The excerpt below was posted on April 8 before the violence of April 10, and contained a discussion of the way commentators have chosen to put political slogans above analysis. I've re-posted it because I think an important debate has to be had about the way academics have engaged with events in Thailand over the last four years. As I outlined in the original post, I believe that easy assumptions were made about PAD because its politics were reactionary and objectionable, and in the influential world of rumour that is the blogosphere, prejudice was heaped up prejudice to create particular images that suited political agendas or biases. Many of the things that were said about PAD could be said about UDD (if news and pictures are taken selectively), but they will not be said for the simple reason that its politics are understandably sympathetically received among commentators. There was hardly any critical discussion about UDD over the last three years other than it was a misrepresented movement of the rural poor etc etc. Such casual representations have left people unprepared for unpacking the role of different factions within the UDD and their competing agendas.
Who could disagree with UDD's official calls for more democracy and an end to amat? That is easy. But understanding what UDD is, and its relation to alternative centres of power, and indeed to old power cliques is harder. ANd understanding to what extent it is transformative, or rhetorical is difficult to ascertain. Also the class composition has largely been assumed, but the early anti-coup movement that provides some of the key cadre for UDD today was Bangkok middle class. And so it goes - there are lots of questions to consider, despite the undeniable fact of the UDD's emergence as a genuine movement of people who rightly feel disenfranchised.
*****************************
"Before the beginning of the current round of protests the UDD disowned militant elements (Sae Daeng among others) that wished to displace the current UDD leadership in order to pursue a more aggressive approach. Such forces it may be speculated were possibly behind some of violence inflicted on the yellow protests in 2008.
Since the protests began, a systematic campaign of targeted attacks (around 20 so far) on government and political buildings has been unleashed as if to demonstrate the viability of an armed path should the current campaign of civil disobedience fail. No doubt it signals to military elements relative impunity for courses of action contrary to government direction. Of course the convenient third hand can be invoked as being behind the bombings, as it was in the assault on the prime minister’s car during the Songkran demonstrations, but the logic of such a claim is weak.
This bifurcation of red shirt (not specifically the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) strategy, if that is what it is, is hardly commented on by those who now see the reds as the hope of the future and support calls for an immediate election so that a pro-red (and pro-Thaksin) government would come to power (probable but not certain). But the campaign of bombing points at least to one possible unpleasant future should the current government fall. Any new government will have a place for all the old elements of the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite (if we take the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite to be a broad class and not a clique) as long as they are on the right side.
Any campaign of double standards needs to be just that, and whatever the outcome of this current fight, the barracks against double standards shouldn't be dismantled too quickly."
Showing posts with label PAD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PAD. Show all posts
April 16, 2010
April 8, 2010
Double Standards and Political Positions
Double Standards and Political Positions
"Whoever has been killed in this manner [unnaturally], their relatives may bring their grievances to the prime minister, because we have central [agencies] that can go down and ensure justice, but [I] believe that [the relatives] will not be so brave because today the majority of those killed have experience [in the drug trade]"
Thaksin, responding to criticism that innocent people were being killed during the war on drugs.
See full discussion at
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Data/FileUpload/296/WP102_09_MConnors.pdf
*******************************************************
The Reds have a bandanna; from memory it says "everything I do is wrong and everything you do is right". It is a perfect statement of the double standards the reds have attempted to expose in Thai society.
That double standards exist is doubtless. But they are not the double standards of colours, but of class, hierarchy, connection and position. They are diffused throughout the system and were as rampant under Thaksin as they were/are under any government. They are systematic and are not the product of one leader, although leadership has a role in determining how acceptable they are.
Daniel Unger’s piece in Asia Times “Bewildered in Bangkok” also brings up another double standard, and that is of truth: The ease with which news is twisted and turned to suit political agendas. This issue is fundamental because it goes to the question of the place of honesty in social change, and the way in which views of the past are set by prejudice upon prejudice. This post is about issues raised by Unger's piece, rather than the cut and thrust of current events.
An example of the way partisanship has yet to deal with recent events is provided by PAD in 2008.
The ultra nationalist royalist politics of the People’s Alliance for Democracy during protests in 2008 made it difficult for commentators to countenance objective treatment. Little was said of the violence inflicted against the protestors – or if it was it was’ self-inflicted’, it was’ provoked’. Figures are unclear but it seems 6 PAD supporters were killed and hundreds injured. The scurrilous discussion on websites of whether the picture of a mutilated leg of a PAD supporter was real or doctored completely overlooked the fact that PAD supporters were actually subject to attack and anonymous intimidation. Indeed some commentators called for and supported a crackdown because PAD were ‘fascist’, and supported police action against PAD. Incidental acts of violence by PAD supporters were turned into examples of a systematic campaign of violence by the PAD. The use of photographic images to promote these agendas was pervasive. An arms cache found in government house, after PAD ceased its occupation was immediately assumed to have been PAD's, without any evidence. On these matters I remain uncertain, just as I am to believe various claims about current events.
Now it is clear that the PAD has terrible politics by the standards of liberal democracy, and its opportunistic use of nationalism and royalism was dangerous and suited to undemocratic purposes. Some of its abrasive and dehumanizing rhetoric from the stage was fearful. It is clear that it had support in high and unsavoury places. But do such facts require that interpretation be completely directed to demonization? Are inconvenient facts to be set aside lest they get in the way of presenting the news as one wants to see it? Is it also a case of everything they do is wrong, everything we do is right?
Indeed I would argue that if PAD was of a leftist persuasion, interpretations of its actions would have been different. The occupation of the airport would have been seen as a brilliant strategy of the angry masses desperate to bring down the government. Random acts of violence would have been seen as the work of the ‘third hand’ attempting to discredit the movement.
The mythic image of PAD now built up around a few totemic images borders on erasure of its origins in a pre-coup context fighting against Thaksin in order to return Thailand to a liberal political path – and by liberal, yes I mean elitist, with the accompanying inequalities entailed in the 1997 constitution.
A long road has been travelled since 2006, and the dynamics of the struggle have transformed, but the same logic of interpretation remains in place. And while the faces may look the same, four years has changed and hardened thinking and strategies.
PAD was and is regularly indicted for treating people who support Thaksin as ignorant and gullible. Such claims by some people in PAD have been made and quite vulgar ones at that. But the basic claim during 2006 was that without access to information and impartial analysis (yes, laughable coming from the Manager newsgroup), people could not make informed judgements. Anyone who listened to this discussion on the PAD stage would have been struck by how “media studies” the discussion was. Actually, such a claim is common to most political persuasions (Marxist included), and that is why most practical politics comes down to vanguard and strategic leadership to win people to a particular view of the world on the basis of where they are. Of course there are anarchists and populists (mediums of the popular will) out there who imagine some transcendent will of the people finding spontaneous expression if it happens to suit the way they also see the world. Another view common to many political persuasions is that political struggle is political education, and its best source. The question, of course, is the content of that political struggle. PAD and UDD obviously see this differently too.
