History Wars: Onward and Forward
By: Michael Connors
Wednesday 30 August 2006
new Matilda
Education in New Australia is just getting back on its feet. Although there are few resources, no texts, and teachers rely on the memory of demented old Australians, the teaching profession is increasingly confident that New History can be written.
Serving a population of 20,000 children on this small island is a cohort of young post-mutant teachers. They are proving able to instil in the minds of our young a regard for narrative and facts. Still there are many gaps in our knowledge, signified by the question marks that appear throughout the following report.
After the Global Flood (which the Turnbull Government claimed was going to be like a swim in a toddler’s pool) and the Great Nuclear War (which the same Government claimed was the final strike against the Islamo-fashionist terror of Europe), much of the social, political and economic infrastructure of Old Australia was devastated.
The new digital city of Onward (?) — named in honour of the longest sitting Prime Minister in Old Australia’s history — was wiped out. It is said that when the first missile hit, John Onward, retired and approaching his 100th birthday, was re-learning how to count with his favourite Minister, Abbott Costello. Both were beneficiaries of the new stool-stem research of the time.
Grand Court Gerontocrat Kevin Rudd, appointed Governor of Australia by the Chinese Rehabilitation Forces (may we be thankful for their presence), has now forgotten how to speak English and through translation from the Mandarin we understand that he merely repeats, ‘No John, that is not a shooting star; that is not a shooting star.’ This will be the title of our Year Zero history book: Not a Shooting Star.
As for the cause of Old Australia’s destruction, no one is sure if New American Empire missiles mistakenly turned on Australia or if the crackpots in Europe decided that if they were going down, then so were we. The Chinese Rehabilitation Forces (may we be thankful for their presence) have instructed us to ignore Old Australia and to begin our history from Year Zero and then move quickly to the era of the Chinese Rehabilitation Forces (may we be thankful for their presence).
There are those of us who seek at least to remember some moments of Old Australia, as it existed to our North. Unfortunately, there was not a single library or digital database left standing after the Great Flood and War. Any carbon-based text found after the War was used to warm scarred bodies in winter. It is surprising, too, that not a single copy of the mass-produced compulsory high school text Advance Australia survives. Written by G Makawish (?), many of our demented elderly remember it fondly.
We understand that sometime early in the century, the Onward Government, on the advice of learned academics, required schools to teach a linear narrative — and the narrative was ‘onward and forward’ — a happy coincidence of name and policy. Makawish’s history served that purpose. Oral historians have made great efforts to commit to memory key aspects of the book by speaking to the less demented elderly among us.
Some of the fragments that we have established include:
How Australian Aborigines welcomed White Australians and then got drunk and needed a long period of guardianship. An eminent Australian historian by the name of John Hurt (?) reputedly sought a return to 19th century local governors to ensure the wellbeing of the Indigenous peoples. We are not sure of the veracity of this history, but we do know that Indigenous peoples are now key to the survival of de-electrified, non coal-fired New Australia. So we now have John Hurt Day to commemorate the Onward Government’s visionary thinking in maintaining Aboriginal heritage and local knowledge. The Chinese, for reasons we cannot ascertain, chuckle about this.
Old Australians fought in 15 wars against Islamo-fashion terrorists. The first, in the late 19th century led to the liberation of White people from Black Muslims who sought to enslave White pioneers. More recently, the Muslim fashion empire in Europe under Hirohito and Stalhit (?) was defeated by a grand coalition of freedom-loving Old Australians and Americans. It seems a donkey was central to the victory. Despite this, the Islamic worm turned and renewed its hold over Europe, despite calls by respectable Rotary-going members that Christians should breed, and a lot.
In the first decade of the new millennium, Australia petitioned for statehood with the New American Empire. President Clinton (?) — no one remembers if this was a man or a woman — accepted the petition and stationed strategic weapon systems here to defeat Islamo-fashionism in Europe and Iceland.
The Introductory Chapter to Advance Australia is said to have decried the standards of teaching in Old Australia, and called for abidance with the following principles:
Patriotism — love of place and nation
Datism — expression of that love by knowing when the good things happened
Matism — the good times
Onwardism — always thinking of the future, not backwards
We can report that the recent Onward History Summit made progress with rediscovering the pre-History of New Australia and we now feel confident that in so doing we will be in a better position to write our own future.
While the Chinese Rehabilitation Forces (may we be thankful for their presence) are firm that we should not return to Old Australian history — it is only on that basis that we can go ‘onward and forward.’
September 8, 2007
US objectives in the War on Terror
America used terror to mask its real aims
By Michael Connors
The Age, Melbourne
September 2, 2005
Canberra has stifled debate while hitching its cart to the US, writes Michael Connors.
