Thailand: Lese Majeste and Jakrapop's Defence

Comment: If Jakarapop's (former Minister to the PM's Office) lese majeste case ever comes to court, one of his defences could be that in the 1970s Thai government manuals on democracy were critical of patronage and reliance on elders and sought to promote a more egalitarian political culture. As discussed in Democracy and National Identity in Thailand (p. 96):

"Before the consolidation of the ideology of ‘democracy with the king as head
of state’ in the 1980s (see Chapter 6), it was still possible to destabilize royalist
readings of democracy. For example, King Ramkhamhaeng’s bell is viewed critically
in this manual.As the Ramkhamhaeng stone inscription, reputedly from the late
thirteenth century, tells it, any one with a grievance needed only to ring the bell and the king would listen to their needs. The authors [of the democracy manual] reinterpret this as a negative thing, for it is seen as producing a culture of citizen dependency, of childlike relations with a father. Thus the old political culture is described as having imparted values of indifference in state matters and a perspective that ‘politics is a matter of those above and thus they [the people] have little ambition to go and vote’."

Jakrapop has said the kind of thing that erst-while liberals such as Chain-Anan S have publicly written about. Actually, the full text of the manual cited above may have been written under Chai-Anan's influence given his prominence at the time.



*** Update
Analysing the background and significance of this case see Shawn Crispin's piece in ATIMES.COM

Thailand: The Resilience of the Third Force

Comment
In recent weeks as the politics of the People's Power Party have become clearer (ensure no revisiting of the accountability agenda of 2004-2006) and as the impasse politics of the People's Alliance for Democracy have intensified, the "no-to the two-camps" position of 2006 is emerging as a tangible third force in the Thai political equation. The position that democracy means more than submission to crown and khaki or capital, which is what was on offer, remains resilient and relevant to those seeking a way that lies beyond elite liberalism or authoritarian populism.

Below, find reproduced two indications of this emergence. A viable politics that has at its centre genuine democratic deliberation in free conditions is emerging. It looks vibrant when set againt the compromised positions of the pro-coup or pro-Thaksin positions.


FROM Prachatai English Site.
Academic advisor for the poor talks about the PAD
Thai Post
04 June 2008
News
Prapart Pintobtang, lecturer at Chulalongkorn’s Political Science Faculty and advisor to the Assembly of the Poor, speaks frankly about the latest moves by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Years of having supported the causes of the poor have made him no stranger at all to some PAD leading members who are from the so-called ‘people’s sector’. Yet, finally, he touches on issues which in the past couple of years have become acrimonious among NGOs and people’s movements, and on which many ‘people’s sector’ insiders have chosen to have reservations.

Prapart was among 137 academics who recently proposed the drafting of a whole new constitution as an alternative to the polarized politics. As one among people with ‘2 No’s’—No Thaksin and No Coup—he earlier signed a petition against the Samak government’s unfair transfers of civil servants, while he was also among 130 academics who condemned the Manager Group for instigating human rights violations. (See 130 activists and academics condemn Manager media group)

Now he talks about the PAD rally in such a way that the PAD will probably see him as yet another enemy, because he does not want to see another coup.

Backward and fanatically nationalistic

He went to see the PAD rally on May 25.

‘I felt what I saw was a war of hatred. The theme was the monarchy, or the trinity of Nation, Religion, and Monarchy, with all the rest being linked to this theme. Under this theme, anybody who doesn’t identify with the PAD is pushed to the other side among those who are destroying this ideology and are trying to build what the PAD calls a republic.’

Read More



From the Bangkok Post
Change, yes. Now, no.
June 4, 2008


By Nidhi Eoseewong



For Thai society, there is no worse moment to amend the constitution than now. Even though a consensus has been more or less reached about whether we should change the charter, some blood was shed on the streets. If we actually get down to rewriting the text, we could be butchering one another

...