Making sense of the last four years is not fundamentally a dispute about who did what when, and who shot first, who shot second– these empirical matters will never find settlement in the turmoil of the present, and they will keep, for a long time, the trolls in the cyber world busy wearing finger tips thin. The real dispute for those not in a position to influence events is where this conflict began and where it ends and for what purpose and future. On such matters a more honest discussion is a better option than mudslinging and sloganeering.
What is at the heart of the matter is not strategy or violence (since these can always be conveniently massaged and explained away in partisan circles) but rather the question of politics and the side one takes in that. Is it possible to explain one’s position, even non-position – without being taken for a lackey of Thaksin’s or the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite? At the moment, no. Where that space will emerge in the current contest is unclear.
Before the beginning of the current round of protests the UDD disowned militant elements (Sae Daeng among others) that wished to displace the current UDD leadership in order to pursue a more aggressive approach. Such forces it may be speculated were possibly behind some of violence inflicted on the yellow protests in 2008.
Since the protests began, a systematic campaign of targeted attacks (around 20 so far) on government and political buildings has been unleashed as if to demonstrate the viability of an armed path should the current campaign of civil disobedience fail. No doubt it signals to military elements relative impunity for courses of action contrary to government direction. Of course the convenient third hand can be invoked as being behind the bombings, as it was in the assault on the prime minister’s car during the Songkran demonstrations, but the logic of such a claim is weak.
This bifurcation of red shirt (not specifically the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) strategy, if that is what it is, is hardly commented on by those who now see the reds as the hope of the future and support calls for an immediate election so that a pro-red (and pro-Thaksin) government would come to power (probable but not certain). But the campaign of bombing points at least to one possible unpleasant future should the current government fall. Any new government will have a place for all the old elements of the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite (if we take the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite to be a broad class and not a clique) as long as they are on the right side.
Any campaign of double standards needs to be just that, and whatever the outcome of this current fight, the barracks against double standards shouldn't be dismantled too quickly.
Can the red movement guarantee that any pro-Thaksin government it brings to power will be subject to ruthless and necessary accountability? If so, how? What has it done to build alternative political organizations for parliamentary power, so that the forms of popular participation now evident are maintained to ensure future governments exercise power democratically and submit themselves to checks and balances that are constitutionally sanctioned (assuming a rewriting of the current constitution or its replacement)?
I have attended both yellow and red demonstrations over the last four years, I’ve always been struck by a similarity of purpose among those sitting below the stage: fair government. Certainly, the red movement has over the last year found a mobilizing idiom in class that has introduced a much needed element into Thai political discussion, and which is fundamentally going to impact future Thai democratisation. If the level of popular organizing can outlast the crisis that has brought it in to being, Thai democracy will be stronger for it.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
For detractors – no I do not support a crackdown on the reds
No I do not grovel at the feet of the monarchy
No I do not share tea regularly with PAD leaders
No I do not want the return of royal liberalism and virtuous leadership
No, just because I have not repeated every possible disclaimer does not mean I subscribe to its opposite.
Yes, I support the repeal of the current constitution
Yes, I support the repeal of lese majeste laws
Yes, I support the immediate release of all those imprisoned under those laws
Yes, I call for retrial of all cases conducted under law built on the back of a military assumption of power.
UPDATE THURSDAY AFTERNOON - the imposition of a state of emergency has led to blackouts on media coverage....it is clearly important that people get the right kind of news and Prachatai.com., one of the few balanced and diverse news sites in Thailand, clearly is not the right kind of news.
"Whoever has been killed in this manner [unnaturally], their relatives may bring their grievances to the prime minister, because we have central [agencies] that can go down and ensure justice, but [I] believe that [the relatives] will not be so brave because today the majority of those killed have experience [in the drug trade]"
Thaksin, responding to criticism that innocent people were being killed during the war on drugs.
See full discussion at
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Data/FileUpload/296/WP102_09_MConnors.pdf
*******************************************************
The Reds have a bandanna; from memory it says "everything I do is wrong and everything you do is right". It is a perfect statement of the double standards the reds have attempted to expose in Thai society.
That double standards exist is doubtless. But they are not the double standards of colours, but of class, hierarchy, connection and position. They are diffused throughout the system and were as rampant under Thaksin as they were/are under any government. They are systematic and are not the product of one leader, although leadership has a role in determining how acceptable they are.
Daniel Unger’s piece in Asia Times “Bewildered in Bangkok” also brings up another double standard, and that is of truth: The ease with which news is twisted and turned to suit political agendas. This issue is fundamental because it goes to the question of the place of honesty in social change, and the way in which views of the past are set by prejudice upon prejudice. This post is about issues raised by Unger's piece, rather than the cut and thrust of current events.
An example of the way partisanship has yet to deal with recent events is provided by PAD in 2008.
The ultra nationalist royalist politics of the People’s Alliance for Democracy during protests in 2008 made it difficult for commentators to countenance objective treatment. Little was said of the violence inflicted against the protestors – or if it was it was’ self-inflicted’, it was’ provoked’. Figures are unclear but it seems 6 PAD supporters were killed and hundreds injured. The scurrilous discussion on websites of whether the picture of a mutilated leg of a PAD supporter was real or doctored completely overlooked the fact that PAD supporters were actually subject to attack and anonymous intimidation. Indeed some commentators called for and supported a crackdown because PAD were ‘fascist’, and supported police action against PAD. Incidental acts of violence by PAD supporters were turned into examples of a systematic campaign of violence by the PAD. The use of photographic images to promote these agendas was pervasive. An arms cache found in government house, after PAD ceased its occupation was immediately assumed to have been PAD's, without any evidence. On these matters I remain uncertain, just as I am to believe various claims about current events.
Now it is clear that the PAD has terrible politics by the standards of liberal democracy, and its opportunistic use of nationalism and royalism was dangerous and suited to undemocratic purposes. Some of its abrasive and dehumanizing rhetoric from the stage was fearful. It is clear that it had support in high and unsavoury places. But do such facts require that interpretation be completely directed to demonization? Are inconvenient facts to be set aside lest they get in the way of presenting the news as one wants to see it? Is it also a case of everything they do is wrong, everything we do is right?
Indeed I would argue that if PAD was of a leftist persuasion, interpretations of its actions would have been different. The occupation of the airport would have been seen as a brilliant strategy of the angry masses desperate to bring down the government. Random acts of violence would have been seen as the work of the ‘third hand’ attempting to discredit the movement.
The mythic image of PAD now built up around a few totemic images borders on erasure of its origins in a pre-coup context fighting against Thaksin in order to return Thailand to a liberal political path – and by liberal, yes I mean elitist, with the accompanying inequalities entailed in the 1997 constitution.
A long road has been travelled since 2006, and the dynamics of the struggle have transformed, but the same logic of interpretation remains in place. And while the faces may look the same, four years has changed and hardened thinking and strategies.