HUGH White is the talking head of the Australian foreign policy commentariat. He is a professor of strategic studies at the ANU, and the security analyst of choice for many in Australia. But his comments on this page yesterday demonstrate an appalling lack of understanding of the politics of the war on terrorism in this country.
White confesses to what most of those people imbibing at diplomatic functions and academic talk-fests have known for quite some time — that the hysterical (he chooses the word heroic) public presentation of the threat of terror is at odds with the more realistic threat perceptions regarding terrorism held by those in power.
The fact is that "terrorism" is not going to wipe out whole societies in the way that nuclear conflict during the Cold War might have done.
White notes the divergence between rational discussion and sensible gradation of threat possibilities among government insiders, flanked by the growing entourage of terror experts, and the ersatz Churchillian thunder of politicians in public.
to explain this divergence? It's a good question, but White's answer fails. He writes: "Politicians (and commentators for that matter) talk about terrorism in what we might
call heroic terms because that is how we as publics want them to talk about it."
Do you get that? It's your fault. You weren't happy with the Government's anti-terror campaign, you wanted to be alarmed. You are aching for a chance to sacrifice, seeking an escape from your meaningless existence. It is you who forces onto politicians an excessive language of threat and extinction. Terror has given your life meaning and, as a consequence, politicians are hostage to popular prejudice. They can only repeat ridiculous rot about barbarians at the gate because if they don't, you won't be happy.
White hopes that if we reflect on this insight we might find a way out, be more sensible, listen to the experts more. Honesty might be a better option.
The Government has not been reluctantly serving up a feast of vacuous platitudes to satiate popular prejudice. It has willingly mastered the art of confection, recklessly serving "sexed-up" intelligence, homilies to our sacred way of life, and, at times, lies.
It has done this to ensure that Australia is hitched to the world's superpower. This is the highest priority of nation-interest diplomacy, and if joining in the "war on terror" is required, this Government will bleat with the rest of them. It'll go to war, too, on totally false premises.
The Government, not the people, is to blame for the woefully inadequate public discussion of terrorism in this country. The language of terror, the inflation of threat and the manipulation of news have been instrumental in furthering US and, by this Government's logic, Australian strategic objectives.
Using terrorism as a cover, the US has embarked on a remarkable expansion and repositioning of its global presence. Bases have sprung up in central Asia and the Middle East.
Why have we witnessed an expansive US policy if terrorism is not the global threat it is made out to be, and if policing is a better option than military deployment? The simple answer is that the US seeks to maintain its present status as sole superpower.
Since the early 1990s when Paul Wolfowitz, then a defence official, penned a memo about the need to thwart the emergence of a regional or global rival to US global hegemony, the US has been playing the game of being the only game in town.
It's no secret.
Even the US National Security Strategy of 2002 addresses the overriding imperative of US global hegemony. To achieve this goal the US needs resource security and unsurpassed military presence.
The rhetoric of the war on terrorism has cloaked these objectives. After all, it is easier to win popular support with talk of evil than with talk of hegemony, military expansion and resource security.
The debacle in Iraq, a more sceptical population, and opposition to national security legislation are all undermining the instrumental uses of the inflated threat of terror.
As Australian foreign policy elites try to pick up the pieces, cover their tracks, and disown some of their erstwhile commentary, it must be tempting to point the finger at someone.
By Michael Connors
The Age, Melbourne
September 2, 2005
Canberra has stifled debate while hitching its cart to the US, writes Michael Connors.
HUGH White is the talking head of the Australian foreign policy commentariat. He is a professor of strategic studies at the ANU, and the security analyst of choice for many in Australia. But his comments on this page yesterday demonstrate an appalling lack of understanding of the politics of the war on terrorism in this country.
White confesses to what most of those people imbibing at diplomatic functions and academic talk-fests have known for quite some time — that the hysterical (he chooses the word heroic) public presentation of the threat of terror is at odds with the more realistic threat perceptions regarding terrorism held by those in power.
The fact is that "terrorism" is not going to wipe out whole societies in the way that nuclear conflict during the Cold War might have done.
White notes the divergence between rational discussion and sensible gradation of threat possibilities among government insiders, flanked by the growing entourage of terror experts, and the ersatz Churchillian thunder of politicians in public.
to explain this divergence? It's a good question, but White's answer fails. He writes: "Politicians (and commentators for that matter) talk about terrorism in what we might
call heroic terms because that is how we as publics want them to talk about it."
Do you get that? It's your fault. You weren't happy with the Government's anti-terror campaign, you wanted to be alarmed. You are aching for a chance to sacrifice, seeking an escape from your meaningless existence. It is you who forces onto politicians an excessive language of threat and extinction. Terror has given your life meaning and, as a consequence, politicians are hostage to popular prejudice. They can only repeat ridiculous rot about barbarians at the gate because if they don't, you won't be happy.
White hopes that if we reflect on this insight we might find a way out, be more sensible, listen to the experts more. Honesty might be a better option.
