about issues raised by Unger's piece, rather than the cut and thrust of current events.

An example of the way partisanship has yet to deal with recent events is provided by PAD in 2008.

The ultra nationalist royalist politics of the People’s Alliance for Democracy during protests in 2008 made it difficult for commentators to countenance objective treatment. Little was said of the violence inflicted against the protestors – or if it was it was’ self-inflicted’, it was’ provoked’. Figures are unclear but it seems 6 PAD supporters were killed and hundreds injured. The scurrilous discussion on websites of whether the picture of a mutilated leg of a PAD supporter was real or doctored completely overlooked the fact that PAD supporters were actually subject to attack and anonymous intimidation. Indeed some commentators called for and supported a crackdown because PAD were ‘fascist’, and supported police action against PAD. Incidental acts of violence by PAD supporters were turned into examples of a systematic campaign of violence by the PAD. The use of photographic images to promote these agendas was pervasive. An arms cache found in government house, after PAD ceased its occupation was immediately assumed to have been PAD's, without any evidence. On these matters I remain uncertain, just as I am to believe various claims about current events.

Now it is clear that the PAD has terrible politics by the standards of liberal democracy, and its opportunistic use of nationalism and royalism was dangerous and suited to undemocratic purposes. Some of its abrasive and dehumanizing rhetoric from the stage was fearful. It is clear that it had support in high and unsavoury places. But do such facts require that interpretation be completely directed to demonization? Are inconvenient facts to be set aside lest they get in the way of presenting the news as one wants to see it? Is it also a case of everything they do is wrong, everything we do is right?

Indeed I would argue that if PAD was of a leftist persuasion, interpretations of its actions would have been different. The occupation of the airport would have been seen as a brilliant strategy of the angry masses desperate to bring down the government. Random acts of violence would have been seen as the work of the ‘third hand’ attempting to discredit the movement.

The mythic image of PAD now built up around a few totemic images borders on erasure of its origins in a pre-coup context fighting against Thaksin in order to return Thailand to a liberal political path – and by liberal, yes I mean elitist, with the accompanying inequalities entailed in the 1997 constitution.

A long road has been travelled since 2006, and the dynamics of the struggle have transformed, but the same logic of interpretation remains in place. And while the faces may look the same, four years has changed and hardened thinking and strategies.

PAD was and is regularly indicted for treating people who support Thaksin as ignorant and gullible. Such claims by some people in PAD have been made and quite vulgar ones at that. But the basic claim during 2006 was that without access to information and impartial analysis (yes, laughable coming from the Manager newsgroup), people could not make informed judgements. Anyone who listened to this discussion on the PAD stage would have been struck by how “media studies” the discussion was. Actually, such a claim is common to most political persuasions (Marxist included), and that is why most practical politics comes down to vanguard and strategic leadership to win people to a particular view of the world on the basis of where they are. Of course there are anarchists and populists (mediums of the popular will) out there who imagine some transcendent will of the people finding spontaneous expression if it happens to suit the way they also see the world. Another view common to many political persuasions is that political struggle is political education, and its best source. The question, of course, is the content of that political struggle. PAD and UDD obviously see this differently too.

Making sense of the last four years is not fundamentally a dispute about who did what when, and who shot first, who shot second– these empirical matters will never find settlement in the turmoil of the present, and they will keep, for a long time, the trolls in the cyber world busy wearing finger tips thin. The real dispute for those not in a position to influence events is where this conflict began and where it ends and for what purpose and future. On such matters a more honest discussion is a better option than mudslinging and sloganeering.


What is at the heart of the matter is not strategy or violence (since these can always be conveniently massaged and explained away in partisan circles) but rather the question of politics and the side one takes in that. Is it possible to explain one’s position, even non-position – without being taken for a lackey of Thaksin’s or the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite? At the moment, no. Where that space will emerge in the current contest is unclear.

Before the beginning of the current round of protests the UDD disowned militant elements (Sae Daeng among others) that wished to displace the current UDD leadership in order to pursue a more aggressive approach. Such forces it may be speculated were possibly behind some of violence inflicted on the yellow protests in 2008.

Since the protests began, a systematic campaign of targeted attacks (around 20 so far) on government and political buildings has been unleashed as if to demonstrate the viability of an armed path should the current campaign of civil disobedience fail. No doubt it signals to military elements relative impunity for courses of action contrary to government direction. Of course the convenient third hand can be invoked as being behind the bombings, as it was in the assault on the prime minister’s car during the Songkran demonstrations, but the logic of such a claim is weak.

This bifurcation of red shirt (not specifically the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) strategy, if that is what it is, is hardly commented on by those who now see the reds as the hope of the future and support calls for an immediate election so that a pro-red (and pro-Thaksin) government would come to power (probable but not certain). But the campaign of bombing points at least to one possible unpleasant future should the current government fall. Any new government will have a place for all the old elements of the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite (if we take the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite to be a broad class and not a clique) as long as they are on the right side.

Any campaign of double standards needs to be just that, and whatever the outcome of this current fight, the barracks against double standards shouldn't be dismantled too quickly.

Can the red movement guarantee that any pro-Thaksin government it brings to power will be subject to ruthless and necessary accountability? If so, how? What has it done to build alternative political organizations for parliamentary power, so that the forms of popular participation now evident are maintained to ensure future governments exercise power democratically and submit themselves to checks and balances that are constitutionally sanctioned (assuming a rewriting of the current constitution or its replacement)?

I have attended both yellow and red demonstrations over the last four years, I’ve always been struck by a similarity of purpose among those sitting below the stage: fair government. Certainly, the red movement has over the last year found a mobilizing idiom in class that has introduced a much needed element into Thai political discussion, and which is fundamentally going to impact future Thai democratisation. If the level of popular organizing can outlast the crisis that has brought it in to being, Thai democracy will be stronger for it.
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For detractors – no I do not support a crackdown on the reds
No I do not grovel at the feet of the monarchy
No I do not share tea regularly with PAD leaders
No I do not want the return of royal liberalism and virtuous leadership
No, just because I have not repeated every possible disclaimer does not mean I subscribe to its opposite.
Yes, I support the repeal of the current constitution
Yes, I support the repeal of lese majeste laws
Yes, I support the immediate release of all those imprisoned under those laws
Yes, I call for retrial of all cases conducted under law built on the back of a military assumption of power.


UPDATE THURSDAY AFTERNOON - the imposition of a state of emergency has led to blackouts on media coverage....it is clearly important that people get the right kind of news and Prachatai.com., one of the few balanced and diverse news sites in Thailand, clearly is not the right kind of news.

October 15, 2009

If you want to escape terrorism don’t ask Rohan Gunaratna what train to catch

If you want to escape terrorism don’t ask Rohan Gunaratna what train to catch.

With his new co-authored book The Terrorist Threat in Southern Thailand (deliberately unread by this author, as I’ve had my fill of fiction reading for the year) Rohan Gunaratna is perhaps hoping for the most improved award and a plaque on the wall of the Pentagon.

Gunaratna’s last foray into the southern insurgency produced a book (Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, 2005) of such breathtaking incompetence that I find myself almost admiring his tenacity to tackle the Southern insurgency once more in 2009. Or perhaps the first book was a draft and this is the real thing? In which case, let’s hope he thanks his many reviewers.

The blurb for the new book promises astute analysis and recommendations for policy regarding the insurgency in Thailand:

“the authors find that there is the possibility that this predominantly localized conflict could escalate into an international Islamic jihad. In addition to analyzing the insurgents' capabilities and opportunities, the authors provide a critique of government policies and make astute suggestions for resolving the conflict.”

The use of the word “astute” implies shrewd judgment and perceptive treatment. I can only hope that Gunaratna has removed the many errors that appeared in the first draft. In my extended review of that book (“War on Error and the Southern Fire” Critical Asian Studies, 2006) I noted just several of the errors thus:

"Most books have some errors, but few books that aspire to such authority contain as many as this one. The mistakes are both historical and contemporary. The authors’ positioning within terrorism studies (knowing a little about lots of conflicts) might explain the flippant attitude to historical context and facts: the authors have nothing more than a casual acquaintance with the history and modern-day politics of Thailand and presumably assume that their readers are not well informed either. Below, some errors are presented.

One example demonstrates the authors’ ignorance of one of the most important events in southern history: they mistakenly describe Haji Sulong, an important southern Muslim leader of the twentieth century, as the leader of the 'Dusun Nyiur incident' in April 1948. He was, in fact, in jail at the time. (The authors return to this event and attribute the leadership to another person, without realizing they are writing about the same event using a different transliteration, naming it the 'Duson Nyor Revolt' For the same event the authors have created two different leaders, two different names, and a different estimation of the numbers killed.)

At times inaccuracy slides into prejudice: the authors speak of the threat potential of Islam, writing, 'The presence of a significant Muslim community in the rest of the kingdom, including Bangkok…has the potential to disperse the threat beyond its current epicenter in the south'. This failure to differentiate between militant violent politics and the Islamic faith in Thailand reveals nothing but prejudicial ignorance.

Topping the list of errors is the claim that Thai Rak Thai MP Wan Muhammad Nor Matha lost his seat in the 2005 elections, which saw TRT lose all of its seats in the border provinces (88). He did not; in fact he retained his seat as a party list MP (based on total national vote of the party). That the authors are mistaken about the status of Wan Nor, one of Thailand’s leading Muslim politicians and a key, though controversial, member of the Wadah group, illustrates their failure to do the basic background work. Negligence becomes absurdity when the authors claim that the 1993 bombing at the Hat Yai railway station was directed at non-Muslim citizens since, they claimed, 'few Muslims use this train station'(36). Hat Yai railway station is a gateway into the border provinces; it is the last major stop before Malaysia and many of its passengers are Muslims."


I am happy to provide Mr Gunaratna with a more extensive list should he wish, but I didn’t hear from him after the review.

Inventing Terror Groups.

When thinking of Rohan Gunaratna’s science fiction expedition into the Southern Insurgency I am always reminded of Graham Brown’s debunking of the kind of ill-informed terror analysis that confidently assumes its facticity, and in particular the contribution of Zachary Abuza, a fellow traveler in the style of Gunaratna (see Brown, G. K., 2006. “The perils of terrorism: Chinese whispers, Kevin Bacon, and Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia - A review essay.” Intelligence and National Security, 21 (1), pp. 150-162.)

Brown reveals disregard for evidence and context, and somewhat revealing errors, the kind that exemplifies Gunaratna’s first book on Thailand. Brown writes

"Much of Abuza's analysis of Malaysia is devoted to the 'Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia' (KMM), although this is [citing Abuza] 'only one of many radical organizations, [including] the Al-Ma'unah, Kampung Medan, and older groups such as the Islamic Revolution Cooperative Brigade' (p.24). Kampung Medan, however, is not any kind of organization, but rather a place where an incident of ethnic rioting took place. Abuza appears to have misunderstood the newspaper article which he cites as his only source here, containing the following sentence: 'On whether a Government white paper to address the Al-Maunah, Kampung Medan and KMM groups would be tabled in Parliament, [Home Minister] Abdullah [Ahmad Badawi] said it would be done after the cases in court were completed'. Casual reading of this sentence by an uninformed observer might well lead to the erroneous conclusion that Kampung Medan is the name of an organization and thus, if his role is indeed that of an uninformed observer, Abuza might be forgiven this error."

If you buy Gunaratna’s latest book on Thailand, do so with a generous spirit and forgiving mind: keeping up with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates is a difficult task and casualness is part of the terrain. Apparently policy makers who seek expert terror advice don’t seem to care, so why should we?

What is troubling about such mistakes - and they are legion - is the way they enter broader commentary, as people continue to cite the work. Casual mistakes and over-calls by Gunaratna get picked up by others and circulated - reinforcing the distance between policy discourse and reality.

Why, if people know the fundamentally flawed record of such authors, does such work keep getting cited (positively and as authoritative). It can only be that bullshit trumps a concern with accurate representation and truth (as much as we can honestly struggle to establish what is true).