PAD was and is regularly indicted for treating people who support Thaksin as ignorant and gullible. Such claims by some people in PAD have been made and quite vulgar ones at that. But the basic claim during 2006 was that without access to information and impartial analysis (yes, laughable coming from the Manager newsgroup), people could not make informed judgements. Anyone who listened to this discussion on the PAD stage would have been struck by how “media studies” the discussion was. Actually, such a claim is common to most political persuasions (Marxist included), and that is why most practical politics comes down to vanguard and strategic leadership to win people to a particular view of the world on the basis of where they are. Of course there are anarchists and populists (mediums of the popular will) out there who imagine some transcendent will of the people finding spontaneous expression if it happens to suit the way they also see the world. Another view common to many political persuasions is that political struggle is political education, and its best source. The question, of course, is the content of that political struggle. PAD and UDD obviously see this differently too.
Making sense of the last four years is not fundamentally a dispute about who did what when, and who shot first, who shot second– these empirical matters will never find settlement in the turmoil of the present, and they will keep, for a long time, the trolls in the cyber world busy wearing finger tips thin. The real dispute for those not in a position to influence events is where this conflict began and where it ends and for what purpose and future. On such matters a more honest discussion is a better option than mudslinging and sloganeering.
What is at the heart of the matter is not strategy or violence (since these can always be conveniently massaged and explained away in partisan circles) but rather the question of politics and the side one takes in that. Is it possible to explain one’s position, even non-position – without being taken for a lackey of Thaksin’s or the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite? At the moment, no. Where that space will emerge in the current contest is unclear.
Before the beginning of the current round of protests the UDD disowned militant elements (Sae Daeng among others) that wished to displace the current UDD leadership in order to pursue a more aggressive approach. Such forces it may be speculated were possibly behind some of violence inflicted on the yellow protests in 2008.
Since the protests began, a systematic campaign of targeted attacks (around 20 so far) on government and political buildings has been unleashed as if to demonstrate the viability of an armed path should the current campaign of civil disobedience fail. No doubt it signals to military elements relative impunity for courses of action contrary to government direction. Of course the convenient third hand can be invoked as being behind the bombings, as it was in the assault on the prime minister’s car during the Songkran demonstrations, but the logic of such a claim is weak.
This bifurcation of red shirt (not specifically the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) strategy, if that is what it is, is hardly commented on by those who now see the reds as the hope of the future and support calls for an immediate election so that a pro-red (and pro-Thaksin) government would come to power (probable but not certain). But the campaign of bombing points at least to one possible unpleasant future should the current government fall. Any new government will have a place for all the old elements of the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite (if we take the bureaucratic-aristocratic elite to be a broad class and not a clique) as long as they are on the right side.
Any campaign of double standards needs to be just that, and whatever the outcome of this current fight, the barracks against double standards shouldn't be dismantled too quickly.
Can the red movement guarantee that any pro-Thaksin government it brings to power will be subject to ruthless and necessary accountability? If so, how? What has it done to build alternative political organizations for parliamentary power, so that the forms of popular participation now evident are maintained to ensure future governments exercise power democratically and submit themselves to checks and balances that are constitutionally sanctioned (assuming a rewriting of the current constitution or its replacement)?
I have attended both yellow and red demonstrations over the last four years, I’ve always been struck by a similarity of purpose among those sitting below the stage: fair government. Certainly, the red movement has over the last year found a mobilizing idiom in class that has introduced a much needed element into Thai political discussion, and which is fundamentally going to impact future Thai democratisation. If the level of popular organizing can outlast the crisis that has brought it in to being, Thai democracy will be stronger for it.
___________________________________________________________________________________________
For detractors – no I do not support a crackdown on the reds
No I do not grovel at the feet of the monarchy
No I do not share tea regularly with PAD leaders
No I do not want the return of royal liberalism and virtuous leadership
No, just because I have not repeated every possible disclaimer does not mean I subscribe to its opposite.
Yes, I support the repeal of the current constitution
Yes, I support the repeal of lese majeste laws
Yes, I support the immediate release of all those imprisoned under those laws
Yes, I call for retrial of all cases conducted under law built on the back of a military assumption of power.
UPDATE THURSDAY AFTERNOON - the imposition of a state of emergency has led to blackouts on media coverage....it is clearly important that people get the right kind of news and Prachatai.com., one of the few balanced and diverse news sites in Thailand, clearly is not the right kind of news.
January 5, 2009
Four Elections and a Coup
Crediting Historical Figures.
The Australian Journal of International Affairs has provided free access to my article,"Four Elections and a Coup".
Written before the Constitution Court's dissolution of the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP) it covers three main areas: the pro-Thaksin side, the People's Allliance for Democracy (PAD), and the issue of the monarchy.
In general I see the events of last year as confirmation of the contingent pacting between liberals and statists against Thaksin (discussed in the post below). I see the struggle as primarily one over regime form, and do not consider that the statist, conservative and liberal elites primarily pacted against Thaksin because of pro-poor policies.
It is generally agreed that the military exerted pressure to break up the PPP led- coalition. However, I do not see a co-ordinated conspiracy against Thaksin that links the PAD, the ECT, the military, the courts, the palace or "network monarchy" and the Democrat Party. Each element has worked against Thaksin and the pro-Thaksin forces, but with different means and towards different objectives, and in ways that may well be antagonistic to other anti-Thaksin forces.
I previously flagged the idea of a Bonapartist solution - one that disarms the "extremes" of both camps and rules above contending forces. It will be interesting to see whether legal cases against the PAD leadership (representing the anti-Thaksin extremity) will proceed. Of course, a Democrat Party led government, no matter how it came to power, is not quite a Bonapartist solution despite Aphisit's suggestions that PAD will be dealt with according to law. The current situation signals the accomplishment of PAD's key objective of removing the pro-Thaksin government (however tentatively).
Moreover, should that objective actually be realised in the medium term (there being no parliamentary re-alignment) PAD in its militant form would most likely disappear. And should the Democrat led government survive, one can expect that PAD's "new politics" will become the detritus of an unlikely circumstance that momentarily saw individual military figures, ultra-nationalists/royalists and democracy activists work together. Perhaps think of "new politics" as a kind of mutating political offspring generated by the pragmatism and opportunism of those who were willing to use any means to beat Thaksin.
Their struggle, among many others, has not returned Thailand to the politics of semi-democracy of the 1980s, nor has it returned it to the politics of the 1990s, when liberal politics and polyarchic democracy were ascendant, nor the mid-2000s of Thaksin's emergent authoritarianism. Having so often suggested that some resolution was close at hand in this epic struggle, I'll desist such a position now.
It appears that the mythic conflation of Thaksinism and democracy (speaking of another mutating political offspring) is going to be around for a while yet - such a powerful myth is socially grounded in the electoral dispossession experienced after the coup, in the social and economic policies of the Thaksin government, and in the activities of party cadre/democracy activists and their interaction with people. Most pointedly, it is grounded in the electoral feats of the pro-Thaksin forces, resulting from a combination of old-style politics, and the Thaksin government's connection with popular aspiration.
Thaksinism, and the threat it posed to the old elite's relationship with the country's population, may well have given speed to the elaboration of its antithesis, a socially embedded liberalism (in sections of the Democrat party and elsewhere).