The Government has not been reluctantly serving up a feast of vacuous platitudes to satiate popular prejudice. It has willingly mastered the art of confection, recklessly serving "sexed-up" intelligence, homilies to our sacred way of life, and, at times, lies.
It has done this to ensure that Australia is hitched to the world's superpower. This is the highest priority of nation-interest diplomacy, and if joining in the "war on terror" is required, this Government will bleat with the rest of them. It'll go to war, too, on totally false premises.
The Government, not the people, is to blame for the woefully inadequate public discussion of terrorism in this country. The language of terror, the inflation of threat and the manipulation of news have been instrumental in furthering US and, by this Government's logic, Australian strategic objectives.
Using terrorism as a cover, the US has embarked on a remarkable expansion and repositioning of its global presence. Bases have sprung up in central Asia and the Middle East.
Why have we witnessed an expansive US policy if terrorism is not the global threat it is made out to be, and if policing is a better option than military deployment? The simple answer is that the US seeks to maintain its present status as sole superpower.
Since the early 1990s when Paul Wolfowitz, then a defence official, penned a memo about the need to thwart the emergence of a regional or global rival to US global hegemony, the US has been playing the game of being the only game in town.
It's no secret.
Even the US National Security Strategy of 2002 addresses the overriding imperative of US global hegemony. To achieve this goal the US needs resource security and unsurpassed military presence.
The rhetoric of the war on terrorism has cloaked these objectives. After all, it is easier to win popular support with talk of evil than with talk of hegemony, military expansion and resource security.
The debacle in Iraq, a more sceptical population, and opposition to national security legislation are all undermining the instrumental uses of the inflated threat of terror.
As Australian foreign policy elites try to pick up the pieces, cover their tracks, and disown some of their erstwhile commentary, it must be tempting to point the finger at someone.
Thailand National Reconciliation Report 2006
Addressing the southern conflagration
Bangkok Post, June 13 2006
The South has long been the victim of political neglect and opportunism.
It is tragic that the political vacuum in Bangkok means the National
Reconciliation Commission's report will not be acted on for some time
By MICHAEL CONNORS
After a year of deliberation, last week the National Reconciliation
Commission released its final report on the causes and proposed solutions
to the violence in the southern border provinces of Thailand. The NRC's
report on what is known as the ''fai Tai'' (the southern fire) is a
significant intervention into the policy agenda in Thailand. It envisages
some major changes that harken back to the political reform agenda of the
1990s that focused on participatory democracy, accountability and human
rights. The NRC _ led by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun and
supported by public intellectuals such as Dr Prawes Wasi and Professor
Chaiwat Satha-Anand _ has used the problems in the South as a platform
upon which to note the deterioration of democratic rule in Thailand, even
if it is too polite to say so directly. The commission notes that the
problems that exist in the South also obtain in other regions _ poverty,
abuse of power, flawed judicial processes.
What distinguishes the southern border provinces, and what has thus led to
the present low intensity conflict between the state and unknown
separatist militants, is that these problems play out in a context marked
by religious, language and cultural difference. These provide all the
necessary ingredients for a further deterioration if grievances are not
addressed. And, as the NRC notes, these grievances are also mobilised by
non-ideological forces who use the opportunity provided by the
securitisation of the conflict to continue with criminal forms of
behaviour such as cross-border trade and drug trafficking.
A number of commentators have used events such as the April 2004 uprising
and discovery of the booklet Berjihad ti Patani to suggest the emergence
of a more ideological strain of Islam in the separatist movement.
Interestingly, the NRC reports that in close to half of the so-called
red-zone villages where insurgents are held to be operative, conflict over
resources is an ongoing issue _ suggesting that economic issues continue
to fuel unrest. While accepting the existence of militant networks, the
NRC sees the violence in the South as a consequence of militant, criminal
and state-based actors interacting with structural factors such as forms
of rule that do not respond to local needs. Working out who is behind the
violence is no easy task. The NRC notes the lack of consensus among state
officials. For example, in the first half of 2005, the Thai police were
unable to determine who was responsible for around 80% of the violent
incidents on record. Furthermore, the military claimed that only half of
the violent incidents in the first quarter of 2004 were attributable to
militants.
The key recommendation of the NRC is that an Act of Reconciliation be
passed which brings into being three new organisations: the Border
Provinces Area Development Council; the Peaceful Strategic Administrative
Centre for Southern Border Provinces; and a permanent fund to support
reconciliation work. The proposed Border Provinces Area Development
Council, which is seen as a response to more radical calls for autonomy,
sounds good on paper; but as an advisory body only, with no official
power, it fails to address local calls for more substantive reform. That
the NRC fiercely debated the question of autonomy is now well known.