In his short work on On BullShit philosopher Harry Frankfurt was pained by our generalised indifference to bullshit, our willingness to just brush it aside rather than face up to the way it structures and perpetuates purposes that are less than benign. Frankfurt writes of bullshitters : “the truth-values of [his/her] statements are of no central interest to him [her]; what we are not to understand is that his [her] intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it”. The intention rather is to "suit his purpose". Bullshit steers us away from the way things are - and in this instance serve alarmist ends by feeding generalised prejudices and ignorance about complex questions of power and inequality. Prejudice or a willingness to serve never had much need for facts.

October 9, 2008

Q & A on Thai crisis

Bloomberg email interview conducted on the afternoon of October 8th.

Q. Just wondering your thoughts on the latest Thai developments. Specifically, does this represent a major change in tactics for the PAD?

A. A stalemate between the pro-and anti-Thaksin forces has been the key characteristic of 2008. Each has its support base in state agencies and the media and each has tried to paint the other as destroying Thai democracy. The arrest of the PAD leaders was clearly an attempt to break PAD in order clear obstacles to constitutional amendments.

While amendments are warranted, given the coup-origins of the 2007 Constitution, the PPP's transparent intent was to destroy the corruption cases against Mr Thaksin and others associated with Thai Rak Thai and PPP, and to revoke anti-Thaksin appointments to the various "independent agencies of the state" such as the National Counter Corruption Commission.

The PPP selection of Somchai, Thaksin's brother in law, as Prime Minister was effectively an announcement that the pro-Thaksin forces were going for broke, which in the current context means that a zero-sum game between the opposing sides is in play.

Q. Do you see an end game in all this?

A. Several outcomes are possible, none knowable: a coup could be launched against the government or there could be a pro-government coup, perhaps in the form of a temporary martial law/state of emergency.


Possibly, a coup could also move against both sides (pro-Thaksin and pro-PAD) and enact a tough period of military rule under a civilian prime minister to beat down both claimants on power in order to establish order. The new regime might well incorporate elements of the PAD 'new politics' agenda but probably would cut loose PAD's social base.

The government could mobilise a mass support base onto the streets to beat back an anti-government coup. This base has so far failed to show itself other than at the ballot box and rallies of indifferent size.

Perhaps the coalition will splinter and defect to a new coalition formation to pre-empt a coup. Remember, factions in the governing coalition are pragmatic. Before PPP elected Somchai as prime minister it was momentarily possible that a Democrat led coalition government might have taken shape as some elements in the PPP and the minor parties were weary of fighting all the way and were ready to do a deal.

Another possibility is the emergence of a government of national unity, which has been flagged several times. Such a government would presumably be convened under the threat of a coup and it would most likely cut the Thaksin link.

As always, predictions are always overtaken by reality.

What can be said is that at some point in the next week an enduring resolution to the stalemate may well emerge. Events of historic proportion are often dictated by a logic that defies transparent interest, a number of realignments might emerge which no one can imagine.


Q. If a new election is called, do you think it's likely a Thaksin-linked party will win again, and if so will this conflict just continue indefinitely?

A. If an anti-government coup occurs I would expect that this time there would be greater repression and manipulation to ensure that in any future election a repeat of the PPP victory would not occur: the school burnings that occurred in 2007 in the North and Northeast might well be a symbol of what will come.

If the House is dissolved and a new election is held and the current balance of popularity remains in place, a PPP led coalition government would be the most likely outcome, although that would depend on the stand taken by the minor parties.

Q. What does the current fight say about Thailand's democracy?

A. Thai democracy is in a state of immolation.

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Additional Commentary/10/10/08

Odd, given the massive erosion of the THaksin/PPP position through the court system, that I should have missed adding a role for the courts in the various scenarios discussed above.

September 29, 2008

"The King Can Do Wrong"

Excerpt from

Connors MK (forthcoming) "Four Elections and a Coup D’etat: Giving Democracy a Break in Thailand", Australian Journal of International Affairs.

The King can do wrong

It is sometimes claimed that Thailand’s current crisis is about the impending succession to the throne. The incumbent, King Bhumibol is 80 years old. The most likely but by no means certain successor to the throne is Prince Vajiralongkorn, rumoured to be, or to have been, close to Thaksin. The coup, in this account, aimed to block a Thaksin-influenced succession (Handley, 2006b 424-5; 2006a) Like much analysis surrounding the monarchy, this is speculative but also plausible. Given that the interests surrounding the crown are extensive and fan out from palace grounds, to military camps, to schools and the bureaucracy, it would be natural for there to be great concern about the succession. A life of socialised royalism through the education system has inculcated an immense respect for the monarchy. For genuine royalist liberals and conservatives, a Thaksin-influenced succession would be repugnant.

Official discourse on the Thai monarchy constantly invokes the idea that the king can do no wrong – indeed this has been one of the abiding elements of the ideology ‘democracy with the king as head of state’. Popularly, the idea of infallibility is understood to relate to the semi-divine nature of kingship in Thailand. But the phrase actually relates to the functions of a constitutional monarchy, namely that a monarchy signs into law legislation and executive decrees, but is not responsible for them. Likewise, court decisions under the authority of the crown do not entail any royal responsibility. It is in this constitutional sense that the ‘the king can do no wrong’. The Thai monarch’s role is to symbolically manifest, by royal imprimatur, the unified sovereignty of the people, through the three arms of government (the judiciary, legislature and the executive). But the Thai king’s role has expanded well beyond this.

In the last five years an incipient debate has emerged in the twilight years of King Bhumibol’s reign. There are those who believe that the monarchy and its interventions at crisis moments (1973, 1992, and 2006) are required in the current stage of Thailand’s political development: the monarchy acts as kind of para-political institution, it intervenes when the contradictions that have attended Thailand’s political transition break out into violence. The king is like an all seeing rational citizen able to adjudge, in times of crisis, the general interest. This view reflects that over two generations the monarchy has extended its role well beyond that of a constitutional monarch in a democracy (right to warn, consult etc.). Accounting for this expanded role, liberal royalist discourse portrays the incumbent as a supreme ombudsman, who has accrued powers by convention and wisdom. Moreover, in the foggy world of practice, liberal discourse merges with traditional Buddhist notions of monarchy based on righteousness (see Bowonsak 1994; Connors 2008a). The coup and the battle against Thaksin then might be seen, in part, both as a struggle to defend the expanded role of a Thai constitutional monarchy, and all the interests that have coagulated to it, and for control over succession.

Indeed, in 2005, the former was how the issue was framed in public debates about Thaksin’s alleged transgression of royal prerogative (Connors 2008a). In the political struggles of 2005-2006 the monarchy was used instrumentally by both anti and pro Thaksin forces in a bid to gain popular favour. But the monarch was more than eager to claim his own space at this time. In his annual birthday speech in 2005 Bhumibol chastised Thaksin for being sensitive to criticism (Thaksin had a penchant for defamation suits) and suggested that even the king could be criticised. This was an extraordinary statement, given the strict enforcement of lèse-majesté. In his speech, Bhumibol (2005) invited criticism of his own role – declaring that the idea that the ‘king can do no wrong’ was a form of condescension on his own person, as if he were not human. Indeed Bhumibol declared that that ‘the king can do wrong’, and welcomed criticism. By saying that he could do wrong, by explictly rejecting the constitutionalist interpretation that 'the king can do no wrong', Bhumibol may well have been expressing the view that his role extends well beyond the symbolic. In short then, the king’s speech might be interpreted as an attack on those who argue for a restricted palace role in administration of the nation. This is a belated public recognition that Thailand’s constitutional monarchy is an activist one. It is, in an oblique way, also a recognition that the king has enduringly headed a national power bloc intent on shaping the nature of Thai capitalism and society (Connors 2007: 131). Thus, in as much as a struggle over succession and the role of the monarchy are to be understood as central to the current crisis, these elements must be mapped on to the broader struggle over regime form.
(CITATIONS IN THE ORIGINAL)

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Comment: this is from a larger article about the events of the last year. Bhumipol's speech on 'doing wrong' was actually a restatement of his December 2003 speech(see below). I can only guess that people simply couldn't comprehend what he was saying the first time round. Even the second time round, the idea didn't sink in: if I remember correctly Matichon Sutsapda, several days after the December 2005 speech, had on its front cover in English "THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG".



Just as the struggle against Thaksin was hotting up in September 2005 I wrote about the 2003 speech thus (published in 2007 Democracy and National Identity in Thailand, pp. 259-260):


"In some respects, the great energy expended in the last decade on democracy promotion, civic education and anti-vote buying campaigns (in short - when tens of thousands of people acted as the shock troops for liberal democrasubjection) has done little to abate the influence of money and power in the political system. Indeed, it might be argued that promoting ‘good citizenship’ in Thailand has led to a moralistic type of politics that permanently displaces questions about power and structure in determining political outcomes. Self-organization is what can transform these democratic institutions into instruments that serve the interests of ordinary people, workers and peasants. Civic politics needs to be complemented with class-based activism in trade unions and farmers federations. Only this can ensure that national politics is not subject to the whims of aggrandizing elites.

In the interests of elite liberalism, and to forestall political instability, action from above may preempt the emergence of a mass progressive movement; and Thaksin may fall in front of a jury of his peers.

Indeed, there is considerable concern about the current political situation among elements of the Thai establishment. The king himself has expressed some cogent concerns that indicate fear of mass disaffection with the political system. In late 2003, the king raised some interesting questions about the future implications of Thaksin’s mode of rule. Offering sympathetic comments on the ‘war on drugs’, the king nonetheless suggested that more had to be done to satisfy critics who claimed the government was responsible for thousands of deaths. The king noted that responsibility was continually shifted from the ‘superman’ prime minister through to ministers, civil servants and through to the people and law, who then might shift responsibility on to the king, ‘which is against the constitution, as the constitution says the king has no responsibility at all… so we agree that none of us are responsible for the nation’. In the same speech the king notes that those responsible in government should accept criticism when it is warranted:

[If] they are right then thank them, if they are wrong tell them, quietly…The person who is greatly troubled by this is the king, because no one can reproach him… We did not tell those who wrote the constitution that no one can reproach or violate the king. Why this was written, I do not know. If one can not be violated how can one know if one is right or wrong?

A system of no accountability is a volatile system, and it is clear that the king’s comments relate not just to the war on drugs but extend to the style of governance that Thaksin has embraced. By implication, if the king is open to criticism, although it is not allowed, Thaksin should also be able to tolerate it. By reprising his role as a cautious liberal king, Bhumipol furthers royal mythology.
Whether a popular movement, a push from above, or an implosion from within TRT removes Thaksin is a matter for speculation, as is his longevity. But if Thailand is to break from the familiar tug of war between authoritarian nationalism, which draws on the three pillars of national identity, and royal liberalism, a movement from below that transcends both streams will need to emerge. Otherwise, a return to the royal embrace will be yet one more historical impasse for Thailand’s poor."


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August 17, 2008

Dismemberment and Thai Politics

It's been a tough few months for some people; the cartoons below capture something of the situation. This week, the Election Commission of Thailand may consider recommending the dissolution of the Democrat Party, after one of its executive members admitted distributing free movie tickets. Also in the pipe line is the case against the governing People's Power Party, after executive member Yongyuth was found guilty of electoral fraud.

It's hard to see how anything can be achieved by pursuing the dissolution of parties on the basis of actions by individuals - the dissolution of Thai Rak Thai by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2007 being a case in point.

Of course, the constitutional article (Article 237) on this matter doesn't stipulate that a party must be dissolved if an executive member is found guilty of electoral fraud/corruption, only that the Constitution Court consider the matter.

In the mean time, with Thaksin in exile, the effort to undo the post-coup political settlement continues by anti-coup/pro Thaksin forces. The June 24th Democracy Group will this week commence a new round of protests to try and dislodge the National Counter Corruption Commission on the basis that its nine members were not royally appointed (they were appointed by the 2006 coupsters). It considers the NCCC and the entire post-coup legal and political order illegitimate, with the exception of the elected parliament.