It would seem that when you are a historical figure, you get a lot of credit.
The Australian Journal of International Affairs has provided free access to my article,"Four Elections and a Coup".
Written before the Constitution Court's dissolution of the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP) it covers three main areas: the pro-Thaksin side, the People's Allliance for Democracy (PAD), and the issue of the monarchy.
In general I see the events of last year as confirmation of the contingent pacting between liberals and statists against Thaksin (discussed in the post below). I see the struggle as primarily one over regime form, and do not consider that the statist, conservative and liberal elites primarily pacted against Thaksin because of pro-poor policies.
It is generally agreed that the military exerted pressure to break up the PPP led- coalition. However, I do not see a co-ordinated conspiracy against Thaksin that links the PAD, the ECT, the military, the courts, the palace or "network monarchy" and the Democrat Party. Each element has worked against Thaksin and the pro-Thaksin forces, but with different means and towards different objectives, and in ways that may well be antagonistic to other anti-Thaksin forces.
I previously flagged the idea of a Bonapartist solution - one that disarms the "extremes" of both camps and rules above contending forces. It will be interesting to see whether legal cases against the PAD leadership (representing the anti-Thaksin extremity) will proceed. Of course, a Democrat Party led government, no matter how it came to power, is not quite a Bonapartist solution despite Aphisit's suggestions that PAD will be dealt with according to law. The current situation signals the accomplishment of PAD's key objective of removing the pro-Thaksin government (however tentatively).
Moreover, should that objective actually be realised in the medium term (there being no parliamentary re-alignment) PAD in its militant form would most likely disappear. And should the Democrat led government survive, one can expect that PAD's "new politics" will become the detritus of an unlikely circumstance that momentarily saw individual military figures, ultra-nationalists/royalists and democracy activists work together. Perhaps think of "new politics" as a kind of mutating political offspring generated by the pragmatism and opportunism of those who were willing to use any means to beat Thaksin.
Their struggle, among many others, has not returned Thailand to the politics of semi-democracy of the 1980s, nor has it returned it to the politics of the 1990s, when liberal politics and polyarchic democracy were ascendant, nor the mid-2000s of Thaksin's emergent authoritarianism. Having so often suggested that some resolution was close at hand in this epic struggle, I'll desist such a position now.
It appears that the mythic conflation of Thaksinism and democracy (speaking of another mutating political offspring) is going to be around for a while yet - such a powerful myth is socially grounded in the electoral dispossession experienced after the coup, in the social and economic policies of the Thaksin government, and in the activities of party cadre/democracy activists and their interaction with people. Most pointedly, it is grounded in the electoral feats of the pro-Thaksin forces, resulting from a combination of old-style politics, and the Thaksin government's connection with popular aspiration.
Thaksinism, and the threat it posed to the old elite's relationship with the country's population, may well have given speed to the elaboration of its antithesis, a socially embedded liberalism (in sections of the Democrat party and elsewhere).
It would seem that when you are a historical figure, you get a lot of credit.
October 15, 2008
PAD and non-violence
Email Interview with Christian Science Monitor, 14 Oct, 2008
* Are there cultural/social reasons why nonviolent protest is/isn't
part of Thai democracy struggle? Has PAD shifted tactics since 2006?
Non-violent protest has been the pre-dominant feature of Thai popular struggles over the last thirty years - in strikes, street protests, petitions, and the like, with varying levels of success. Non-violence works best in a responsive political system where predictable protest routines and signals are measured and fed back into policy outcomes.
Crisis moments however have not generally been characterised by the success of non-violent protest and such moments tend to spiral towards a violent conflict. By crisis moments I mean those times when fundamental issues of political order are at stake between strategic actors who mobilise resources against rivals. The deployment of violent means in 1975-1976 by elites to withstand a popular challenge is one case in point, the use of military force against democracy protesters in 1992 another. Then, though, the violence was instigated largely by statal forces.
Speaking of the current situation, the extraordinary development of 'self-defence' units on both sides is partly a result of memory and circumstance. In that sense the implicit violent rhetoric of both sides in terms of eliminating the other makes imperative some form of protection. But of course, once armed, the genie is out of the bottle and public pronouncements of non-violence in the Gandhian mode are belied by actions.
It is now conventional wisdom to state that PAD protest leaders actually want violence in order to invite a coup against the government - I can see how this might logically flow from their actions, which is to say it is one possible outcome. It can also be deduced from some of Sondhi's comments. But I am not comfortable with that idea being defined as PAD's key strategy: it recycles reactionary ideas about the way in which protest is merely the plaything of conspiracy and the cynicism of leaders. Something more fundamental is going on in Thailand right now.
It's interesting to see the way in which the key PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang is being demonised by some commentators as some kind of puppet master. This kind of commentary draws on Thai debates about his role in the 1992 protests against the Suchinda government, when Chamlong's leadership is said to have led to the May massacre after soldiers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. To suggest that Chamlong wanted the massacre to happen as part of some grand strategy grants Chamlong extra-ordinary powers of prescience and manipulation. It also lets off the hook those who did the shooting. The implications of that analysis for the present should be clear. The casual and tendential assertion of motive hardly illuminates the fundamental conflict that set up the present crisis.
* Don't people's power movements in Asia usually rely on support from
within security apparatus? I'm thinking Philippines in 1986.
Regime change or attempted regime change is always much more messier than post-triumphalist histories present. And in the current stand-off in Thailand one can speak about a conflicted state in which both sides have support right across a range of state-agencies. In the end, if the stalemate continues, it is not impossible to imagine a move against both sides by a draconian faction within the elite who use the vacuum of power to reestablish order and sweep away this conflict. Of course, for that to happen, it won't be a 'soft' coup. Alternatively, an elite compromise could be reached which leads to the popular arms of both wings being amputated and a deal done.
**********************************
Various scenarios discussed here
* Are there cultural/social reasons why nonviolent protest is/isn't
part of Thai democracy struggle? Has PAD shifted tactics since 2006?
Non-violent protest has been the pre-dominant feature of Thai popular struggles over the last thirty years - in strikes, street protests, petitions, and the like, with varying levels of success. Non-violence works best in a responsive political system where predictable protest routines and signals are measured and fed back into policy outcomes.
Crisis moments however have not generally been characterised by the success of non-violent protest and such moments tend to spiral towards a violent conflict. By crisis moments I mean those times when fundamental issues of political order are at stake between strategic actors who mobilise resources against rivals. The deployment of violent means in 1975-1976 by elites to withstand a popular challenge is one case in point, the use of military force against democracy protesters in 1992 another. Then, though, the violence was instigated largely by statal forces.
Speaking of the current situation, the extraordinary development of 'self-defence' units on both sides is partly a result of memory and circumstance. In that sense the implicit violent rhetoric of both sides in terms of eliminating the other makes imperative some form of protection. But of course, once armed, the genie is out of the bottle and public pronouncements of non-violence in the Gandhian mode are belied by actions.