Some NRC members were disaffected that prominent NRC members argued that
concessions to autonomy or even a Bangkok-style form of government would
lead to an ultra-nationalist reaction, making any NRC recommendations
redundant.
Those fearing a nationalist backlash thus pushed for a minimalist
semi-elected Development Council that provides for non-binding popular
participation in policy formation and monitoring of government. In not
dealing with genuine political re-organisation, tensions on the nature of
political rule in the deep South will continue. The second body, the
Strategic Administrative Centre, essentially recreates the Southern Border
Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) that the Thaksin government
disbanded in 2002. It is not at all clear that re-establishment of that
organisation in all but name will end the crisis.
SBPAC's success was not simply related to its organisational efficiency.
It also embodied a two-decades social compact in the South that
recognised, integrated and legitimised various interests. The last five
years have seen those interests embroiled in conflict, violence and
reconfiguration. The balance of power that held in the SBPAC cannot now be
resurrected by simple administrative decree. The NRC has been more
creative when it comes to questions of peace-building and cultural
understanding. The NRC proposal to deploy unarmed military units is an
attractive one, given that violence breeds violence. The recommendation
flows from a recognition that in the past the presence of weapons has
inflamed tense stand-off situations. The problem remains of how such
unarmed forces would protect themselves in the event of an attack.
The NRC final report also stresses the importance of working towards
increased cultural understanding in the region, including the possible
expansion of Sharia law _ what this means practically will depend on local
Muslim interpretation. The NRC's stress on the importance of understanding
the cultural identity of the region echoes a key demand of political
Muslims who formed the Wadah faction in the 1980s. Wadah also sought to
make Malay a second official language in the region, and the NRC has
endorsed this idea. The significance of such a proposal cannot be
underestimated. Thai for many people in the border provinces is, at best,
a second language. In meetings in Pattani, I have seen state officials
speak Thai to a largely uncomprehending audience.
One Uzstad explained to me that many of his friends did not understand
Thai and so had left one particular meeting early.
This probably happens all the time. The official could probably speak
Malay, but as it was an official gathering, so the medium of communication
was Thai. Culture is lived through language. Devaluing the language spoken
by the majority of the people in the southern border provinces in the name
of promoting national integration, has bred resentment and antagonism,
entrenching a sense of alienation towards the state among some Malay
Muslims in the South. The proposed change in language policy is one of the
most significant advances proposed by the NRC because it has the potential
to have an impact on many other areas, including cultural alienation,
employment in the civil service, and on relations between state officials
and Malay-speaking communities.
Children's first years of state education may well become bilingual,
presenting them with a confidence in their own language that could lead to
confidence in acquiring Thai. The NRC language recommendation has the
potential to provide a long-term solution to the anomic violence that may,
in part, flow from social exclusion. If you can't speak in your own voice,
how can you be a citizen? The introduction of a new language policy would
be an expansion of citizenship rights in Thailand.
The South has long been the victim of political neglect and opportunism.
It is tragic that just as some good ideas have been formulated to redress
legitimate grievances in the South, the political vacuum in Bangkok and
the current struggle for political survival of Thaksin Shinawatra and his
Thai Rak Thai party means that there will be no systematic approach to
the National Reconciliation Commission's report for some time.
Bangkok Post, June 13 2006
The South has long been the victim of political neglect and opportunism.
It is tragic that the political vacuum in Bangkok means the National
Reconciliation Commission's report will not be acted on for some time
By MICHAEL CONNORS
After a year of deliberation, last week the National Reconciliation
Commission released its final report on the causes and proposed solutions
to the violence in the southern border provinces of Thailand. The NRC's
report on what is known as the ''fai Tai'' (the southern fire) is a
significant intervention into the policy agenda in Thailand. It envisages
some major changes that harken back to the political reform agenda of the
1990s that focused on participatory democracy, accountability and human
rights. The NRC _ led by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun and
supported by public intellectuals such as Dr Prawes Wasi and Professor
Chaiwat Satha-Anand _ has used the problems in the South as a platform
upon which to note the deterioration of democratic rule in Thailand, even
if it is too polite to say so directly. The commission notes that the
problems that exist in the South also obtain in other regions _ poverty,
abuse of power, flawed judicial processes.
What distinguishes the southern border provinces, and what has thus led to
the present low intensity conflict between the state and unknown
separatist militants, is that these problems play out in a context marked
by religious, language and cultural difference. These provide all the
necessary ingredients for a further deterioration if grievances are not
addressed. And, as the NRC notes, these grievances are also mobilised by
non-ideological forces who use the opportunity provided by the
securitisation of the conflict to continue with criminal forms of
behaviour such as cross-border trade and drug trafficking.
A number of commentators have used events such as the April 2004 uprising
and discovery of the booklet Berjihad ti Patani to suggest the emergence
of a more ideological strain of Islam in the separatist movement.