(UPDATE 18th August) And on another front the campaign against Jaravan, the Auditor General, heats up. Citing Article 301 of the 2007 Constitution, Prachathat, the pro-Thaksin newspaper, has called for Jaravan to leave office. Article 301 stipulates that: "The selection for the State Audit Commission and the Auditor-General shall finish within one hundred and twenty days as from the date of appointment of the President of the House of Representatives and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives after the first general election of members of the House of Representatives under this Constitution and, if the President of the Constitutional Court from the selection proceedings under this Constitution does not exist, the Selective Committee shall consist of the existing members."






Cartoon from Khao Sut 15th August. The text reprises Thaksin's assurance - after speaking to an astrologer - that after July 2nd everything would be okay.




Cartoon is from Naew Naa 17th August. A tree (People's Power Party) is cut down by a saw-wielding man (The Election Commission of Thailand).

June 24, 2008

Thai communitarian nationalism and the NGO movement





Rethinking the nation in times of crisis ,

Full citations may be found in the published edition


Democracy, civic engagement and community
In March 2002 the highly esteemed Dr Prawet Wasi issued a public letter to Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The letter mirrored the thrust of King Bhumipol’s speech in late 2001 to the effect that the government needed to be more tolerant of different opinions. Prawet warned that Thailand was facing the gravest crisis it had ever faced. Having lost economic sovereignty in the 1997 currency meltdown, the country was now faced, he asserted, with the loss of political sovereignty. In response to this threat he called for the government and people to work together as a civil-state (pracharat). Such calls for unity have become endemic in Thailand, particularly following the crisis. Perhaps the most famous call came from Thirayut Bunmi, who provided a popular Thai reading of the idea of good governance (thammarat) by linking it to a strategy to overcome the economic crisis. Thirayut’s intellectual intervention, which kicked off a minor discourse boom on good governance, aimed at taking the reform movement beyond the prevalent liberalism of the new constitution, and towards a new and extensive project of economic revitalization through social and political reform. A good governance ‘movement’ outside of the state, he argued, was needed. In place of state- or society-centred approaches, Thirayut proposed the creative interaction of state, business and social forces. Economic recovery was possible only through the cooperative effort of all. With his calls for common sacrifice for the nation, alongside the king’s call for self-reliance and modesty, Thirayut sought a revisioning of the Thai nation.

These ubiquitous calls for unity have been operationalized through the promotion of civic participation, particularly since the passing of the ‘people’s constitution’. Civic politics is effectively an attempt to foster informed public opinion that has the capacity to influence the broad policy terrain of governments, and to bring into being a body of citizens capable of free and meaningful association across an array of issues. The contemporary rise of civic politics in Thailand can be traced broadly in the development of a public sphere instantiated by media, publicly engaged NGOs, and intellectuals acting as articulators of the public interest from the 1980s onwards. The density of this sphere has intensified, witnessed by the arrival of many new public formations seeking to broaden the legitimate scope of engagement around anti-corruption, election monitoring, consumer watchdogs and public health—to name a few. Since 1997 one can speak of a qualitative leap in terms of this intensity, with networks of activists, intellectuals and the media using the constitution to push forward social justice agendas and people’s participation. Such politics have become influential for several reasons. First, the failure of the party political system to function as an interest aggregator and articulator gives these movements significance despite their relatively small size. Second, their significance is also derived from positive factors: a long accumulation of strategic knowledge and resources, and the formation of dynamic networks. Third, the contested reformation of the state over the last twenty years has provided a space for reformists in the bureaucracy to interact with such currents, leading to a process of appropriation and partnership. What is more, inasmuch as civic education waged by government and non-government bodies is highly abstract, the politics of civic engagement provides, according to its advocates, a greater learning ground for bringing into being informed citizenship. The rise of civic politics marks the shift away from state-based democratic education programmes towards the intervention of new ‘civil society’ forces into the ideological recomposition of Thailand following the political and economic crisis of 1997.

In focusing on civic politics in this chapter, much of the more radical activity of forces in pro-democracy networks and more radically oriented NGOs is necessarily overshadowed. This focus is warranted because the forces of civic engagement have had a degree of organizational and ideological impact on the state. Moreover, while there is ideological and strategic differentiation among NGOs and social movements, it is clear that in practice there is an orientation to the politics of constituting a functioning public sphere. This project, a reflection of the crisis of development and money-democracy, has been influenced by intellectuals, NGOs and activists who have sought to revisualize Thailand as a place of community, citizenship and nationhood. While the National Identity Board was busy articulating the ideology of the king as head of state, figures elsewhere were eager to break from the fossilization of ideology and seek a reformed nationalism of the people based on local knowledge and wisdom, but still drawing on Buddhism and monarchy. Their communitarian perspective on democracy within a newly imagined nation of Thais has drawn succour from the ideological and real crisis faced by the Thai state, especially after 1997. In the following, a tentative genealogy of the formation of reformed nationalism is offered that highlights the interrelationship of significant actors and circumstances in fuelling new national imaginings. Like liberalism, this is an emergent formation and its origins are fragmentary and circumstantial.
The chapter begins with a discussion of NGOs, not because they are uniformly part of civic politics, but because the context of their operations in the 1980s led NGOs to promote rights-based discourses beyond the more select development aspects of their work. These organizations, working on the ground, through networks, and finding exposure in various media, significantly reworked and challenged the rights and citizenship framework of the state and the liberals. Indeed, through NGO practice and its ideological effects, the state’s monolithic ethos of the Thai common good would come to be pluralized into many localized common goods. This undermined the hegemonic effect of conservative national ideology (Thainess), and liberal invocations of the individual. When local peoples and activists raised banners against particular development programmes (dams, for example) that were purportedly ‘in the national interest’, they put pressure on the delayed liberalism of the state, pushing for a more fertile realization of liberty and responsibility in the locale.

NGOs, rights and development
The emergence of development NGOs, which had their modern origins in the late 1960s among reforming elites, was a matter of great historical consequence. The history of NGOs in Thailand is customarily related to the efforts of the late Puey Ungphakorn, a leading government economic technocrat, who famously began to criticize the government’s growth-oriented economic policy and was instrumental in the establishment of the Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement. The moderately reformist Puey would be later hounded out of the country by right-wing fanatics in the wake of the massacre at Thammasat university. In this atmosphere, NGOs operated under extremely difficult circumstances, with state elements continuing to portray them as communist fronts right into the 1990s.

In considering the influence of NGOs, it will be useful to focus on the small but important and enduring human rights organization, the Union of Civil Liberty (UCL). Formed in November 1973 with figures such as Kothom Ariya and Saneh Chamarik at the forefront, the UCL addressed the issue of democracy from the perspective of institutionalizing human rights. Dedicated to educating and socializing people around constitutional and human rights, the UCL’s first constitution expressed its objectives thus:

At this moment the Thai people have a tacit understanding that any form of government which lacks respect for, and the promotion of, the freedom and rights of the people is but a way for corrupt and decadent state administration…which subverts security and the progress of the individual and the nation.

Tirelessly working to propagate rights and dispense advice, the group soon found itself inundated with grievances from farmers and workers. However, in the charged atmosphere of the times, the UCL was hard pressed for credibility. While right-wing paramilitary organizations were gunning down working-class and peasant leaders during 1975–76, the UCL failed to issue condemnations of alleged official involvement. It was also being pressed by left-wing activists to join in the popular movement, while military radio was calling it part of the communist current. Such issues led to great tension as some members sought to join up with the popular movement while others sought to remain formally neutral. In any case, the group was effectively silenced after the 1976 coup. It was revived in July 1979, and thenceforth pursued political neutrality, as well as making an explicitly endorsing ement of non-violence. Throughout the 1980s the UCL bravely functioned as a human rights monitoring group, as well as a launching pad for the formation of other groups. A number of Thailand’s prominent NGO workers have been associated with the UCL in some way.

In the first half of the 1980s, some communist and student returnees from the jungle, and other left-wingers, debated new strategies for the revolutionary movement, searching for answers to the failure of the CPT and the popular movement. Arguments ranged from seeking a rethinking of radical politics along reformist and socialist humanist lines, to others wanting to rebuild the left along Leninist lines. Others were simply demoralized. Somkiat Wanthana paints a picture of a depressed left:

The mentality of the age…was inert. Among the progressive sector it was melancholy. The glass that cracked, the idol that fell from the shelf, the world that turned upside down…were the images that many students and intellectuals surely had in their heads.

The period signalled a shift from broadly Marxist-oriented left politics towards issue-based politics and engagement with the state and political sphere where possible. Considering the failure of the CPT, and given the dual challenge facing the left in the 1980s—the attempt to entrench military and bureaucratic notions of democracy and the rise of parliamentary democracy—Thai Marxists attempted to find a new strategic path. The editors of the radical political economy journal Warasan Setthasat Kanmeuang argued that the constitutional struggle of 1983 was essentially an argument between the various leaders of the capitalist state, namely: traditional rulers who want an amendment to the constitution so they can receive support…of the traditional capitalists who have partly developed from landlords and have influence in the bureaucracy.

The editors gave qualified support to elites struggling to strengthen parliamentary politics, but noted it would be the task of radicals to extend the struggle so that proper principles of democracy were established. These were defined as ‘participation of the people in defining their destiny, and opening up opportunities in different types of elections to allow broad social participation in the economy, society and politics’. The idea of civil society (prachasangkhom) would come to describe these developments, although the term itself was understood in a broadly Gramscian way in the mid-1980s. With the rise of local struggles and then the emergence of the democratic struggle of 1991–92 the moderate idea of civil society as a normative force against an overbearing state gained wide influence. Based on a critique of older forms of class-based struggle, civil society became a new way of conceptualizing a broad-based struggle for justice around pluralist politics and new norms of civic engagement.

With the political left in organizational and ideological disarray in the 1980s, a modest ‘movement’ based on local developmental problems gradually took hold. Indeed, as one NGO activist explains it, between 1979 and 1980 a number of progressive intellectuals involved in the mass movements of the 1970s consciously shifted towards small-scale NGO-type activity, seeing this as localized and less likely to provoke state repression, as it would be perceived as less threatening to those in power than other forms of activity. For many, the politics of the UCL, as neutral and issue-based, seemed more realistic in this situation. Kothom Ariya noted how the 1980s offered the opportunity for a more modest politics to take shape:

When the left-wing wind is blowing I am lagging behind, at the times when the CPT advocated armed struggle I was speaking about non-violence, so out of tune, but what I claim as a credit is when the opposite wind blew I was in front and many retreated.

Kothom also positively appraises the advances made by the NGO movement in its shift from an oppositionist stance in the early 1980s to winning acceptance among the business and bureaucratic sectors later in the decade. As a one-time president of the Thai Development Support Committee, he was a central player in the Campaign for Popular Democracy, before moving to Pollwatch and becoming a Commissioner of the Electoral Commission of Thailand.

NGOs’ local focus provided a breeding ground for new strategies that eventually merged into a loose national network aiming to promote sustainable development and participatory democracy. In this context, groups such as the UCL and its offshoots provided much of the rights discourse, cementing different groups with a common language. UCL’s founding president Saneh Chamarik wrote extensively on human rights and also linked the dominant NGO discourse of people-centred development with the recovery of local community culture. Saneh, close to the UN development research community, assumed the chair of the important NGO-Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (NGO-CORD) in 1989–92, and was central in the propagation of community rights over resource management, a position that was fermenting within the multitude of local struggles spread throughout the nation. This provided developmental NGOs with a language that articulated local developmental needs, seen as ‘alternative development’ with rights-based discourses aimed at constitutional structures and the state, a process that would gain momentum in the 1990s.

The intersection of unbalanced economic growth, its environmental and social consequences for local communities, and the response of critics to this, led to rapid growth of the developmental NGO movement, from some thirty or forty organizations in the early 1980s to over 300 in the late 1990s. Such origins do not offer up an orderly pattern of development. However, it might be useful to follow Suthy Prasartset’s discussion of NGO development. Suthy argues that there have been four overlapping strategies within the NGO movement, what he calls the four-corner strategy. In part, each strategy is seen as a phase, but cumulatively the four-corner strategy is held to describe the Thai NGO movement.