It is now conventional wisdom to state that PAD protest leaders actually want violence in order to invite a coup against the government - I can see how this might logically flow from their actions, which is to say it is one possible outcome. It can also be deduced from some of Sondhi's comments. But I am not comfortable with that idea being defined as PAD's key strategy: it recycles reactionary ideas about the way in which protest is merely the plaything of conspiracy and the cynicism of leaders. Something more fundamental is going on in Thailand right now.
It's interesting to see the way in which the key PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang is being demonised by some commentators as some kind of puppet master. This kind of commentary draws on Thai debates about his role in the 1992 protests against the Suchinda government, when Chamlong's leadership is said to have led to the May massacre after soldiers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. To suggest that Chamlong wanted the massacre to happen as part of some grand strategy grants Chamlong extra-ordinary powers of prescience and manipulation. It also lets off the hook those who did the shooting. The implications of that analysis for the present should be clear. The casual and tendential assertion of motive hardly illuminates the fundamental conflict that set up the present crisis.
* Don't people's power movements in Asia usually rely on support from
within security apparatus? I'm thinking Philippines in 1986.
Regime change or attempted regime change is always much more messier than post-triumphalist histories present. And in the current stand-off in Thailand one can speak about a conflicted state in which both sides have support right across a range of state-agencies. In the end, if the stalemate continues, it is not impossible to imagine a move against both sides by a draconian faction within the elite who use the vacuum of power to reestablish order and sweep away this conflict. Of course, for that to happen, it won't be a 'soft' coup. Alternatively, an elite compromise could be reached which leads to the popular arms of both wings being amputated and a deal done.
**********************************
Various scenarios discussed here
October 9, 2008
Q & A on Thai crisis
Bloomberg email interview conducted on the afternoon of October 8th.
Q. Just wondering your thoughts on the latest Thai developments. Specifically, does this represent a major change in tactics for the PAD?
A. A stalemate between the pro-and anti-Thaksin forces has been the key characteristic of 2008. Each has its support base in state agencies and the media and each has tried to paint the other as destroying Thai democracy. The arrest of the PAD leaders was clearly an attempt to break PAD in order clear obstacles to constitutional amendments.
While amendments are warranted, given the coup-origins of the 2007 Constitution, the PPP's transparent intent was to destroy the corruption cases against Mr Thaksin and others associated with Thai Rak Thai and PPP, and to revoke anti-Thaksin appointments to the various "independent agencies of the state" such as the National Counter Corruption Commission.
The PPP selection of Somchai, Thaksin's brother in law, as Prime Minister was effectively an announcement that the pro-Thaksin forces were going for broke, which in the current context means that a zero-sum game between the opposing sides is in play.
Q. Do you see an end game in all this?
A. Several outcomes are possible, none knowable: a coup could be launched against the government or there could be a pro-government coup, perhaps in the form of a temporary martial law/state of emergency.
Possibly, a coup could also move against both sides (pro-Thaksin and pro-PAD) and enact a tough period of military rule under a civilian prime minister to beat down both claimants on power in order to establish order. The new regime might well incorporate elements of the PAD 'new politics' agenda but probably would cut loose PAD's social base.
The government could mobilise a mass support base onto the streets to beat back an anti-government coup. This base has so far failed to show itself other than at the ballot box and rallies of indifferent size.
Perhaps the coalition will splinter and defect to a new coalition formation to pre-empt a coup. Remember, factions in the governing coalition are pragmatic. Before PPP elected Somchai as prime minister it was momentarily possible that a Democrat led coalition government might have taken shape as some elements in the PPP and the minor parties were weary of fighting all the way and were ready to do a deal.
Another possibility is the emergence of a government of national unity, which has been flagged several times. Such a government would presumably be convened under the threat of a coup and it would most likely cut the Thaksin link.
As always, predictions are always overtaken by reality.
What can be said is that at some point in the next week an enduring resolution to the stalemate may well emerge. Events of historic proportion are often dictated by a logic that defies transparent interest, a number of realignments might emerge which no one can imagine.
Q. If a new election is called, do you think it's likely a Thaksin-linked party will win again, and if so will this conflict just continue indefinitely?
A. If an anti-government coup occurs I would expect that this time there would be greater repression and manipulation to ensure that in any future election a repeat of the PPP victory would not occur: the school burnings that occurred in 2007 in the North and Northeast might well be a symbol of what will come.
If the House is dissolved and a new election is held and the current balance of popularity remains in place, a PPP led coalition government would be the most likely outcome, although that would depend on the stand taken by the minor parties.
Q. What does the current fight say about Thailand's democracy?
A. Thai democracy is in a state of immolation.
********************************************************
Additional Commentary/10/10/08
Odd, given the massive erosion of the THaksin/PPP position through the court system, that I should have missed adding a role for the courts in the various scenarios discussed above.
Q. Just wondering your thoughts on the latest Thai developments. Specifically, does this represent a major change in tactics for the PAD?
A. A stalemate between the pro-and anti-Thaksin forces has been the key characteristic of 2008. Each has its support base in state agencies and the media and each has tried to paint the other as destroying Thai democracy. The arrest of the PAD leaders was clearly an attempt to break PAD in order clear obstacles to constitutional amendments.
While amendments are warranted, given the coup-origins of the 2007 Constitution, the PPP's transparent intent was to destroy the corruption cases against Mr Thaksin and others associated with Thai Rak Thai and PPP, and to revoke anti-Thaksin appointments to the various "independent agencies of the state" such as the National Counter Corruption Commission.
The PPP selection of Somchai, Thaksin's brother in law, as Prime Minister was effectively an announcement that the pro-Thaksin forces were going for broke, which in the current context means that a zero-sum game between the opposing sides is in play.
Q. Do you see an end game in all this?
A. Several outcomes are possible, none knowable: a coup could be launched against the government or there could be a pro-government coup, perhaps in the form of a temporary martial law/state of emergency.
Possibly, a coup could also move against both sides (pro-Thaksin and pro-PAD) and enact a tough period of military rule under a civilian prime minister to beat down both claimants on power in order to establish order. The new regime might well incorporate elements of the PAD 'new politics' agenda but probably would cut loose PAD's social base.
The government could mobilise a mass support base onto the streets to beat back an anti-government coup. This base has so far failed to show itself other than at the ballot box and rallies of indifferent size.
Perhaps the coalition will splinter and defect to a new coalition formation to pre-empt a coup. Remember, factions in the governing coalition are pragmatic. Before PPP elected Somchai as prime minister it was momentarily possible that a Democrat led coalition government might have taken shape as some elements in the PPP and the minor parties were weary of fighting all the way and were ready to do a deal.
Another possibility is the emergence of a government of national unity, which has been flagged several times. Such a government would presumably be convened under the threat of a coup and it would most likely cut the Thaksin link.
As always, predictions are always overtaken by reality.
What can be said is that at some point in the next week an enduring resolution to the stalemate may well emerge. Events of historic proportion are often dictated by a logic that defies transparent interest, a number of realignments might emerge which no one can imagine.
Q. If a new election is called, do you think it's likely a Thaksin-linked party will win again, and if so will this conflict just continue indefinitely?