At this juncture, I see no plausible way to end this conflict other than to allow the whole society to take part in drafting the new charter themselves. We will have to resort to having a public hearing on each important aspect of the constitution, for example how the electorate should be divided? One-person-one-vote? Small constituencies or large ones?

I hope that the process of arguing and discussing these important issues regarding the constitution would divert society to a more reasonable conflict than the trading of accusations that we are facing at present. We can have legal hands do the actual rewriting of the charter, but the concept must come from the results of public hearings.

Read full article

Thai Constitutions and the lineage of of Article 7”

“Lineage of Article 7”

Article 7 was perhaps one of the most well known articles of the 1997 Constitution during the 2005-2006 rallies against Thaksin Shinawatra. It was used first to call for political reform initiated by the king and then later for a royally appointed government, which the king famously rejected in late April 2006.

In "Article of Faith" I look at how this article was inserted into the 1997 constitution, noting that it was an attempt to safeguard conservative notions of rule.


Article 7 reads:

"Whenever no provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional practice in the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State" (Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997).

The above is an official translation of Article 7, and it's how I have referred to it elsewhere, as have others. It's worth noting that a more literal translation would be:

"Whenever no provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with traditions/conventions of governmment (ประเพณีการปกครอง) in a democratic regime with the king as head of state."

The term 'constitutional practice' then should be understood in the manner of Britain's unwritten constitution.

When Article 7 was inserted into the 1997 draft constitution a veteran left politician noted that its substance was in accord with the far ranging powers contained in coup-generated constitutions. That claim was right. Its first appearance was in the 1959 constitution under Sarit. Interestingly though, the term “democratic regime with the king as head of state” appears in this context only in the 1997 constitution, the 2006 interim constitution and the pseudo-referendum constitution of 2007.

Variations on Article 7 are found in all constitutions (differently numbered) from 1959 with the exception of the 1968 constituion.

2502 1959
มาตรา ๒๐ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งธรรมนูญนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้วินิจฉัยกรณี
นั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตย
ในกรณีมีปัญหาเกี่ยวแก่การวินิจฉัยกรณีใดตามความในวรรคก่อนเกิดขึ้นในวงงาน
ของสภา หรือเกิดขึ้นโดยคณะรัฐมนตรีขอให้สภาวินิจฉัย ให้สภาวินิจฉัยชี้ขาด

2514 1971
มาตรา ๒๒ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งธรรมนูญการปกครองนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้
วินิจฉัยกรณีนั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตยในกรณีมีปัญหาเกี่ยวแก่การวินิจฉัยกรณี
ใดตามความในวรรคหนึ่งเกิดขึ้นในวงงานของสภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ หรือเกิดขึ้นโดยคณะรัฐมนตรีขอให้สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัย ให้สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัยชี้ขาด


2519 1976
มาตรา๒๕ เมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งรัฐธรรมนูญนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้วินิจฉัยกรณี
นั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตย


2520 1977
มาตรา ๓๐ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งธรรมนูญการปกครองนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้
วินิจฉัยกรณีนั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตย
ในกรณีมีปัญหาเกี่ยวแก่การวินิจฉัยกรณีใดตามความในวรรคหนึ่งเกิดขึ้นในวงงาน
ของสภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ หรือเกิดขึ้นโดยคณะรัฐมนตรีขอให้สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ วินิจฉัยให้ สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัยชี้ขาด

2534 1991
มาตรา ๓๐ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งธรรมนูญการปกครองนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้
วินิจฉัยกรณีนั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตย
ในกรณีมีปัญหาเกี่ยวกับการวินิจฉัยกรณีใดตามความในวรรคหนึ่งเกิดขึ้นในวงงาน
ของสภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ หรือเกิดขึ้นโดยคณะรัฐมนตรีขอให้สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัย ให้
สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัยชี้ขาด

2540 1997

มาตรา ๗ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งรัฐธรรมนูญนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้วินิจฉัย
กรณีนั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตยอันมีพระมหากษัตริย์ทรงเป็นประมุข