To simplify Suthy’s schema somewhat, the four-corner strategy is first marked by the ‘search for alternative livelihood’. NGOs in the early 1980s promoted self-reliance and people’s participation in local development. Such activity was characterized by promoting small cooperatives and various commodity banks for the benefit of small producers. Such a local focus gave rise to popular discourses of community culture, economic delinking from the global economy (present in the form of agribusiness as well as older forms of merchant intermediaries) and integrated farming for self-reliance. Concomitant with this was a promotion of ‘local wisdom’, which entailed elevating the knowledge of local leaders who were seen as the repository of a community’s learning evolution and encyclopaedic in their appreciation of local circumstance. Developing from this first stage was the second corner of NGO strategy, which entailed promoting networking among NGOs and people’s organizations. This resulted in the formation of numerous networks across the nation which were based on information exchange and solidarity around common issues. Third, as Thailand entered its accelerated boom in the mid-1980s, placing pressure on natural resources, there emerged a generalized conflict, ‘pitting the state and corporate sector against the popular sector’. A consequence of this was the third strategy: the urgent need to articulate policy alternatives and raise public awareness. In this regard NGOs proposed an alternative People’s Development Plan, emphasizing, among other things, just development and support for the agriculture sector without linkage to agribusiness. Finally, Suthy notes that NGOs began to consciously devise a strategy of alliance building, the fourth corner, with state officials and others so as to coordinate their projects and win greater legitimacy. Furthermore, they aimed at galvanizing broad support from the urban middle class and academics.

The above may suggest a coherent politics, strategy and historical progression, but it is important to recognize that NGOs did not form a unified movement. Indeed, there were many ideological tendencies in the NGO movement. However, by the mid-1980s many development NGOs presented a generic united front which was critical of mainstream development (macro-economic focused, industrialist, GDP-focused) and authoritarianism. They also rejected strategies of mass mobilization and class struggle. In its Directory of 1987, the Thai Volunteer Service provides something of a broad-brush depiction of NGO political orientation:

The NGDOs [Non-government development organizations] reject the use of power conflicts or violence as a way of solving problems. They associate such methods with dictatorship and feel that their use can only lead to further misery, conflict and violence. NGDOs feel that developing people’s consciousness and carrying out small-scale peaceful, practical activities is a more appropriate and secure path to social change in Thai contexts. Thai NGDOs view social development not as an overt struggle but as a long, peaceful process of change in consciousness. A great deal of this theoretical orientation is rooted in prevailing cultural values and an appreciation of current political realities, particularly local government officials’ distrust of NGDOs. The unhappy experience of many Thai intellectuals with constitutional and rapid popular mobilization efforts, right-wing violence and an ideologically backward Communist Party during the 1970s have also played a part in producing a reaction against much radical social theory and the confrontational political activism practiced in other Asian Countries.

If disillusion with older forms of struggle was motivating a more modest practice, as well as a modest expectation of what could be achieved, the overwhelming nature of foreign funding for these organizations further accentuated this tendency. One comprehensive analysis of the staffing and financial structure of 135 NGDO groupings in the late 1980s found them mostly foreign-funded with limited means and staff. International NGOs and foreign governments were funding NGOs according to their own agendas. Some of these funding mechanisms might be seen as promoting the expansion of either international social democracy or liberalism, depending on the funding body. To the extent that NGOs were dependent on funding they were required to plan, justify and develop programmes in line with the international developmental ethos whose endpoint was forms of just capitalism. Equally, this meant developing professionalism, accountability and integration with international agendas of ‘just’ development. Inevitably, this also entailed a degree of bureaucratization, career ladders, self-advancement and funding for projects that were not based on popular demands but on NGO prerogative. The pressures for moderate approaches were further felt when, in the early 1990s, it looked as if Thai NGOs would lose a significant proportion of foreign funding (as Thailand was no longer considered a poor nation). The Thai Foundation was set up to develop the fundraising capacities of local NGOs and to promote the philanthropic sensitivity of Thai business and the middle class. Such moves further differentiate NGOs into those promoting a responsible and socially useful image, integral to the public good and Thai society, and those remaining more critical of capitalist development and its greed ethos.

Another significant aspect of the changing nature of development discourses was the active engagement of government with NGO forces and ideas. Reformist elites were by no means outside the development of the NGO ‘social-political infrastructure’, as Suthy names it. As early as 1984 NGOs proposed the establishment of a joint committee of NGOs and government agencies, a proposal supported and acted on by the National Economic and Social Development Board. Such developments pressed on the NGOs the need for a national coordinating body, which came into being in 1985 as NGO-CORD, to which many NGOs are affiliated while maintaining their own organizational autonomy. As Prudhisan and Maneerat observe, this was not a matter of co-option by the state, but represented a greater negotiating power on behalf of NGOs. To varying degrees, NGOs coordinated their projects with state officials, depending on the campaign and receptiveness of officials. As the boom spread, however, and pressure on resources grew, this relationship became increasingly tense, with some NGOs becoming supportive of people’s confrontation with ‘maldevelopment’ projects. In turn, state and private sector actors resorted to repressive tactics. Nevertheless, attempts were made to seek coordination and dialogue with both the bureaucracy and parliamentary institutions. A series of seminars in the late 1980s and early 1990s, aiming to open a dialogue on mutual work and promote the exchange of information, brought together NGO leaders and MPs. Such moves hinted at the strategic advance of NGOs in staking a legitimate position within the political sphere.

In 1992 important sections of the NGO movement and their intellectual allies issued the Declaration of the Customary Rights of Local Communities. In many ways this document provides the clearest exposition of NGO strategic thinking in the 1990s. It presents a critique of development as practised by the state-capital alliance and proposes alternative development measures as well as outlining a political strategy. Thai industrialization is said to have been achieved by the extraction of the rural surplus from Thai farmers, a process now threatening the rural communities. With the state supporting the private sector, there had been environmental degradation, the impoverishment of rural communities and the emergence of agribusiness. This is said to have occurred against a backdrop of authoritarianism, which had been justified by the need to harmonize and stabilize development. The document notes that state legislation dating from 1964 gave the state ownership of all forest reserves, resulting in the usurpation of traditional ownership by local forest dwellers. As the state moved to enforce its ownership, in order to provide natural resources to the private sector during the boom years, conflicts regularly flared up between officials and locals. Interestingly, the declaration cites one of the king’s speeches that pointed to the precedence of the property rights of individuals over retrospective legislation transferring ownership to the state:

In forests designated as reserved or restricted, there were people there already at the time of delineation. It seems rather odd for us to enforce the reserved forest law on people in the forest which became reserved only subsequently by the mere drawing of lines on pieces of paper. The problem arises in as much as, with the delineation done, these people became violators of the law. From the viewpoint of law, it is a violation, because the law was duly enacted; but according to natural law the violator of the law is he who drew the lines, because the people who has [sic] been in the forest previously possessed the rights of man, meaning that the authorities has [sic] encroached upon individuals and not individuals transgressing on the law of the land.

Having offered a critique of the state of development, the declaration then moves to its political position. It notes that industrial development has spawned a middle class which, it states, is the core of the human rights movement in Thailand:

The emergence of the human rights movement among the middle class could, to a certain extent, help contain the military dictatorship’s role and influence. It also opens up opportunities for business–industrial groups to rise to power in the politico-economic arena. This is the rationale for the formation of the business group for democracy.

The Declaration notes some positive developments among business groups relating to democratic development, but strikes a cautionary note on the self-interested attitude of business to democracy. Furthermore, the freedoms and rights of business in the new democracy are said to be at the expense of the ‘majority rural-agricultural sector’. Coming to the strategic question of how the NGOs might relate to the capitalist and middle classes, the ball is rhetorically thrown into the potential allies’ court:

A choice is to be made as to whether the newly-emerged capitalist and middle class would continue to follow the authoritarian path…. Or whether they would take a democratic path which is the common aspiration of all sectors in society, not just for the middle class.

By deed, many NGO activists have answered that question themselves. Suspicious, but hopeful, NGOs pursue a strategy of working with progressive sections in state agencies and business, hopeful that with the institutionalization of democracy they will be in a better position to address the issues of maldevelopment. It is this tension between suspicion and hope that characterizes NGO approaches to the liberal elite, in pursuit of a ‘minimum’ programme.

This battle to win acceptance of business and the state to alternative development visions and new forms of participatory democracy, which places importance on communities, has shaped public discourse in the last decade. It has served to link local community issues to national political levels and it has spawned a broad current of thought known as ‘localism’ (thongthinniyom), which became something of a generic slogan for a strategy of recapturing a past communitarian ethos to help local communities negotiate their way through the hazards of the global market economy. The guiding theme of localists is the necessity of rooting development (in the sense of people’s wellbeing) strategies in people’s own practices by a process of consciousness-raising. Localism takes a participatory approach to development as a process of learning, where the reference point is rooted in existing culture and communities. Its focus on community rehabilitation means that localism is also seen as a way of strengthening and remoralizing the nation after the perceived moral collapse into materialism during the economic boom. Against the background of ‘maldevelopment’ and responding to popular antipathy to unbalanced developmental capitalism, a number of prominent intellectuals theoretically intervened in the NGO movement in an attempt to place a theoretical unity across their diverse practices and constituencies. The intellectual attempt of the so-called community culture school to extract some ‘indigenous’ core from peasant and rural life practices, as a basis to return cultural dignity to a nation they see being degraded by materialism, was, in the first instance, a radical political critique of existing society. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, intellectuals within and close to state organs such as the National Economic and Social Development Board and the National Culture Commission developed a moderate brand of localism which has come to have a significant impact on reformed notions of national identity and democracy. There is a sense in which it may be said that localism became mainstreamed. What was essentially a counter-hegemonic position in the 1980s was in the 1990s, by a process of appropriation and partnership with state agencies, a key ideological and organizational resource in saving Thai capitalism from itself. It might be useful to see moderate localism as part of a broad ideological current that Somchai Phatharathananunth terms ‘elite civil society’. This is characterized by state society cooperation and involves potential domination by the state of civil society forces. At another level, though, it may also be possible to suggest that emergent forms of cooperation are also part of the changing nature of the state; it is not necessarily a strategy of defensive co-option in order for things to stay the same, but a process of adaptation as the integral state undergoes liberal change.
From radicalism to reform

The radical position is articulated in the work of Chatthip Nartsupha, whose Marxist historical work on political economy has, in recent years, been superseded by his shift to a somewhat anarchist position on community culture (watthanatham chumchon), and his liberal position on national democratic structures. In a recent preface to an English translation of his The Thai Village Economy in the Past, Chatthip tells of how he moved from a study of the economy and culture of the state, to a study of village economy and culture, which meant a shift in research methodology from documents and statistics to ‘interviewing ordinary people and listening to the account of their lives, difficulties and struggles for subsistence’. This is a significant observation, for it registers the shift to an epistemology of the local, and a strategy built on local knowledge in the 1980s. The base position of this approach was to turn villagers themselves into crafters of their own development by drawing on local resources of knowledge and community affection. Armed with their own self-knowledge, confident with their local identity, villagers could negotiate development on their own terms. At its most radical, the community culture orientation preached de-linking and a rejection of the market economies. Few villages have actually taken this path, and few NGOs are proponents of this position. Instead a more general theme has emerged on the importance of drawing on local resources for development, rather than development being a project led from the outside.

One implication of the culturalist focus of Chatthip is seen in his argument on the need to Thai-ify development such that the Thai bourgeoisie becomes encultured in village ways of life, rather than slavishly following ‘Western’ consumerism and the high culture of the royal court. Addressing the failure of the Sino-Thai capitalist class to lead the ‘Thai’ masses in a bourgeois democratic revolution, Chatthip curiously proposed that the Sino-Thai capitalists mix their tentative embracing of liberal democracy with community culture:

if [I]f the Thai bourgeoisie were to accept this mixed ideology that contains both Western liberalism and peasant culture, then the bourgeoisie will be more Thai, will more consciously identify with the development of the country. When they share the same identity as the majority of Thais, the bourgeoisie will be stronger and may become a true vehicle for the advance of ideology in Thailand.