Interestingly, the NRC reports that in close to half of the so-called
red-zone villages where insurgents are held to be operative, conflict over
resources is an ongoing issue _ suggesting that economic issues continue
to fuel unrest. While accepting the existence of militant networks, the
NRC sees the violence in the South as a consequence of militant, criminal
and state-based actors interacting with structural factors such as forms
of rule that do not respond to local needs. Working out who is behind the
violence is no easy task. The NRC notes the lack of consensus among state
officials. For example, in the first half of 2005, the Thai police were
unable to determine who was responsible for around 80% of the violent
incidents on record. Furthermore, the military claimed that only half of
the violent incidents in the first quarter of 2004 were attributable to
militants.
The key recommendation of the NRC is that an Act of Reconciliation be
passed which brings into being three new organisations: the Border
Provinces Area Development Council; the Peaceful Strategic Administrative
Centre for Southern Border Provinces; and a permanent fund to support
reconciliation work. The proposed Border Provinces Area Development
Council, which is seen as a response to more radical calls for autonomy,
sounds good on paper; but as an advisory body only, with no official
power, it fails to address local calls for more substantive reform. That
the NRC fiercely debated the question of autonomy is now well known.
Some NRC members were disaffected that prominent NRC members argued that
concessions to autonomy or even a Bangkok-style form of government would
lead to an ultra-nationalist reaction, making any NRC recommendations
redundant.
Those fearing a nationalist backlash thus pushed for a minimalist
semi-elected Development Council that provides for non-binding popular
participation in policy formation and monitoring of government. In not
dealing with genuine political re-organisation, tensions on the nature of
political rule in the deep South will continue. The second body, the
Strategic Administrative Centre, essentially recreates the Southern Border
Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) that the Thaksin government
disbanded in 2002. It is not at all clear that re-establishment of that
organisation in all but name will end the crisis.
SBPAC's success was not simply related to its organisational efficiency.
It also embodied a two-decades social compact in the South that
recognised, integrated and legitimised various interests. The last five
years have seen those interests embroiled in conflict, violence and
reconfiguration. The balance of power that held in the SBPAC cannot now be
resurrected by simple administrative decree. The NRC has been more
creative when it comes to questions of peace-building and cultural
understanding. The NRC proposal to deploy unarmed military units is an
attractive one, given that violence breeds violence. The recommendation
flows from a recognition that in the past the presence of weapons has
inflamed tense stand-off situations. The problem remains of how such
unarmed forces would protect themselves in the event of an attack.
The NRC final report also stresses the importance of working towards
increased cultural understanding in the region, including the possible
expansion of Sharia law _ what this means practically will depend on local
Muslim interpretation. The NRC's stress on the importance of understanding
the cultural identity of the region echoes a key demand of political
Muslims who formed the Wadah faction in the 1980s. Wadah also sought to
make Malay a second official language in the region, and the NRC has
endorsed this idea. The significance of such a proposal cannot be
underestimated. Thai for many people in the border provinces is, at best,
a second language. In meetings in Pattani, I have seen state officials
speak Thai to a largely uncomprehending audience.
One Uzstad explained to me that many of his friends did not understand
Thai and so had left one particular meeting early.
This probably happens all the time. The official could probably speak
Malay, but as it was an official gathering, so the medium of communication
was Thai. Culture is lived through language. Devaluing the language spoken
by the majority of the people in the southern border provinces in the name
of promoting national integration, has bred resentment and antagonism,
entrenching a sense of alienation towards the state among some Malay
Muslims in the South. The proposed change in language policy is one of the
most significant advances proposed by the NRC because it has the potential
to have an impact on many other areas, including cultural alienation,
employment in the civil service, and on relations between state officials
and Malay-speaking communities.
Children's first years of state education may well become bilingual,
presenting them with a confidence in their own language that could lead to
confidence in acquiring Thai. The NRC language recommendation has the
potential to provide a long-term solution to the anomic violence that may,
in part, flow from social exclusion. If you can't speak in your own voice,
how can you be a citizen? The introduction of a new language policy would
be an expansion of citizenship rights in Thailand.
The South has long been the victim of political neglect and opportunism.
It is tragic that just as some good ideas have been formulated to redress
legitimate grievances in the South, the political vacuum in Bangkok and
the current struggle for political survival of Thaksin Shinawatra and his
Thai Rak Thai party means that there will be no systematic approach to
the National Reconciliation Commission's report for some time.
Thailand: Thaksin: Hero of the Poor?
Hero of the poor became a corrupter of democracy
The Age, Melbourne
April 6, 2006
Michael Connors
Two years ago, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra noted, "A company is a country. A country is a company, the management is the same." The Opposition's boycott of last Sunday's snap election has delivered what may be Thaksin's last political lesson: a company and a country are different, and chief executives don't always get what they want.