2549 2006
มาตรา ๓๘ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งรัฐธรรมนูญนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้วินิจฉัยกรณี
นั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตยอันมีพระมหากษัตริย์ทรงเป็น ประมุข
ในกรณีมีปัญหาเกี่ยวแก่การวินิจฉัยกรณีใดตามความในวรรคหนึ่งเกิดขึ้นในวงงานของ
สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติ หรือเมื่อมีกรณีที่คณะรัฐมนตรีขอให้สภานิติบัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัยให้สภานิติ
บัญญัติแห่งชาติวินิจฉัยชี้ขาด


2550 2007
มาตรา ๗ ในเมื่อไม่มีบทบัญญัติแห่งรัฐธรรมนูญนี้บังคับแก่กรณีใด ให้วินิจฉัยกรณีนั้นไปตามประเพณีการปกครองระบอบประชาธิปไตยอันมีพระมหากษัตริย์ทรงเป็นประมุข
{this post was edited on 2/12/2010 to correct an error)

Competing Regime Framers

The following extracted conclusion is from my paper:

"State ambivalence, decisionism and competing regime framers", paper presented to
workshop on ‘Contemporary Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia’, City University, Hong
Kong, May 9-10, 2008.


Conclusion The authoritarian paradox in Thailand.

Why is it that, in combination and contest, the liberal and democratic (electoral) positive aspects of Thailand’s history come to be expressed by authoritarian modes of power?

Thailand has a rich liberal and democratic heritage, the deepening discourses of these currents in the last generation represents a societal gain occasioned by mass struggle and incremental emergence by liberal regime framers. While the democratic forces of popular society have often been willing to ally with liberal elites to extend the political space upon which they can work on distributional and identity issues, elite liberal forces have not sanctioned an expansion of democratic space into substantive economic questions –viewing civil society as a place of tempered civic virtue and a place of social learning and political socialisation.

In the 2000s, the historical failure of Thai liberalism to deal with fundamental class grievances was grasped as an opportunity by an instrumental populist who sought to mobilise electoral weight to break through the liberal-bureaucratic compact and shift the terms of Thailand’s political economy. His populism dramatised by the “three narratives” of giving, being of the people and acting on their will )Pasuk and Baker, 2008), was made concrete by extraordinary measures to address grievances geared not simply at redistribution and alleviation but at a reconfiguration of power in Thailand. Thaksin’s wielding of the democratic gains of Thai politics, his willingness to enter the competitive fray, led to the disarticulation of an already precariously balanced liberalism and democracy (electoralism). That move laid open the possibility of the potential emergence of an electoral authoritarian regime that might permanently quash the politically liberal current, pushing such currents back into the “soft-authoritarian” arms of the noble state.

The clash of these modes of power laid the basis for the current authoritarian paradox in Thailand. In the battle between modes of order, each force competed with the other and attempted to restrain the other, ultimately resorting to authoritarian methods. Each force has failed to become institutionalised, leaving strategic elites to play games of absolute advantage, further enforcing the authoritarian impulse. Each force necessarily articulates to existing state institutions or supportive elements therein, whose substance is neither liberal nor democratic. The two positives – in a tortured historical process - have produced a negative – a decisionist authoritarianism of state and liberal regime framers.

Thailand: The Silent Insurgency

From New Matilda 27 March.
Newmatilda.com

The Silent Insurgency
By Michael Connors


The bombing of an elite hotel last week shattered any illusion of safety in Thailand's insurgent Southern border provinces, writes Michael Connors
Last week a cook and a security guard were killed by a car bomb at the C.S. Pattani Hotel. I've stayed at the C.S. Pattani a number of times. It's the kind of place the novelist Graham Greene would have acutely observed, its archaic Arabic façade and grand staircase ripe for a vignette of spooks and opportunists thickly in congress. Better still, the hotel is stuck in the middle of an insurgency - not in Iraq but in the Malay-speaking Southern border provinces of Thailand.
The conflict, known as the "Southern Fire" to the Thai, has claimed just over 3000 lives in the last four years. It is now one of the most violent conflicts in Australia's neighbourhood - and the least talked about in the international media.