This fusion would be a form of ‘progressive’ Thai nationalism, which disavows the high culture of the centre and revalues the ancient Thai traditions of kind-heartedness, said to be rooted in the spiritual values of village communities. This suggestion of cultural politics, of changing the identity of the Thai elite, partly motivates the broad localist current.

One question emerges from all of this: why would the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie concern itself with peasant culture in a bid to legitimate itself as fully Thai? For Chatthip, the Thaification of the Sino-bourgeoisie becomes a historical possibility because, as he argues, community culture discourse and strategy is not one centred on class polarization but stresses the ‘people’, a term that encompasses the middle class. This disavowal of Marxist class struggle seemingly breaks a barrier, for the progressive bourgeoisie should be willing to form an alliance with the people, since there is no threat of class revolution. Reflecting his Marxist past, Chatthip lays his cards on the table:

in [I]n reality, what we face is capitalism. We should therefore have a maximum program and a minimum program. The maximum program is anarchism and the minimum program is progressive capitalism. In other words, we demand that a progressive middle class share administrative power and the management of the economy with village communities.

Pasuk and Baker, in a review of Chatthip’s recent work, note how he later moved away from the minimum programme and has instead focused on the building of rural community networks that retreat from relationships with the state and capital. Certainly, the anarchism of Chatthip’s version of localism places him on the radical edge of anti-statism.

Others, however, while critical of the state, pursue a politics of collaboration with state agencies, in the hope of advancing self-capacity as part of a reduction of the role of the state in an effort to enhance the capacity of ‘civil society’. This current may be termed ‘moderate localism’. Moderate localism is a different animal than earlier manifestations of localism as theorized by Chatthip under the rubric of the ‘community culture school’.

The shifting forms of localism are partly exemplified in the thought of Saneh Chamarik. Saneh, who is best located between radical and moderate localism, is an influential thinker and has sought to propagate village culture and local wisdom within a Buddhist frame, without the Marxist and anarchist colouring of Chatthip. If Chatthip’s work spoke to more radical elements in the development sector, Saneh has a broader appeal, unclouded as it is by hopes of radical peasant federations.
Saneh’s critique of capitalism is really a critique of capitalism without human values. For Saneh, the neo-classical approach to economic growth places the interests of a minority at the centre while depriving the majority ‘of their productive potentials, and, most significantly, right to development’. It is not the market which is the problem but rather the idea that it can rule unregulated. Indeed, the market is described as an outcome of the great evolutionary scheme of history ‘when societies and the world at large come to be interdependent’. It is the conditions under which it operates, and whether actors are equally placed to deal with its exigencies, that concerns Saneh:

The market is a necessity, as is producing for the market, but farmers should not only focus on this dimension because we must accept that the agricultural basis of our farmers is as petty producers.

Thus practical strategies for development have preoccupied Saneh. Among his proposals is the call for state aid in research and development to assist small farmers to be able to respond to the world market. More recently Saneh has connected the issue of local wisdom to the development of small and medium enterprises. Given Saneh’s diagnosis, the challenge for NGOs was to enter the policy bodies of the state such that its unbalanced development policies could be addressed.

Saneh’s critique of existing conditions is embedded in a critical Buddhism in which good politics can only emerge when linked to wisdom and ethics. For Saneh, Thai Buddhist institutions needed to be more effective in propagating the Buddhist philosophy of a state based on dharma and virtue. Such propagation could influence the practice of secular politics. Critical of political reform as simply a technocratic attempt to counter money-politics, Saneh proposes that solutions be found at the local level, where petty producers, working cooperatively, could impact on the national political structures:

[V]arious community economic networks will combine and become a new social force to change the structure and relations of power towards balance and freedom…according to the processes of grassroots democracy.

For Saneh, the economic crisis of 1997 provided an opportunity to commence a debate on development. It could also lead to a highlighting of the need to work towards modest economic growth at local levels, based on self-reliant methods whereby communities raised their own credits and worked through various mechanisms to lift the level of capital within a community. Furthermore, local economic development would ultimately benefit national capital in its dealings with foreigners, for it would provide Thai capitalism with an economy rooted in local strength. This would be aided by a return to Thailand’s ‘cultural capital’ (thun watthanatham) held to be embodied in Buddhist wisdom.

Saneh’s critique of capitalism, at times rhetorically powerful, becomes, in the circumstances of national crisis, a critique of neo-liberalism and the market’s inability to lift the agricultural sector up to a real functioning market level. In essence, Saneh proposes a reformed national capitalism that draws sustenance from local communities so as to be able better to compete in the world economy. Such a position has become influential in directing the work of a number of rural NGOs.
Prawet Wasi similarly argues for the need to develop local capital in Thailand in a manner consonant with local culture and wisdom. The designation of Prawet as an advocate of localism is somewhat limiting, as this is just one aspect of his Buddhist communitarianism. Prawet’s localism is conversant with international trends which began to value the local in development from the mid-1980s onwards. Prawet has been a long-term board member of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the body responsible for producing Thailand’s broad five-year development plans, and has used that position to push participation and the importance of community in development. At the same time, a central figure in the Local Development Institute, Prawet has been an influential figure among moderate NGOs. Critical of the ‘compartmentalized’ thinking that produces an emphasis on material development as the measure of progress, Prawet suggests that a more holistic approach to development would see a return to culture—which is simply conceived as situated wisdom and integrated knowledge of local places, within an overarching Buddhist rationality. Following the broad stream of localism, Prawet argues for the need to develop local capital in Thailand in a manner consonant with the local culture and wisdom of the people.

Prawet’s basic communitarianism emerges in his conception of communities as places of common locality and identity where citizens come together to solve problems and advance their wellbeing. For Prawet, communities are the basic component of democracy, a place where individuals as members of groups cooperate, share knowledge and work towards creative solutions to common problems. People in communities, not necessarily geographic, share common ideals, beliefs and objectives. They have love, fraternity and collective learning. Supplementing this broad communitarianism is the more developmental concern with growing social capital in communities, and on this Prawet is clearly conversant with the ‘Putnam School’ and its stress on social capital (norms, networks and trust) as the social underpinnings of growth. In this way of thinking, communities are seen as democratic building blocks because the extent to which they are able to be self-reliant in generating solutions to their problems, is also the extent to which democracy can be consolidated at the national level. It is at local sites that the imperatives of civic responsibility and public mindedness can best be nurtured, and it is therefore there that communities, with adequate social capital, can establish a strong moral base to sustain democracy.
Although broadly embracing a communitarian position, Prawet is first and foremost a thinker who repeatedly integrates his social critique with Buddhist themes; principal among them is the need to possess ‘right thinking’ (sammaditthi)—which is no less than ensuring a full understanding of the Buddha’s teachings. For example, regarding development Prawet says:

The Thai path of development is, therefore, not a desperate chase to keep up with farang [Westerners]. We have learned that the western model of development is a mistake because it is based on a money chase. Our path must transcend this. We must stay one step ahead of the world by remaining faithful to the right concept, or sammaditthi, of development. It is one which focuses on goodness while interlocking the economy with mind, family, community, culture and the environment.


With Prawet’s Buddhist position comes an ethic of impermanence and detachment—ideas that are used by Prawet to propagate non-anger and non-violence on the basis of non-attachment to positions, and which seemingly positions him above polarized conflicts based on material interest. Buddhism also provides Prawet with his rationale for human rights and respect of human dignity, which is seen to lie in each individual’s capacity for right understanding. As much as Prawet seeks to inculcate right thinking into individuals, he sees it also as immanent in the social whole, by a logic of reciprocity whereby a good society and right understanding are mutually reinforcing. Thus he roots individual potential—or the capacity of right understanding—in the social conditions that prevail.

Underlying these seemingly progressive positions lies a strong current of elitism. The elitism itself comes out in the various pronouncements that Prawet makes about the state of the Thai people. In an open letter to the prime minister, for example, Prawet explained that Thais possess a small conscience and that ‘people still cannot think more of the public interest than themselves and their cronies’. Prawet is a disciplinary thinker who makes no bones about the need to educate the masses in the ways of rationality and public-mindedness. Importantly, in discussing the lessons of May 1992 when confrontation between democracy protestors and the Thai military led to scores of people being shot dead, Prawet argued that the hope for Thai democracy was the middle class because they were educated and their lifestyle required rational calculation. Thus he thought more effort needed to be put into making them a new moral force. As for workers and peasants, the vast majority of the Thai population, Prawet implicitly argued that their efforts for social change were prone to violence. For Prawet, then, it is the middle class who best encapsulate the values of the rational citizen. Here the middle class is construed as teachers, shopkeepers, civil servants, business-people, etc. What marks all of these groups is a reasonable degree of economic independence. This underlines one aspect of elite communitarian thought—the need for communities to provide a basis of economic growth such that the people populating them come to have the characteristics of the middle class, namely rationality. ‘Self-reliance’ and ‘self-sufficiency’, then, all comes down to providing the material conditions for a deliberative rationality, a prerequisite for democracy. By a long detour one may say that Prawet arrives at a proto-modernist position on the role of the middle classes in democracy.
Prawet’s elite communitarianism and democratic outlook converge. Collectively, for him, communities are sites of learning as they endeavour to move towards higher moral states embodied in the principle of self-reliance. In this, intellectuals are seen as having a responsibility to lead by first understanding the conditions and worldview (local wisdom) of the villagers (chaoban). This comes about not through abstract discussion or education but through engagement with issues that emerge in communities and which become points of organization, grievance and, hopefully, community deliberation.

In response to the growth of state power, Prawet proposed the strengthening of civil society/community by focusing on increasing people’s own power. However, rejecting the idea that the state and business sectors were ‘all rotten’, he proposed that the state and business sector be utilized in building up the strength of society: ‘Don’t let us think that they are enemies like communists, we must think in terms of allies.’ Influenced by development concepts of participation, and in pursuit of unity in development between the state and other actors, Prawet proposed new structures for deliberation that bring various groupings under the rubric of what he calls ‘penjapakkhi’ or a partnership of five sides, including state officials, NGOs, people’s organizations, academics and the private sector. In this is, perhaps, Prawet’s most important contribution to the ‘participatory’ aspect of democratization in Thailand, having led to the establishment of prachakhom, or provincial-level civic assemblies throughout Thailand. At Prawet’s suggestion, the Eighth National Development Plan called for the establishment of prachakhom, described as ‘assemblies for the purpose of formulating development plans and guidelines for the provinces’. What is significant in this development is the institutionalization of state/society relations through civic assemblies in which each sector discusses development issues. Although the bodies have no binding authority, they are meant to provide popular input into programmes.

In the above we can identify quite clearly the manner in which Prawet is a disciplinary thinker. He aims to mould the nature of citizens by inculcating a form of rationalism which will be educed by taking account of local circumstance and the nature of emergent knowledge in the locale. Any citizen’s engagement with this process is to be one that conforms broadly to principles of rational thought (the right way) and which envisages a consensual process of learning which avoids polarity and conflict. Prawet, despite the local, comes to sanction the unity of the Thai, and the prachakhom are an organizational embodiment of this.

Socializing political reform, mitigating the economic crisis
While at one level, and corresponding to structural interests, political reform might be conceived as part of the politics of capitalist good governance, at another it may also be seen as a basis on which to build social justice around communitarian ethics encased in a liberal political shell. Taking the latter as their framework, a number of organizations associated with localism have embraced the opportunities for participation afforded by the new constitution and new rhetoric of participatory development embraced by the NESDB and bureaucratic bodies. To illustrate this connection, the following looks at the collaboration between the Local Development Institute (LDI) and Civicnet.

The LDI has, in one form or another, been an influential actor in the domestic NGO scene for close to two decades, its leaders being prominent persons such as Saneh Jamarik and Prawet Wasi. A mediator for international aid, it also relates closely to reformist elements in the bureaucracy. It has long been involved in local development projects and providing support for small-scale development initiatives, assisting in hundreds of these in the last decade. Soon after the crisis the LDI formed the Save the Nation Forum (prachakhom kopban ku meuang) to provide an alternative explanation of the economic crisis and to suggest solutions rooted in localism and nationalism. It aimed at forming a pluralistic cross-class movement based on ‘collective learning’ to overcome materialism, Westernization, patronage culture and corruption. The forum was short-lived (April–May 1998), with limited reach, although it provided a basis for the creation of some new networks countrywide.