Thaksin's party, Thai Rak Thai, might have won the most votes in last Sunday's poll, but his hopes of a third term in office are now gone. In the face of a 10 million-strong protest vote against abuse of power, and facing immense pressure from key figures, Thaksin has renounced claims to the prime ministership. Democracy is better for it.
Thaksin will be remembered for stacking independent institutions such as the Electoral Commission of Thailand with preferred candidates. He allegedly bought influence in the Senate. He gobbled up minor parties to ensure absolute parliamentary dominance. He bought media organisations that criticised him.
But Thaksin won't fully depart the political scene voluntarily unless a backroom deal provides him with a guarantee of immunity. Without power he will be vulnerable to the law.
When Thaksin came to power in 2001, he was appealing against a National Counter Corruption Commission verdict that he had deliberately concealed assets (he admitted to parking millions of dollars in the accounts of a maid and a driver). The Constitution Court narrowly overruled the verdict, allowing him to remain in office. Since then, Thaksin's wealth has more than trebled. Now, opponents want the Constitution Court's decision revisited, for Thaksin's dealings to be investigated. Some have called for his assets to be seized.
Thaksin's violent "war on drugs" in 2003 left 2000 people dead. The Government claimed the violence was gang-related. Human rights activists believed state-sponsored extra-judicial death squads were running wild. Thaksin reportedly told officials at the beginning of the war: "We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their assets as well, so their sinful inheritance will not be passed on." Many innocent people on police blacklists were killed. The Human Rights Commission of Thailand may reopen this issue if Thaksin falls completely from power.
In response to what appears to be separatist violence in the Muslim-majority southern provinces, Thaksin backed a military response that caused many deaths. Scores of Muslim youths, reportedly on blacklists, have disappeared. In October 2004, close to 80 unarmed demonstrators died as they were transported from a protest site to a military camp. These incidents await proper investigation. Without the protection of political office, Thaksin may be called to testify.
Clearly, Thaksin needs to hold on to power, even if indirectly, unless he strikes a deal on post-office criminal immunity. Those sympathetic to Thaksin argue that his is the first Thai Government not only to announce pro-poor policies but to implement them. These include debt moratoriums for farmers and cheap universal health care. Thaksin has talked to the poor in a way no other politician has. This, they say, is why he won office and remains popular in the rural provinces.
There is a lesson in all of this for the liberal Democrat Party, which led the election boycott. In the late 1990s, a Democrat-led government implemented an IMF program centred on liberalising the economy. They oversaw the sale of many Thai firms, bankrupted by the 1997 currency crisis, to foreign companies at bargain prices. The Democrats ignored mass protests by the rural poor who travelled to Bangkok and encamped outside government house. They then lost office.
The Democrats are now considering how they can ensure that Thailand's poor have a stake in democracy so that they do not fall victim to demagoguery. They will have to work on making democracy mean something more than the rule of law and economic liberalisation. That will mean entertaining some of the policies that made Thaksin so popular.
It seems unlikely that a parliament will be convened from last Sunday's election. The future of Thai Rak Thai, which is a holding company of many factions, is also uncertain. Already the Opposition is claiming the outcome is illegitimate and that the Electoral Commission acted unconstitutionally.
One thing is clear. The move for political reform in Thailand has gained renewed impetus. As political liberals move to amend the constitution and remove clauses that allowed Thaksin to centralise power, they will also need to attend to the problems that led to a populist alliance between the rural poor and the billionaire Prime Minister.
As for Thaksin, he may have time to reflect on his own observation that "people who are in power for a long time may acquire a self-delusion that they're the best".
The Age, Melbourne
April 6, 2006
Michael Connors
Two years ago, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra noted, "A company is a country. A country is a company, the management is the same." The Opposition's boycott of last Sunday's snap election has delivered what may be Thaksin's last political lesson: a company and a country are different, and chief executives don't always get what they want.
Thaksin's party, Thai Rak Thai, might have won the most votes in last Sunday's poll, but his hopes of a third term in office are now gone. In the face of a 10 million-strong protest vote against abuse of power, and facing immense pressure from key figures, Thaksin has renounced claims to the prime ministership. Democracy is better for it.
Thaksin will be remembered for stacking independent institutions such as the Electoral Commission of Thailand with preferred candidates. He allegedly bought influence in the Senate. He gobbled up minor parties to ensure absolute parliamentary dominance. He bought media organisations that criticised him.
But Thaksin won't fully depart the political scene voluntarily unless a backroom deal provides him with a guarantee of immunity. Without power he will be vulnerable to the law.
When Thaksin came to power in 2001, he was appealing against a National Counter Corruption Commission verdict that he had deliberately concealed assets (he admitted to parking millions of dollars in the accounts of a maid and a driver). The Constitution Court narrowly overruled the verdict, allowing him to remain in office. Since then, Thaksin's wealth has more than trebled. Now, opponents want the Constitution Court's decision revisited, for Thaksin's dealings to be investigated. Some have called for his assets to be seized.