A. If an anti-government coup occurs I would expect that this time there would be greater repression and manipulation to ensure that in any future election a repeat of the PPP victory would not occur: the school burnings that occurred in 2007 in the North and Northeast might well be a symbol of what will come.
If the House is dissolved and a new election is held and the current balance of popularity remains in place, a PPP led coalition government would be the most likely outcome, although that would depend on the stand taken by the minor parties.
Q. What does the current fight say about Thailand's democracy?
A. Thai democracy is in a state of immolation.
********************************************************
Additional Commentary/10/10/08
Odd, given the massive erosion of the THaksin/PPP position through the court system, that I should have missed adding a role for the courts in the various scenarios discussed above.
October 7, 2008
Conclusions: A Thaksin return can not be ruled out
Conclusions
Today's events in Bangkok when PAD blocked parliament and the police moved to disperse the protestors are a climax long in the making, delayed only by an uncertain balance of forces. Several outcomes are possible, none knowable: a coup could be launched from either side (even Thaksin considered a pro-government coup). Possibly, a coup could also move against both sides and enact a tough period of military rule to beat down both claimants on power in order to establish order - think Bonapartism. The government could finally mobilise a mass support base onto the streets to beat back an anti-government (Thaksin) coup. This base has so far failed to show itself other than at the ballot box and rallies of indifferent size. As always, predictions are always overtaken by reality.
What can be said is that at some point in the next week an enduring resolution to the stalemate may well emerge. Events of historic proportion are often dictated by a logic that defies transparent interest, and it is not unlikely that a number of realignments might emerge which no one can imagine. Below, I have reproduced the conclusion from an article I wrote a month ago "Four Elections and a Coup" to appear in Australian Journal of International Affairs at the end of the year. The excerpt "The King Can Do Wrong" in the last post also comes from that piece.
Conclusion
During the 1990s, liberal impulses emanating from within Thailand merged with the international discourse of good governance. This process was halted when Thaksin’s rise coincided with global security discourse in the wake of the ‘war on terror’ and the pressure to conform to international forms of political liberalism receded. This was a dynamic broadly reminiscent of geo-politics of the Cold War. Now, with the region and the globe entering a new phase of geo-political conflict in which China and Russia are highly assertive, and the US is in retreat, the liberal politics that have largely dictated Thai pro-western foreign policy inclination may retreat further as states in the region gravitate more decisively to China.
Thaksin’s emergent authoritarianism and political challenge to elite power centres influenced the convergence of rightist fear of disorderly electoral democracy and middle-class concern for ‘good governance’. It has left Thailand’s political system faltering under a mass of contradictions that are not easily categorised. The current trajectory of Thai politics is impossible to predict. As system level contradictions simultaneously implode, the resulting conflagration may give birth to odd formations. Alternatively, politics might return to a status quo ante of corruption, electoral mobilisation and capital capture of the state. Certainly, when all sides play with the rules of the game, the crisis will remain intractable, perhaps until a rupturing historical event provides relief. One thing, though, is certain: the future of Thai politics will be extremely uncertain, precarious and subject to momentous change once the current king’s interventionist role, on the side of conservatism, is absent. With that in mind, at the very least a Thaksin return in some form can not be ruled out.
Postscript (10th September)
On September 9, 2008, in a unanimous verdict the Constitutional Court disqualified Samak as prime minister on the relatively trivial grounds that his hosting of a television cooking show while prime minister, violated Article 267 of the constitution, relating to conflict of interest. In July, Samak had bemoaned the smothering nature of the constitution, noting, ‘In the past, it was considered an honour to join the Cabinet. Now being a minister is like having one's leg in jail already’ (The Nation, 2008). This latest development might enforce the idea – as propagated by the respective protagonists - that Thai politics is like a social laboratory pitting the ‘rule of law’ against ‘democratic majoritarianism’. In reality, venal and vested political interests mix with popular aspirations on both sides of this elite conflict. Those interests have historic roots and structural properties. They are unlikely to lie down before moral censure that demands conformity to the rule of law or submission to the ballot box. In taking politics back to year zero – establishing the rules of the game – the current Thai conflict is a reminder that most social and political orders are established by the right, first, to be dominant. Such a right necessarily involves contradiction, selectivity, and myth. Currently, that right is contested, leading to parallel contradictions, selectivities and myths.
Today's events in Bangkok when PAD blocked parliament and the police moved to disperse the protestors are a climax long in the making, delayed only by an uncertain balance of forces. Several outcomes are possible, none knowable: a coup could be launched from either side (even Thaksin considered a pro-government coup). Possibly, a coup could also move against both sides and enact a tough period of military rule to beat down both claimants on power in order to establish order - think Bonapartism. The government could finally mobilise a mass support base onto the streets to beat back an anti-government (Thaksin) coup. This base has so far failed to show itself other than at the ballot box and rallies of indifferent size. As always, predictions are always overtaken by reality.
What can be said is that at some point in the next week an enduring resolution to the stalemate may well emerge. Events of historic proportion are often dictated by a logic that defies transparent interest, and it is not unlikely that a number of realignments might emerge which no one can imagine. Below, I have reproduced the conclusion from an article I wrote a month ago "Four Elections and a Coup" to appear in Australian Journal of International Affairs at the end of the year. The excerpt "The King Can Do Wrong" in the last post also comes from that piece.
Conclusion
During the 1990s, liberal impulses emanating from within Thailand merged with the international discourse of good governance. This process was halted when Thaksin’s rise coincided with global security discourse in the wake of the ‘war on terror’ and the pressure to conform to international forms of political liberalism receded. This was a dynamic broadly reminiscent of geo-politics of the Cold War. Now, with the region and the globe entering a new phase of geo-political conflict in which China and Russia are highly assertive, and the US is in retreat, the liberal politics that have largely dictated Thai pro-western foreign policy inclination may retreat further as states in the region gravitate more decisively to China.
Thaksin’s emergent authoritarianism and political challenge to elite power centres influenced the convergence of rightist fear of disorderly electoral democracy and middle-class concern for ‘good governance’. It has left Thailand’s political system faltering under a mass of contradictions that are not easily categorised. The current trajectory of Thai politics is impossible to predict. As system level contradictions simultaneously implode, the resulting conflagration may give birth to odd formations. Alternatively, politics might return to a status quo ante of corruption, electoral mobilisation and capital capture of the state. Certainly, when all sides play with the rules of the game, the crisis will remain intractable, perhaps until a rupturing historical event provides relief. One thing, though, is certain: the future of Thai politics will be extremely uncertain, precarious and subject to momentous change once the current king’s interventionist role, on the side of conservatism, is absent. With that in mind, at the very least a Thaksin return in some form can not be ruled out.