Civicnet, formally established in the aftermath of the economic crisis, was an initiative of individuals who had been closely associated with the Bangkok Forum, environmental groups and LDI. One key member, Anuchart Puangsamli, noting how the power of the middle class was traditionally seen to be centred in Bangkok, explains that one motive behind the formation of Civicnet was to tap into the power of emerging middle classes in the provinces. Given the limited engagement of the Bangkok middle class post-1992, it became apparent that new sources of change needed to be identified: ‘We tried to look at the people in the provinces, there are a number of educated people there, a number of professionals and business peoples.’ While NGOs focused on disaffected groups and organized around particular issues, the provincial urban middle class (itself often the leadership of these NGOs) had few places to congregate and deliberate on public issues. Civicnet would provide an avenue for the formation of a politically engaged middle class that could intersect and inform other movements. Indeed, a key organizing activity of Civicnet is training programmes to equip individuals and groups with the capacity to be ‘change agents’. It sees its work as one of providing training to bodies of activists and publicly minded middle-class persons with the skills and wisdom to confront local and national problems through processes of deliberation and learning. As Chaiwat Thirapan, a leading member of Civicnet, explains:

We don’t want to work as a protest or pressure group; we want to create the opportunity of new alternatives, and to develop strength from positive action and thinking…. We work with many groupings and we have observed that through dialogue with other groups and institutions, they start to change their minds.

In line with these politics of dialogue, Civicnet was a supporter, along with LDI and Prawet in the NESDB, of the formation of prachakhom (civic assemblies) as new spaces for deliberation:

We tried to think very hard of how to set up some sort of social space for people at the provincial level to come together and talk, because we think that the citizenship wouldn’t happen if people don’t have space to exercise their ideas…they wouldn’t have place to learn. So that is why we try to encourage this idea…we didn’t mean to set up an organization, rather set up a forum for people to talk.

The prachakhom have been subject to significant criticism by several observers who see them as sites where state officials and local notables have come to dominate. These criticisms bring into focus the issue of the nature of deliberative processes when participants come together in cultural settings where power is scripted around status, position, gender, wealth and sexuality. LDI and Civicnet are not oblivious to these problems, indeed they seek a long-term redress to them through participation and the creation of public opinion which will gradually act as a social sanction. Nor are they naive about some state actors’ intentions, thus counselling caution in relations with the state. Nonetheless, theirs is a strategy of engagement which follows from a firm belief in the power of dialogue and learning processes, and the possibility of bringing into being moral counterweights to the decadent practices of money-democracy, bureaucratic theft and local thuggery.

In 1997 the LDI shifted its focus from the formation of prachakhom to what it termed ‘the period of social reform and macro mobilization’. Seeking to expand its influence nationally through various networks, and by propagating the formation of collective learning through deliberative forums and campaigns, the LDI posed for itself a grand quest itemized in a nine-point strategy: the establishment of a social reform refund to ‘develop central co-coordinating committees to work with agencies under the principal ministries’, help develop consumer networks, assist in the development of media for social reform, assist prachakhom to reform education and the value system, assist prachakhom for the reform of law and the macro economy, and open the state to more people’s participation in order to strengthen communities.

The work of LDI and Civicnet has largely converged around the project of social reform. In the face of the economic crisis and the resulting national reflection on its causes, localism and its embracing of local wisdom and self-reliance became a key public discourse. Also, calls for fresh and paradigm-breaking thinking were heard. This positioned the two organizations as significant actors in the ideological maelstrom resulting from the crisis. People, and in particular Prawet Wasi, began to speak about utilizing social energy—the power of local communities in interaction and in a process of learning—as a way out of the crisis.

In November 1999 the LDI co-coordinated a number of public intellectuals, including Prawet Wasi, Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Bowonsak Uwanno and Seksan Prasertkul (a mixed bag to say the least) to support a joint statement outlining what was described as the ‘Forces of the Land Strategy to Solve the National Crisis’. In the face of foreign domination, the authors counselled that

Time has proven that the power of the state is not sufficient to solve the national crisis, it is necessary that the social or people sector consolidates its power and takes part in solving the crisis. There is no power that can solve such complicated problems besides the power of society (SOCIAL ENERGY). Social energy comes from the coming together to think and act—all over the Thai nation, in all places, all organizations, on all issues—as a force of the land (phalang phaen din)…. This social energy should have three methods, act by oneself, work with the state, scrutinise the state…. In the age of globalization neither the state nor society alone has sufficient power to preserve the country’s economic sovereignty. The state and the people need to integrate as a civil-state (pracharat).

Although the term pracharat is contained in the national anthem, a more recent meaning was elaborated by the liberal royalist Chai-Anan. In a series of articles concerning globalization and change, Chai-Anan tapped into popular writings on the changing nature of the state to produce a broad dichotomy between the older nation-state and the ideal state of the global era. While the nation-state was characterized by such features as uniformity, submission, dependence, compulsion and control, the civil state promotes diversity, freedom, autonomy, pluralism and empowerment and good governance (including institutionalized relations between the state and civil society), as prescribed by the United Nations Development Programme.
If the idealized prachakhom might be seen as miniature versions of pracharat in local and provincial settings, the next stage was clearly to have the same kind of idealized interaction and integration at the national level. This is what partly lies behind the idea of ‘forces of the land’. This is not to say that there is any illusion about a pracharat coming into existence; rather, as an ideal it motivates the activities of the organizations concerned, and acts as a regulating goal for their work. The idea of the civil-state articulates liberal and communitarian positions: the civil-state and its inherent liberalism will foster the strength and revitalization of communities. One illustrative example of this kind of politics is the Forces of the Land Forum (wethi phalang phaendin), which is discussed below.

The Forces of the Land Forum
In 1998 the newly established Thai-rak-Thai party, in an effort to broaden its appeal and to rebut criticisms of it being just another capitalist party, began to meet with communities, NGOs and public intellectuals in an effort to hammer out a policy platform. In the course of discussions, TRT edged towards a number of seemingly progressive positions including suspension of farmers’ debts, cheap health care and increased village funds. Its nominal membership base also rose from tens of thousands to a reputed eleven million by mid-2001. In its policy documents, the party also spoke of harnessing local wisdom for the wellbeing of the nation.
The apparent openness of TRT led to a number of dialogues between the party and public intellectuals, with the Strategy to Save the Nation (see above) clearly being aimed at the electioneering parties. It was Thaksin who most ambitiously drew on localism discourse. Indeed, Phonladej Pinpratip, the present Secretary-General of LDI, informs that a number of key reformist members in TRT, including the prime minister himself, began to use the term palang paen din. There was even talk of the government issuing a general Prime Ministerial Order similar in effect to Order 66/2523 (to defeat communism), but LDI suggested this would just make it too formulaic and defeat its intention.

In the few months after the TRT election victory, dialogue between TRT and LDI continued and in the end TRT gave its formal blessing to LDI, with Civicnet, to launch a forum to gather people’s opinions on what could be done to solve local and national problems. According to Phonladej,

The strategy of palang paen din is a combined project between the Office of the Prime Minister and my institution, the LDI…. Both of these work together, with the Office of the Prime Minister needing us, [because] we have connections with many networks all over the country, who can come and help think about the strategy of palang paen din.

Phonladej was quick to note that although the project had formal government blessing, it was independent of government interference. The basic idea was to gather various networks around the country and to build up a composite picture of local wisdom, mediated by change agents, and to formally present to the government some proposals. Dialogue, learning and communication for social change were to not only influence the government and its policy agenda, but they were also to be seen as part of the process of self-empowerment of communities and individuals alike. Although it would be facile to give too much rigidity to the notion of ‘forces of the land’, given that it, like so many other Thai phrases, goes through a boom-like use and then becomes redundant, the meaning of the term associated with the LDI comes from Prawet Wasi, in a document distributed at Forces of the Land workshops:

That Thailand is poor, with no money, doesn’t mean that we have nothing. We have something of greater value…the Thai people, that is we our very selves, Thai people who love the land are capital (thun) that is greater than money, greater than anything.

Thais who come together and think together across the land will be a great force of the land that can defeat any obstacle.


Prawet then goes on to speak about how coming together can solve numerous social ailments:

A strong community is a force of the land which is a moral force.
Force of the land is phumi phala, phumi is land, phala is the force of the land. The force of the land is the name of the Rama 9th [Bhumiphon] of Rathanakosin. If you think of the King, think of the force of the land, if you think of force of the land, please think of the power of community.


This sloganistic conflation has purchase in Thailand because the king is constantly invoked as the embodiment of all Thais. However, the reasoning behind this conflation is interesting, for while it would seem to suggest mere homage to the king, Phonladej explains that
We think in Thailand that the institution of the monarchy is loved by the people, so in thinking of a strategy that can be accepted by the people, we think we need to find something that is symbolic of this, and so the name of king is Bhumiphon, it can be translated as palang paen din…. Given that for sometime Thai society has been weakening, we must revive its strength, which corresponds with the name of the king, thus we devise the strategy of palang paen din.

What we see, then, in the Force of the Land Forum, is the fusion of localism, monarchism, nationalism and the attempt to forge new forms of participatory democracy through civic assemblies. Hardly reactionary nationalism, the movement gives voice to the ‘people’, who are perceived to be lacking both in the capacity to speak ably as yet, and also lack the space in which to speak. This invocation of ‘people’ is significant, for it elides significant class differences and purports to see a generalized common interest.

Prawet goes on to speak about needing to interweave the civil-state (pracharat) with the force of the land, noting that the people or state alone cannot solve problems. Rather with the power of society, culture, morality, new organizations and wisdom, national problems could be solved in a sustainable fashion:
The state is composed of politics and bureaucracy, the people are the villagers, communities, society, localities, business, monks, academics, artists, the media etc. Pracharat thus means all sectors of Thai society or Thai people combine together transcending parties…[and] cliques, and having a new consciousness which sees the common interest of the nation, ready to create force of the land or force of the nation to defeat the national crisis and move towards wellbeing.

Forces of the Land meetings were held in over ten subregional locations in mid-2001. Approximately 1,000 community leaders, teachers, doctors, villagers, NGO activists and unaffiliated individuals from various prachakhom attended the three-day workshops. In a workshop in Khon Kaen held in July 2000, participants were treated to introductory speeches in which Prawet’s sentiments were recounted by different speakers. Facilitators and speakers addressed the meeting on the nature of social communciation, the power of civic action and the need for the accumulation of knowledge. Equally, there were calls for all sectors of society to work together. Participants broke into teams to consider key problems of Thai society, coming back to share their findings, with facilitators drawing a general picture. Moving from problems, participants were asked to suggest solutions. Most groups were keen to advance ‘community strengthening’ and local wisdom, with calls even to institutionalize the Forces of the Land movement. In November, delegates from the various subregional meetings met to generalize their findings and prepare a report for the Thaksin government. The findings of the various subregions were divided into four general areas, all seen as falling within the strategy of palang paen din: creating the power of networks; creating the power of pracharat; creating the power of wisdom; and creating the power of the media. Under each topic, prescriptions were given on the necessary organization and structural outcomes for each area to be advanced, as well as a description of the kinds of activity that could be undertaken. The campaign has called for the establishment of a fund for Forces of the Land which would provide umbrella support for various groups: it could support the establishment of an institute for development of regional-level civil society networks; networks of over 100,000 people to work according to the new constitution; support anti-corruption and antidrugs campaigners who confront difficulties in their livelihoods as a result of their work. In practice, these formations are to push forward decentralization and the reform of the bureaucracy, assist in the creation of local economies and self-reliance, scutinize the work of the local authorities and be part of the creation of public space to develop ‘healthy public life’ and local culture. Second, in creating a people-state an interweaving network of civil society/state groups are to assist in the implementation of the village fund (an initiative of the Thaksin government) and prachakhom, assist in moving the bureaucracy away from backward practices, take part in the discussion on amendments to the constitution and push forward anti-corruption measures, strengthen the ECT, push for the Community Forest Law and push for land reform legislation. Third, an ‘Institution to Develop Local Wisdom’ is to be established, backed also by a local wisdom fund and a’Local Wisdom Learning Council’. These will assist in research and the drafting of local development plans, drawing up ‘corruption maps’ and using the media to further local wisdom. Finally, a fund for social and community media is to be established. This will fund radio and television programmes ‘of the people, by the people and for the people’.