The C.S. Pattani Hotel is the one place in Thailand's South where security is considered tight and bombs and assassin's bullets are unlikely to reach. For that reason, anyone who goes to the South normally stays there. At any time one might find former prime ministers, ambassadors, Red Crescent officials and ambitious freelance journalists imbibing tea or discreetly drinking a beer.

In my stays I've met militant Malay nationalists who want a political solution to the conflict, peace-activists seeking reconciliation between Buddhist and Muslim communities, Imams of a fundamentalist bent who deplore violence, and widows and bereaved daughters whose husbands or fathers have been lost in the conflict.

The car-bombing, which claimed two lives and injured a dozen others, was a turning point, signalling that there is no safe ground in the area, not even for the elites who frequent C.S. Pattani. Many see it as a signal that the insurgency is about to get worse.

The border provinces of Thailand have been a frequent site of disturbance, repression and insurgency since they were formally annexed by Siam in a 1909 agreement with the British, who in return were given parts of the north of present day Malaysia.

In the face of nearly a century of Thai programs of cultural assimilation that verged on colonialism, the Malays of the South have maintained their own distinct identity and language. Many officials in the Thai State have finally begun to understand this fact, but at glacial pace and without comprehending the political implications that a second nation exists within Thailand.

No solution appears to be in sight - in part because few people understand what is actually happening - and few Thai nationalists are willing to even talk about autonomy, let along grant it to the region.

While many believe the Southern conflict is largely driven by nationalist politics, some want to paint the insurgency as primarily Islamist. Certainly, there is evidence for this. Moreover, terrorism experts speak of the extending tentacles of JI into the South, or suggest the potential internationalisation of the conflict, which may well mean a role for Al Qaeda. But it is worth bearing in mind that, as Dr Mike Smith noted a decade ago, terrorism experts "know a little about a lot of conflicts".

Serious scholars of the conflict are much more cautious in attempting to explain its nature and causes. It's not hard to see why. Different insurgent groups come and go (at least in name); intelligence reports are cooked up, serve a purpose and then retired. Inexplicable acts of violence by the State are ignored while alleged insurgents are rounded up and forced to attend re-education camps to learn the value of national unity.

Then there is the dual system of justice. While some alleged insurgents face court and trial, not a single State official has faced criminal charges related to the 30 extra-judicial killings in the Krue Se Mosque in April 2004. After the reprehensible killing in October 2004 of 78 Muslim men, who died after they were stacked one on top of the other and transported for hours in military trucks, the Government claimed the victims died, in part, because they were fasting for Ramadan. The Thai State has also yet to open a proper inquiry into the mass graves found in Pattani where upwards of 300 corpses lie.

In contrast to the predictable statements issued by terrorism analysts, a new documentary film on the South by Thai filmmaker Ing K sheds much light. The film, Citizen Juling, has been described as a road trip into Thailand's soul.

It follows the life of Juling, a Buddhist who went to live in the South to teach arts. She was brutally bashed and left comatose, allegedly by local Muslim women whose children Juling taught. Her story becomes the canvass upon which the whole "Southern Fire" is drawn.

In following the footsteps of Juling and those touched by her story, Citizen Juling does something no terrorism analysis can do. It brings into genuine dialogue the frustrations of Muslims and Buddhists alike, it offers insights into the pain of violent loss, and it reaches beyond the clichés of the War on Terror to tell a very human story of idealism and betrayal.

A powerful documentary that mixes the ordinary and revealing life of Malay Muslims in Thailand with a quietly probing study of violence and its odious ramifications, Citizen Juling may finally make the world take notice of what is happening in the South of Thailand.

La Trobe University and the Australian Centre for the Moving Image (ACMI) are jointly hosting a free screening of Citizen Juling in Melbourne on March 28. Click here for details. You can read a longer analysis on the South here.