Postscript (10th September)
On September 9, 2008, in a unanimous verdict the Constitutional Court disqualified Samak as prime minister on the relatively trivial grounds that his hosting of a television cooking show while prime minister, violated Article 267 of the constitution, relating to conflict of interest. In July, Samak had bemoaned the smothering nature of the constitution, noting, ‘In the past, it was considered an honour to join the Cabinet. Now being a minister is like having one's leg in jail already’ (The Nation, 2008). This latest development might enforce the idea – as propagated by the respective protagonists - that Thai politics is like a social laboratory pitting the ‘rule of law’ against ‘democratic majoritarianism’. In reality, venal and vested political interests mix with popular aspirations on both sides of this elite conflict. Those interests have historic roots and structural properties. They are unlikely to lie down before moral censure that demands conformity to the rule of law or submission to the ballot box. In taking politics back to year zero – establishing the rules of the game – the current Thai conflict is a reminder that most social and political orders are established by the right, first, to be dominant. Such a right necessarily involves contradiction, selectivity, and myth. Currently, that right is contested, leading to parallel contradictions, selectivities and myths.
September 2, 2008
Comments on Thailand's Crisis 1st September
A short interview I did on Australian Network TV
Pick the story at the bottom of the list: "Thai Protestors Dig In"
This was recorded before the recent clash and declaration of a state of emergency.
Pick the story at the bottom of the list: "Thai Protestors Dig In"
This was recorded before the recent clash and declaration of a state of emergency.
July 15, 2008
Thailand: Coup? New Politics? Rule of Law?
Thai politics six months from now?
Some people have given up trying to understand current events in Thailand. They figure, I suppose, that they will pick up the thread once it’s all sorted.
That thread has several possible endings.
It might be a Democrat Party led coalition government in power, aided by military machinations of some form. Thaksin Shinawatra would be in exile (if he can get away), with ex-prime minister Samak sunk by allegations of corruption relating to the time he served as Bangkok Mayor. This possibility emerges on the assumption that the various court cases against Thaksin and the government proceed, and the coalition government splinters in the face of indictments and the dissolution of pro-Thaksin political influence.
Another possibility would be a resurgent People’s Power Party (PPP) government (sans Samak?). This outcome would require more of the counter demonstrations that are breaking out across the country against the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). This is the so-called “Udon model”, which entails breaking up PAD rallies wherever they occur in the provinces. Empowered by the mass mobilisation of its support base, the government would simultaneously amend the constitution and in doing so end the cases on corruption and party dissolution. This outcome would assume significant military support to offset anti-Thaksin forces in the military.
To get that outcome would require a judicial revolution of its own. It would mean invalidating the work of the Assets Examination Committee (which was the body that forwarded some of the corruption cases to the courts) by claiming that it had no legitimate legal status because it was established by the coup group. But for sixty years, laws that have been issued by military juntas have been judged legally binding by the Supreme Court. Such decrees and laws remain in force today. The status of ‘coup law’ was recently re-affirmed by the Constitution Court in regard to the AEC. However, in the face of mass mobilisation - and one assumes some degree of military backing to the government - the courts might revisit the question.
Alternatively, pressure may be applied to have the various cases withdrawn, thus avoiding a legal challenge that might unravel the entire system. For that to occur some deal might be done that brings about a political truce. Not many people can imagine a truce right now.
Another possibility is a coup d’etat against the government. It is hard to imagine such a coup d’etat merely restoring the situation preceding the elections in 2007. This is where PAD’s ideas of recasting politics into a “functional democracy” of occupational representation comes to the fore. By appointing most representatives to parliament in the post-coup environment, and making this permanent in accordance with PAD's New Politics , pro-Thaksin forces would be marginalised. Such a system could only emerge with immense acts of repression and endure with the same.
There is a less destabilising possibility.
The PPP government could muddle through in its own way, surviving or stumbling according to parliamentary convention. An agreement could be reached on a constitutional amendment that abolishes Article 237 (see below) dealing with party dissolution, and which currently looms over the Coalition government. In return, the cases relating to corruption would proceed. All parties would pledge to non-interference in the courts and support a fair trial.
Undoubtedly, something else will happen.
******************************************************************
Article on Party Dissolution in 2007 Constitution
"Section 237. Any candidate in an election, who has committed, created or supported any person to commit any act in violation of the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators or orders and announcements of the Election Commission, causing the election not to be proceeded in an honest and fair manner, shall be deprived of his or her voting rights in accordance with the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators.
If any such act of person under paragraph one appears to have convincing evidence that the leader or an executive member of his or her political party has acknowledged or ignored that action or has known of the act but failed to prevent or rectify it in order to ensure an honest and fair election, that political party is assumed to have sought to gain power in state administration by means other than what is provided in Section 68 of the Constitution, and in case the Constitutional Court consequently orders its dissolution, the voting rights of its leader and executive board members shall be revoked for a period of 5 years as from the date of issuance of the party dissolution order."
Taken from an unofficial translation of the constitution.
Some people have given up trying to understand current events in Thailand. They figure, I suppose, that they will pick up the thread once it’s all sorted.
That thread has several possible endings.
It might be a Democrat Party led coalition government in power, aided by military machinations of some form. Thaksin Shinawatra would be in exile (if he can get away), with ex-prime minister Samak sunk by allegations of corruption relating to the time he served as Bangkok Mayor. This possibility emerges on the assumption that the various court cases against Thaksin and the government proceed, and the coalition government splinters in the face of indictments and the dissolution of pro-Thaksin political influence.
Another possibility would be a resurgent People’s Power Party (PPP) government (sans Samak?). This outcome would require more of the counter demonstrations that are breaking out across the country against the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). This is the so-called “Udon model”, which entails breaking up PAD rallies wherever they occur in the provinces. Empowered by the mass mobilisation of its support base, the government would simultaneously amend the constitution and in doing so end the cases on corruption and party dissolution. This outcome would assume significant military support to offset anti-Thaksin forces in the military.
To get that outcome would require a judicial revolution of its own. It would mean invalidating the work of the Assets Examination Committee (which was the body that forwarded some of the corruption cases to the courts) by claiming that it had no legitimate legal status because it was established by the coup group. But for sixty years, laws that have been issued by military juntas have been judged legally binding by the Supreme Court. Such decrees and laws remain in force today. The status of ‘coup law’ was recently re-affirmed by the Constitution Court in regard to the AEC. However, in the face of mass mobilisation - and one assumes some degree of military backing to the government - the courts might revisit the question.
Alternatively, pressure may be applied to have the various cases withdrawn, thus avoiding a legal challenge that might unravel the entire system. For that to occur some deal might be done that brings about a political truce. Not many people can imagine a truce right now.
Another possibility is a coup d’etat against the government. It is hard to imagine such a coup d’etat merely restoring the situation preceding the elections in 2007. This is where PAD’s ideas of recasting politics into a “functional democracy” of occupational representation comes to the fore. By appointing most representatives to parliament in the post-coup environment, and making this permanent in accordance with PAD's New Politics , pro-Thaksin forces would be marginalised. Such a system could only emerge with immense acts of repression and endure with the same.
There is a less destabilising possibility.
The PPP government could muddle through in its own way, surviving or stumbling according to parliamentary convention. An agreement could be reached on a constitutional amendment that abolishes Article 237 (see below) dealing with party dissolution, and which currently looms over the Coalition government. In return, the cases relating to corruption would proceed. All parties would pledge to non-interference in the courts and support a fair trial.