The proposals are a programme for a revitalized nation organized around rural networks, interaction between state and society, and so on. In effect the proposals were a crystallization of the politics of civic participation and reformed nationalism. It can be seen that in moderate localism, exemplified in the phalang phaen din campaign, localist activists seek a participatory democracy characterized by communitarian institutions, modes of participation and ideologies that, in tying in with the state, try to reform it. In the context of a contested democratic transition, localists and civic activists attempt to bring about institutions and processes that can facilitate the formation of a Thai public consciousness. As has been indicated, it is important to note the disciplinary aspects of this, inasmuch as the ideal citizen becomes one who has regard for the Thai triad and acts through their ‘Thainess’. While there is room for local identities in this mode of politics, localist politics are connected to the broader wellbeing of a reformed and reimagined Thai nation. Certainly, it is hard not to see this as a step forward from the atavistic nationalism of the National Identity Board. However, the figures of the ‘people’, ‘citizen’ and ‘community’, so central to localist, communitarian and civic discourses, do not quite exist. The organizational and ideological invocation to be proud of the locality, to be a participant in the locality, is part of the process of bringing them into being as a new ideological reference point for a new Thai nationalism. This process of democrasubjection is steadily gaining ground in Thailand precisely because of the break-up of older modes of association (neo-patrimonialism), and it also works against the formation of a more class-based consciousness. Seen in this light, the politics of civic engagement are not insignificant, despite being pitted against powerful old-style politics. They are part of the process of new forms of order and discipline. With the state in crisis, and the economy in free fall, localism works worked to harness the power of the nation in producing order and identity, by relaxing its borders in order that they such borders could be strengthened.

Culture and democracy: a campaign
Thus far it has been suggested that there is an emergent reformist discourse that integrates concerns around development, moral personhood, democracy, community and civil society, and that links activists and reformist elites. This intellectual trend is partly manifested in the work of the Office of the National Culture Commission (NCC), established in 1979. The NCC was formed in an attempt to propagate an awareness of the ‘oneness of Thais’ despite their diverse and regional cultures. Located within the Ministry of Education, the first few years of its activity involved the establishment and integration of provincial- and district-level cultural offices where both local and national culture was displayed. In 1982 The National Culture Commission launched a campaign to address the cultural deficits of Thais in terms of promoting self-reliance, diligence and responsibility, thrift, discipline, law-abiding behaviour, development of a religious ethic and getting the people to follow the slogan of ‘nation, religion and monarchy’. According to the commission’s secretary-general, this was seen as an important aspect of the struggle against communism. One official of the NCC nicely sums up its reason for existence: ‘if we are not the same we will break up’. Certainly, national policy makers were concerned with the destruction of traditional culture and the fading of old ways, as well as what they considered to be bad elements of Thai culture. Premised on anti-communist sentiment and cultural propagation, the NCC would find itself adrift in the late 1980s as the security complex broke up and its rationale of oneness against communism wavered. Furthermore, as the CPT declined and NGO and local struggles emerged, there was a certain ideological crossing of some bureaucrats and the NGOs. This is particularly so of Ekkawit Na Thalang, a former high-ranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education and Secretary-General of the NCC from 1988 to 1991. Ekkawit was intellectually close to Prawet’s reformist Buddhism and the project to promote local wisdom. By the mid-1990s he was arguing for the government to encourage NGOs’ involvement in culture propagation. Ekkawit is intellectually important in making respectable the move from notions of unified culture towards an acceptance of diversity as non-threatening and part of a greater uniformity of Thai culture. Within this reformist current of Thai nationalism there is also a more explicit appeal to the religious underpinnings of democracy, such that Buddhist virtue would be the regulating principle of a moral democracy.

Cognizant of local wisdom and its varied expressions, there nevertheless remains the attempt by Ekkawit, and Prawet, to project a rational Buddhism onto the communities. The relevance of Buddhist wisdom to political reform, decentralization and self-government in reform Buddhism is expressed best by Peter Jackson:
In rationalist Buddhism…rationally guided ethical action is posited as the source of legitimate secular power. This power is immanent in ethical action and is believed capable of transforming the social world for the better. It is universally accessible to all ethical individuals and is thus decentralized, becoming manifest wherever an individual chooses to act ethically and to place reason above unreason.
Important as the reformist elite recognition of community culture and local wisdom was, this was qualified by Buddhist propagation, self-reliance and moral strictures as to the qualities of a self-governing person: this was rationalist Buddhism acting as a disciplinary discourse.

In 1990 the Chatichai government adopted the NCC plan for developing national culture, perhaps reflecting its own apparent cultural anxiety about money and materialism. As a rationale of the plan, the NCC noted the lack of faith in local wisdom and the corresponding elevation of foreign-influenced Bangkok culture. This contamination of culture was said to be spreading to the regions with the result that ‘the integrity, honour and pride in old local culture…is declining everywhere’. In 1994 the NCC launched a major campaign for the preservation of Thai culture. Concerned with the declining interest in things ‘Thai’ and the rise of materialism, the campaign sought to address the cultural problems that had occurred under a period of accelerated economic development. To distinguish its work from the kind of ‘decreed’ culture of the Phibun era, an effort was made to emphasize that there was no element of compulsion in its campaign:

under a democratic system of government there is one thing that is generally accepted and that is democratic culture…[and thus] the state probably should not be the one to stipulate all cultural standards, since it is a basic freedom of the people to seek their own ways appropriate with their private circumstance.

Yet despite this seeming openness, the eleven issues to be propagated in the campaign were familiar rallying cries of the cultural infrastructure. Starting with the inculcation of nation, religion and monarchy (institutions which are said to ‘give pride to being born Thai’), the campaign was to give emphasis to knowing the origins of the Thais, to understanding democracy with the king as head of state, and to have the people realize the king’s compassion as expressed in various royal activities. The traits the campaign was to promote were principally not those for ‘preservation’, but those that the disciplinary agencies of the state had been trying develop. The same contradiction that was noted in the promotion of identity replays itself in this campaign: to be Thai, to have Thai culture, is to develop discipline, orderly family relations, self-reliance, religious virtue, etc. This developmental aspect was of course complemented by the abiding essentialism of Thainess. Thus, as was the case with campaigns of national identity and democracy, the campaign for culture was also one of partly developing what Kasian has called the ‘ethno-ideology of Thainess’. In this ideology the Thai nation is ‘imagined as a happy and calm village’, an immemorial and morally bounded community of intimate ties. Yet there are certain cracks in this ideology, witnessed by the proposed voluntariness of the campaign.

If the cultural warlords have become less belligerent, this owes something to the new democratic openings and the cultural space won by the struggles of local communities. Nevertheless, articulators of the Thai nation, in the age of globalization, are now using those struggles as part of the material to regenerate Thai nationalism within a refurbished traditional frame of the triad, in which the nation is a call to unity; the king is an overarching guardian of the nascent democracy of his subjects, preaching Buddhist virtue and industriousness and generating in the people an affective orientation towards hierarchy and duty; and religion provides the moral codes of the people. What makes this nationalism different from the ultra-right version of the 1970s is that there is a recognition of things not being right, that the nation is more than high culture, that religious institutions are crumbling edifices requiring doctrinal reform, and that the state, as the upholder of Buddhism, has dubious claims on this capacity. There is of course continuity. Reformist nationalists are the inheritors of the seemingly unquestionable position of the monarch, and thus no matter how badly the nation and religion are faring, the prime institution, which in any case embodies the others, is robust and developing an almost god-like status. These are the cultural tensions present in liberal Thailand, a project that requires a new imagining of Thai unity within a democracy.


The new nationalism in Thailand aims to do the work of creating unity, of developing within people affective orientations to the geo-body of Thailand. With no ulterior motive, it is clearly geared towards assisting reformed Thai capital’s venture into the global economy.

Liberalism, communitarianism and possible futures
In this and the previous chapter, the focus has been on two major currents of thought: political liberalism and its attachment to the Thai common good, and a communitarianism that subscribes to the institutions of political liberalism. It has been suggested that for the foreseeable future this is the terrain of ideological struggles in Thailand, as both sides will attempt to formulate new democratic imaginaries within the bounds of national ideology. This is, admittedly, a simplistic picture since it misses the monarchy as a nodal point connecting both streams of elite communitarianism and liberalism. This nodal point suggests there is a good deal more unity than division between the two positions. However, this unity is tensely poised, given that liberals are more attached to a national project of economic growth and modernization that would be likely to undermine rural communities.

However, it should be noted that some liberals, taking a developmental perspective on democracy and capitalism, also see ‘communities’ as a necessary step in the fulfilment of a Thai modernity. Thus while localists speak of communities as if they were impermeable entities, refuges from the perils of globalization and the market, some also think in terms of transition, building up the capital of local communities, of connecting with national and global markets. This tension, which plays itself out in the attempts to rearticulate national ideology around the local, is most apparent in liberal renderings of the ‘community’. Bowonsak Uwanno provides some insights into this. Taking the stance that democracy is now a universal phenomenon, Bowonsak attempts to articulate an element of Thainess to it. The new constitution, he believes, reflects Thai philosophy in its support for ‘community rights’. Noting that the West had shifted, in the eighteenth century, from collectivism to individualism, he flags the Thai aspect of democracy:

legally, constitutionally speaking there is in the Western legal tradition the state and the individual but in between there is nothing. We are trying to put something in between, that is to say the community.

Involved with Saneh and Prawet in a three-year research project on community rights, Bowonsak had popularized the idea that such rights existed under the absolute monarchy. Interestingly, he argues it is the section on community rights that provides the new reform constitution with ‘the Thai contribution’. This section, he says, ‘is more or less eastern’. This is also how he integrates the king to the constitution, for he argues that the king’s thought parallels that of many NGOs on community rights. Thus what is seen as among the most radical elements of the constitution—community rights—is presented as having a relationship to ‘Eastern’ collectivist ways and is linked to the pondering of the philosopher king. Some exploration of this reveals a fairly pragmatic commitment to this ‘Thai’ aspect. Bowonsak, who would seem to straddle both the liberal and communitarian camps, presents an ideal picture of democracy:

Democracy is successful in the Western world because the majority of the people in the Western world are middle class. They stand by themselves and are not dependent on others. But the Thai majority are dependent on others, but if we can make them more independent the culture will change.

Bowonsak unexpectedly reveals that the ‘Eastern’ aspect of the constitution is a stop-gap measure:

if [I]f people depend on community it is better than asking them to be totally independent, the idea of urbanization will take at least fifty years. The middle path is how to strengthen the communities, it would seem the ideas of Dr Prawet and the King are the way out.

Bowonsak then moves on to speak of the idea of developing civil society to strengthen groups. These supportive comments on civil society clearly situate Bowonsak within a modernizing gesture, for between community and civil society there seems to be an ineluctable transition awaiting Thai peasants. Clearly, some community discourses are part of the transitional ideological underpinnings on the road to a more vital national capitalism. The idea of community need not be seen as a journey into the past, rather it might just as well be seen as a temporary solution to the failures of the market to develop all sectors uniformly.

This posture finds support in an important book analysing participatory rural development in Thailand. Shin’ichi Shigemoti notes that many of the cooperative aspects of contemporary rural communities are truly recent, while traditional communities unpenetrated by the market were likely to have more individualistic and family-orientated activities. What many in the community culture school take to be echoes of an idyllic village past (cooperatives, rice banks, etc.), Shigemoti argues, are really organizations which have emerged to mitigate the direct impact of the larger external money economy; they are essentially about mobilizing local capital in productive ways. Thus the collective pooling of resources is seen to be ‘based on a calculation that cooperative organizations are more beneficial than a market economy, even in terms of the individual pursuit of profit’. However, organizational commitments such as these are transitory, a process which provides some individuals with the skills to make the transition to a market economy. Shigemoti argues that when cooperative organizations confront severe competition, the ‘know how which the villagers do not yet have (i.e. the ability to manage a private enterprise) will become vital. This opens a new stage of organizing among the villagers’.