Thaksin's violent "war on drugs" in 2003 left 2000 people dead. The Government claimed the violence was gang-related. Human rights activists believed state-sponsored extra-judicial death squads were running wild. Thaksin reportedly told officials at the beginning of the war: "We have to shoot to kill and confiscate their assets as well, so their sinful inheritance will not be passed on." Many innocent people on police blacklists were killed. The Human Rights Commission of Thailand may reopen this issue if Thaksin falls completely from power.
In response to what appears to be separatist violence in the Muslim-majority southern provinces, Thaksin backed a military response that caused many deaths. Scores of Muslim youths, reportedly on blacklists, have disappeared. In October 2004, close to 80 unarmed demonstrators died as they were transported from a protest site to a military camp. These incidents await proper investigation. Without the protection of political office, Thaksin may be called to testify.
Clearly, Thaksin needs to hold on to power, even if indirectly, unless he strikes a deal on post-office criminal immunity. Those sympathetic to Thaksin argue that his is the first Thai Government not only to announce pro-poor policies but to implement them. These include debt moratoriums for farmers and cheap universal health care. Thaksin has talked to the poor in a way no other politician has. This, they say, is why he won office and remains popular in the rural provinces.
There is a lesson in all of this for the liberal Democrat Party, which led the election boycott. In the late 1990s, a Democrat-led government implemented an IMF program centred on liberalising the economy. They oversaw the sale of many Thai firms, bankrupted by the 1997 currency crisis, to foreign companies at bargain prices. The Democrats ignored mass protests by the rural poor who travelled to Bangkok and encamped outside government house. They then lost office.
The Democrats are now considering how they can ensure that Thailand's poor have a stake in democracy so that they do not fall victim to demagoguery. They will have to work on making democracy mean something more than the rule of law and economic liberalisation. That will mean entertaining some of the policies that made Thaksin so popular.
It seems unlikely that a parliament will be convened from last Sunday's election. The future of Thai Rak Thai, which is a holding company of many factions, is also uncertain. Already the Opposition is claiming the outcome is illegitimate and that the Electoral Commission acted unconstitutionally.
One thing is clear. The move for political reform in Thailand has gained renewed impetus. As political liberals move to amend the constitution and remove clauses that allowed Thaksin to centralise power, they will also need to attend to the problems that led to a populist alliance between the rural poor and the billionaire Prime Minister.
As for Thaksin, he may have time to reflect on his own observation that "people who are in power for a long time may acquire a self-delusion that they're the best".
Fact and Fiction in the War on Terror
Fact and fiction in the war on terror
The Age, Melbourne
April 7, 2005
Michael Connors
Looking for an exciting and lucrative career? You may have seen the recent recruitment advertisements for Australia's premier intelligence agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
They invite applications from people who can think outside the box. Such banal management-guru speak nicely glosses over the kind of thing you might be required to do if you are recruited, including having people think inside a box - namely a 5-by-5 room for interrogation. These are the boxes that generate most of the intelligence on terrorism.
And it is this intelligence that is increasingly cited in the many authoritative books on terrorism. It seems it is now respectable to include in a list of references things such as Terrorist 489: Intelligence Debriefing, CIA, Our Part of Cuba. If intelligence or counter-intelligence is not your thing, what about writing a book on the War on Terror?
It used to be globalisation that sold books. Now it's terror. Readers can't get enough of thinly researched - but polemically driven - books exposing the inner sanctums of terror networks. The great thing about writing books on current affairs is that opinion trumps fact. In the lazy world of prejudicial common sense that the war on terror has ushered in, you can build a writing career as long as you toe the right line, genuflect in the direction of Big Daddy (authority in all its rotundity), and repeat sanctimonious tripe about the need to repel barbarians at the gate.
If you take the right approach, you might have a bestseller in the making. Judging from the dozen or so books I have looked through, any person who can implausibly claim to have interviewed an informant has a chance of writing a bestseller. The more masked informants, the better the book will sell. When you do research have a mask on hand, just in case you get a photo opportunity. If you manage to score a few interviews, the blurb for your prospective book may read "Using unused sources, this book offers new news on a problem that is new".
Problematically, but unavoidably, if you are going to write a book on terror you have to demonstrate some knowledge of Islam. To do this, it helps to produce a glossary of strange-sounding words that you have never encountered before. Use italics to suggest a scholarly approach to languages that you do not understand. Where possible, make a reference to the crusades as this will add historical depth to your work, but do get the century right (check Encyclopedia Britannica).
To give the work a feeling of authenticity, try to begin chapters with references to dusty roads and villages only to be found off the beaten track.