Undoubtedly, something else will happen.
******************************************************************
Article on Party Dissolution in 2007 Constitution
"Section 237. Any candidate in an election, who has committed, created or supported any person to commit any act in violation of the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators or orders and announcements of the Election Commission, causing the election not to be proceeded in an honest and fair manner, shall be deprived of his or her voting rights in accordance with the Organic Act on Election of Members of the House of Representatives and the Taking of Office of Senators.
If any such act of person under paragraph one appears to have convincing evidence that the leader or an executive member of his or her political party has acknowledged or ignored that action or has known of the act but failed to prevent or rectify it in order to ensure an honest and fair election, that political party is assumed to have sought to gain power in state administration by means other than what is provided in Section 68 of the Constitution, and in case the Constitutional Court consequently orders its dissolution, the voting rights of its leader and executive board members shall be revoked for a period of 5 years as from the date of issuance of the party dissolution order."
Taken from an unofficial translation of the constitution.
July 3, 2008
A Night with the People's Alliance for Democracy
A brief note on a visit to PAD Rally 2nd July 2008
During late 2005 I visited the Sonthi rallies in Lumpini Park and then at Royal Plaza as they transformed into PAD. It has been over two years since I observed a PAD rally. Last night I headed to the rally near Government House and Kromluang Chumphon. It was day 39 of PAD’s newest incarnation. Calls for “new politics” were aired frequently.
Chamlong occasionally came on the stage to introduce artists/musicians supporting PAD. He also handed a 100,000 baht donation someone had given him to Suriyasai in a formal presentation.
Former Industry Minister and until recently member of the Democrat Party Chaiwat Sinsuwong gave a spirited speech, some of which I couldn’t catch. Chaiwat was the chap who filed a suit against the People’s Power Party for being a proxy of Thaksin, which was rejected by the Supreme Court. Pressure from the Democrats to withdraw the suit led to his resignation from the party. On stage, he announced that there would be demonstrations across the country on the 4th of July. This is the day that Sonthi Limthongkul has set for announcing the details of PAD’s “Revolution”. Chaiwat, as did others, referred to nation, king and religion constantly and also praised the navy for being (apart from a top navy general) on the right side, of the sacred triad. Chaiwat called on civil servants to join the struggle, asking if they belonged to the government or the king. After Chaiwat’s speech a navy song was played at the rally, military pomp and all that.
Praphan Kunmee, former member of the National Assembly appointed after the coup in September 2006, spoke about the long struggle ahead and invoked the patience of Mao, Mandela, Gandhi and Ho Chi Min. The struggle for new politics Praphan announced was no longer a struggle of the rural areas surrounding the cities, but both working together. Praphan was one of those thousands of people who fled to the jungle and sought refuge with the Communist Party of Thailand after the massacre at Thammasat University in October 1976. Subsequently, Praphan is reported to have worked with Chavalit’s New Aspiration Party and is said to be close to Prasong – the anti –Thaksin former intelligence chief and President of the Council that drafted Thailand’s current constitution. Praphan noted that in the short struggle so far two corpses had been claimed: Yongyuth (former speaker of the house) and Jakraphop (former minister). He also claimed that former PM Thaksin had dispensed with the telecommunications business in 2006 in order to use his special knowledge to invest in energy.
A singer, Rang, belted out songs about the king. He said no one wanted a coup because it would mean the end to the constitution that needed to be protected. During his time on stage he called on the (วิญญาณ) spirit of Sarit Thanarat (สฤษดิ์ ธนะรัชต์) to return and eliminate corruption. Sarit who died in 1963, was notoriously corrupt. The crowd, of around 4000-5000, applauded. The singer seems to have been travelling the country collecting money for PAD. On stage he presented 27000 baht to organisers from Chumphon.
There was lots of clapping, some of it by springed plastic hands waved by people. Plastic clapping hands and the spirit of dictator Sarit being summoned to eliminate corruption - a kind of surreal but appropriate montage for Thailand's "carnival of reaction" as Ji Ungphakorn has dubbed current trends in Thai politics.
During late 2005 I visited the Sonthi rallies in Lumpini Park and then at Royal Plaza as they transformed into PAD. It has been over two years since I observed a PAD rally. Last night I headed to the rally near Government House and Kromluang Chumphon. It was day 39 of PAD’s newest incarnation. Calls for “new politics” were aired frequently.
Chamlong occasionally came on the stage to introduce artists/musicians supporting PAD. He also handed a 100,000 baht donation someone had given him to Suriyasai in a formal presentation.
Former Industry Minister and until recently member of the Democrat Party Chaiwat Sinsuwong gave a spirited speech, some of which I couldn’t catch. Chaiwat was the chap who filed a suit against the People’s Power Party for being a proxy of Thaksin, which was rejected by the Supreme Court. Pressure from the Democrats to withdraw the suit led to his resignation from the party. On stage, he announced that there would be demonstrations across the country on the 4th of July. This is the day that Sonthi Limthongkul has set for announcing the details of PAD’s “Revolution”. Chaiwat, as did others, referred to nation, king and religion constantly and also praised the navy for being (apart from a top navy general) on the right side, of the sacred triad. Chaiwat called on civil servants to join the struggle, asking if they belonged to the government or the king. After Chaiwat’s speech a navy song was played at the rally, military pomp and all that.
Praphan Kunmee, former member of the National Assembly appointed after the coup in September 2006, spoke about the long struggle ahead and invoked the patience of Mao, Mandela, Gandhi and Ho Chi Min. The struggle for new politics Praphan announced was no longer a struggle of the rural areas surrounding the cities, but both working together. Praphan was one of those thousands of people who fled to the jungle and sought refuge with the Communist Party of Thailand after the massacre at Thammasat University in October 1976. Subsequently, Praphan is reported to have worked with Chavalit’s New Aspiration Party and is said to be close to Prasong – the anti –Thaksin former intelligence chief and President of the Council that drafted Thailand’s current constitution. Praphan noted that in the short struggle so far two corpses had been claimed: Yongyuth (former speaker of the house) and Jakraphop (former minister). He also claimed that former PM Thaksin had dispensed with the telecommunications business in 2006 in order to use his special knowledge to invest in energy.
A singer, Rang, belted out songs about the king. He said no one wanted a coup because it would mean the end to the constitution that needed to be protected. During his time on stage he called on the (วิญญาณ) spirit of Sarit Thanarat (สฤษดิ์ ธนะรัชต์) to return and eliminate corruption. Sarit who died in 1963, was notoriously corrupt. The crowd, of around 4000-5000, applauded. The singer seems to have been travelling the country collecting money for PAD. On stage he presented 27000 baht to organisers from Chumphon.
There was lots of clapping, some of it by springed plastic hands waved by people. Plastic clapping hands and the spirit of dictator Sarit being summoned to eliminate corruption - a kind of surreal but appropriate montage for Thailand's "carnival of reaction" as Ji Ungphakorn has dubbed current trends in Thai politics.
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