The strength of Shigemoti’s argument is that it makes explicit the tacit acceptance of the market by many in development circles. It also draws out the logic of this, that many NGOs are assisting in the process of nurturing a capitalist mentality within a transitory cooperative-protective shell. Community, then, is not the fulfilment of Eastern collectivism, but rather the filament that will play its role in the fertilization of local potential for the capitalist transition. Given this, it would appear that the more urban rhetoric of civil society is destined to overwhelm community and, indeed, there has been a growing popularization of this idea among NGOs and related intellectuals.

A communitarianism for a liberal future
Through a broad range of local activities and attempts at policy mobilization, NGOs succeeded in at least flagging their work as a credible alternative or modification of existing state practices of development. NGOs were able to influence political discourse by bringing into the public arena notions such as integrated farming, community rights, self-reliance, local wisdom, and so on, which gradually permeated governmental discourse. The various calls and campaigning for community control over resources, participation in policy determination, public hearings and feasibility studies, were all part of a more generalized political offensive against the hegemonic state that had succeeded in locking out alternative voices through a measure of ideological mobilization and, where necessary, repression and coercion. These movements and the response of the state led to heated conflict and contest over numerous spheres. With state calls for unity increasingly falling on deaf ears, and with new political openings making it difficult to engage in suppression, state and political actors have partly accepted the new institutionalized settings for dispute resolution, but have done much to subvert them towards their own interests. Nevertheless, the myriad forms in which the state/NGO contest was pursued allowed for a constant engagement between the two, with the consequence that in some quarters there was a cross-fertilization of ideas and practices, particularly in the development field. Furthermore, there are actors within and without the state who do seek genuine redress of legitimate grievances, and see a precondition of this the creation of means of communication between conflicting sides, so that—through dialogue—more appropriate action in the pluralized national interest can take place. This broad experience has been significant in reshaping reformist versions of nationalism and democracy.

On a more critical note, it may be noted that a pragmatic communitarianism lies at the heart of some civil society intellectual currents. This does not mean that there is a cynicism about the fate of communities. What it does suggest is that it is a communitarianism that engages with the liberal spaces of the market and the institutions of liberal democracy. It seeks to imprint on these a communitarian concern that morally transcends the enlightened self-interest of elites. Thus communitarianism provides a stronger moral claim on the public good. It is not surprising, therefore, that this current is represented by prominent lay Buddhists, former communists and activists. Nor is it surprising that such claims are taken up and profiled in state centres such as the NCC There is a logic to this seeming contradiction: in the present circumstances of Thailand, for the rationale of self-governance to be speakable to a moral community, such as intellectuals believe they are addressing, an ethos that binds that community but which articulates it with political liberalism is needed. In all respects the notions of civic virtue, of responsibility, of self-reliance, in communitarian discourse, while located first as principles for the community, are also addressed to individuals. Furthermore, a careful analysis would suggest that ultimately, even if communitarian thinkers believe morally market-based local economies provide the basis of community sovereignty, it would be utopian to imagine the circulation of capital and its attendant commodification of life would not destroy the communitarianism they seek to embed.
What precisely is the democrasubjection sought in this tension between liberal and communitarian? In this space, national ideology emerges as a diverse and encompassing one which interpellates citizens as members of a self-reliant community which, standing on its own, can legitimately speak and address the national arena. It coaxes from such communities uniformity to moral precepts that define the inner life of communities as ultimately self-determining. Citizen Community acts like Citizen Subject: responsible and productive. In this frame the imagined democracy is localized into community and then projected back to the national stage as communities neither in bondage to the state nor degraded by the evils of patronage and subjection to external powers.

FUll Citations of sources may be found in the published edition.


Thai Commentary and part-translation of this chapter:
ชุมชนนิยมกับขบวนการเคลื่อนไหวของเอ็นจีโอ
พบ Blog ที่น่าสนใจโดยบังเอิญ คนที่สนใจเหตุการณ์บ้านเมืองอาจจะอยากเข้าไปดู เขาตั้งชื่อ Blog ว่า Sovereign Myth เขียนโดย Michale K. Connors อยู่ที่ Melbourne ออสเตรเลีย http://sovereignmyth.blogspot.com

มีบทความหนึ่งชื่อ Thai communitarian nationalism and the NGO movement โพสต์ไว้ตั้งแต่วันที่ 24 มิถุนายน ที่ผ่านมา [คลิกอ่านตรงนี้ http://sovereignmyth.blogspot.com/2008/06/thai-communitarian-nationalism-and-ngo.html] เป็นบทความที่พูดถึง “ชุมชนนิยม” (communitarianism) ที่ผู้เขียนมองว่าเป็นกระแสคิดหลักของเอ็นจีโอในเมืองไทย มีการย้อนเล่าถึงการก่อตัวของแนวคิดนี้ตั้งแต่ทศวรรษ 1960s เรื่อยมา โดยโยงเข้ากับประวัติการก่อเกิดเอ็นจีโอในเมืองไทย และบริบทของสถานการณ์บ้านเมืองในแต่ละช่วงเวลา

ในส่วนท้ายของบทความมีการวิเคราะห์ communitarianism ว่ามีตำแหน่งแห่งที่อย่างไรในสถานการณ์การเมืองไทยในปัจจุบัน โดยพาดหัวข้อย่อยว่า “ชุมชนนิยม เพื่ออนาคตอันเสรี” (A communitarianism for a liberal future) เนื้อหาส่วนนี้สรุปย่อ ๆ ได้ว่า.. .

[แนะนำให้ผู้ที่อ่านภาษาอังกฤษได้ไปอ่านต้นฉบับใน blog ที่ระบุข้างต้นจะรู้เรื่องกว่า เพราะ blogger ตีความมั่วซะเยอะ]

นับว่าเป็นความสำเร็จของเอ็นจีโอในการปักธงทางเลือกให้แก่สังคม เพื่อท้าทายแนวทางการทำงานพัฒนาของรัฐ เพราะเอ็นจีโอได้สร้างอิทธิพลต่อวาทกรรมทางการเมือง ทำให้มีการพูดถึง เกษตรผสมผสาน สิทธิชุมชน การพึ่งพาตนเอง ภูมิปัญญาท้องถิ่น และอื่น ๆ ในพื้นที่สาธารณะ และวาทกรรมเหล่านี้ได้ค่อย ๆ แทรกซึมเข้าไปในวาทกรรมการปกครอง จากการรณรงค์เคลื่อนไหวมากมายเพื่อเรียกร้องสิทธิเหนือทรัพยากรของชุมชน เรียกร้องให้ชุมชนมีส่วนร่วมในการกำหนดนโยบาย มีการรับฟังสาธารณะ และการศึกษาความเหมาะสมก่อนการดำเนินโครงการพัฒนา จนกระทั่งสิ่งเหล่านี้กลายมาเป็นประเด็นหลักที่ใช้ต่อรองกับรัฐในทางการเมือง

ขบวนการเคลื่อนไหวทางสังคม และการตอบโต้ของรัฐ นำไปสู่ความขัดแย้งที่ร้อนแรง การที่รัฐเน้นแต่การสร้างความเป็นเอกภาพก็ทำให้รัฐหูหนวกไม่ได้ยินเสียงเรียกร้องของประชาชนมากขึ้นเรื่อย ๆ แต่ด้วยการเปิดโอกาสทางการเมืองแบบใหม่ ๆ ก็ทำให้รัฐไม่อาจใช้วิธีการปราบปรามแบบเดิม ๆ ได้ ด้วยเหตุนี้รัฐและผู้ปฏิบัติการทางการเมืองจึงยอมรับการจัดตั้งสถาบันใหม่ ๆ ขึ้น ซึ่งแม้จะอ้างว่าเป็นกลไกเพื่อคลี่คลายแก้ปัญหา แต่ส่วนใหญ่ก็ยังทำไปเพื่อผลประโยชน์ของพวกเขาเอง

กระนั้นก็ตาม รัฐและเอ็นจีโอก็เห็นความสำคัญของการเจรจากันมากขึ้น และการสร้างเครื่องมือในการสื่อสารระหว่างคู่ขัดแย้ง ซึ่งเชื่อว่าจะช่วยคลี่คลายปัญหา และเป็นผลดีต่อผลประโยชน์ของชาติโดยรวม

ชุมชนนิยมได้รับความสนใจจากภาคประชาสังคมอย่างกว้างขวาง แต่แนวคิดของมันอาจจะไม่ค่อยสอดคล้องนักกับบริบทสังคมไทยในปัจจุบันที่เน้นการเปิดตลาดเสรีและระบบประชาธิปไตยเสรี ซึ่งเอื้อต่อผลประโยชน์ส่วนตัวของชนชั้นนำ

ชุมชนนิยมเน้นเรื่องจริยธรรมที่ให้ความสำคัญต่อผลประโยชน์ส่วนรวม ดังนั้น จึงไม่น่าแปลกใจที่แนวคิดนี้ถูกนำเสนอโดยชาวพุทธ อดีตคอมมิวนิสต์ และนักกิจกรรม (แต่ไม่ได้ถูกเสนอโดยชนชั้นนำ) และมันก็ไม่น่าแปลกอะไรถ้ารัฐจะหยิบแนวคิดแบบนั้นไปใช้ด้วย

แนวคิดที่พูดถึงกัน ได้แก่ แนวคิดว่าด้วยการปกครองตนเองของชุมชน จริยธรรมของชุมชน และเสรีนิยมทางการเมือง มีแนวคิดว่าด้วยการเป็นพลเมืองที่ดี ที่มีความรับผิดชอบ พึ่งพาตนเอง แนวคิดเหล่านี้แท้ที่จริงเป็นส่วนประกอบของความเป็นชุมชนที่บรรจุอยู่ในวาทกรรมชุมชนนิยม แต่ต่อมาได้ถูกอ้างถึงว่าเป็นหลักปฏิบัติ (ที่ดี) ของปัจเจกบุคคลด้วย

มีข้อวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ว่า แม้ว่านักคิดสายชุมชนนิยมจะเชื่อว่าการพัฒนาระบบการตลาดในระดับระดับท้องถิ่นจะช่วยทำให้ชุมชนมีอธิปไตย แต่มันอาจจะเป็นเพียงความเพ้อผัน (Utopian) หรือเป็นเพียงแค่จินตนาการว่าการหมุนเวียนของทุนและกระบวนการทำให้ชีวิตเป็นสินค้าในระดับโลกจะไม่เข้าไปทำลายความเป็นชุมชน

ผู้เขียนชี้ให้เห็นว่าในวาทกรรมชุมชนนิยมที่ถูกนำเสนอในบริบทที่มีการปลุกอุดมการณ์ชาตินิยมขึ้นมาด้วยนั้น ได้ทำให้เกิดความไม่ลงตัวระหว่างความเป็น เสรีนิยม (ระดับชาติ) กับ ชุมชนนิยม (ระดับท้องถิ่น) กระแสชุมชนนิยมได้เสนอให้พลเมืองเป็นสมาชิกของชุมชนที่พึ่งพาตนเองได้ และก็เป็นพลเมืองของชาติที่มีความเป็นเสรีนิยมในขณะเดียวกัน

พลเมืองที่ดีจะต้องเชื่อฟังคำสอนทางจริยธรรม เป็นปัจเจกชนที่กำหนดตนเอง รับผิดชอบดูแลตนเอง และสร้างการผลิตที่มีคุณภาพ การจินตนาการถึงประชาธิปไตยได้ถูกทำให้เป็นเรื่องของท้องถิ่น แต่ก็โยงไปสู่ระดับชาติ ด้วยการมองว่าชุมชนไม่พันธนาการอยู่กับรัฐ และไม่ได้ขึ้นอยู่กับระบบอุปถัมภ์อันเลวร้ายที่ดำรงอยู่ในสังคมไทย

From
http://nrmdigest.blogspot.com/2008/09/blog-post_27.html