Best of all, put yourself in the narrative. Paint a self-portrait of a wilful and seasoned traveller, seeking out sinister operatives in faraway places. Make sure you refer to how the Islamic Morning Prayer (Fajr) interrupts your sleep when you are on the road - people like to identify with the writer. You need not be concerned that your arguments are flimsy; there is a ready-made trick to give the appearance of being informed. All you need do is cite and recite. Read through the footnotes of various books on terror and you will discern a pattern of repetition: citation and recitation. Say something over and over again, and supply a footnote.
The CIA Factbook seems to be a constant star in many bibliographies. Using such sources will establish as fact even as flimsy a premise that al-Qaeda is everywhere. There are many other sources. You can quote anyone who has an affiliation with the proliferating number of Institutes of Strategic Studies. Don't be afraid to contact any organisation with acronyms such as ISS, ISIO, SISS. Such organisations have on hand a number of media-savvy researchers eager to be interviewed and cited about any topic. Make sure your sources, real or unreal, do not say anything original, challenging or thoughtful.
If they do, someone will want to know who they are, and you might find yourself in an ASIO interrogation room, explaining that the informant doesn't exist. The ASIO operative will, no doubt, think you have impeccable journalistic ethics, and try and break you down. Lawfully, of course.
To maintain rapport with the reader, it is important that you do not disturb society's sense of proper proportion - tragedies that happen to our people are capital "T" tragedies. The following opening line is obligatory for any book on the right side of the War on Terror: "The Tragedy of 7/11". Make sure you engage a proofreader to spot embarrassing mistakes.
Finally, don't worry about being caught out for being shallow, ignorant and a poseur - this has not hurt the careers of some prominent professors.
The Age, Melbourne
April 7, 2005
Michael Connors
Looking for an exciting and lucrative career? You may have seen the recent recruitment advertisements for Australia's premier intelligence agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
They invite applications from people who can think outside the box. Such banal management-guru speak nicely glosses over the kind of thing you might be required to do if you are recruited, including having people think inside a box - namely a 5-by-5 room for interrogation. These are the boxes that generate most of the intelligence on terrorism.
And it is this intelligence that is increasingly cited in the many authoritative books on terrorism. It seems it is now respectable to include in a list of references things such as Terrorist 489: Intelligence Debriefing, CIA, Our Part of Cuba. If intelligence or counter-intelligence is not your thing, what about writing a book on the War on Terror?
It used to be globalisation that sold books. Now it's terror. Readers can't get enough of thinly researched - but polemically driven - books exposing the inner sanctums of terror networks. The great thing about writing books on current affairs is that opinion trumps fact. In the lazy world of prejudicial common sense that the war on terror has ushered in, you can build a writing career as long as you toe the right line, genuflect in the direction of Big Daddy (authority in all its rotundity), and repeat sanctimonious tripe about the need to repel barbarians at the gate.
If you take the right approach, you might have a bestseller in the making. Judging from the dozen or so books I have looked through, any person who can implausibly claim to have interviewed an informant has a chance of writing a bestseller. The more masked informants, the better the book will sell. When you do research have a mask on hand, just in case you get a photo opportunity. If you manage to score a few interviews, the blurb for your prospective book may read "Using unused sources, this book offers new news on a problem that is new".
Problematically, but unavoidably, if you are going to write a book on terror you have to demonstrate some knowledge of Islam. To do this, it helps to produce a glossary of strange-sounding words that you have never encountered before. Use italics to suggest a scholarly approach to languages that you do not understand. Where possible, make a reference to the crusades as this will add historical depth to your work, but do get the century right (check Encyclopedia Britannica).
To give the work a feeling of authenticity, try to begin chapters with references to dusty roads and villages only to be found off the beaten track.
Best of all, put yourself in the narrative. Paint a self-portrait of a wilful and seasoned traveller, seeking out sinister operatives in faraway places. Make sure you refer to how the Islamic Morning Prayer (Fajr) interrupts your sleep when you are on the road - people like to identify with the writer. You need not be concerned that your arguments are flimsy; there is a ready-made trick to give the appearance of being informed. All you need do is cite and recite. Read through the footnotes of various books on terror and you will discern a pattern of repetition: citation and recitation. Say something over and over again, and supply a footnote.
The CIA Factbook seems to be a constant star in many bibliographies. Using such sources will establish as fact even as flimsy a premise that al-Qaeda is everywhere. There are many other sources. You can quote anyone who has an affiliation with the proliferating number of Institutes of Strategic Studies. Don't be afraid to contact any organisation with acronyms such as ISS, ISIO, SISS. Such organisations have on hand a number of media-savvy researchers eager to be interviewed and cited about any topic. Make sure your sources, real or unreal, do not say anything original, challenging or thoughtful.
If they do, someone will want to know who they are, and you might find yourself in an ASIO interrogation room, explaining that the informant doesn't exist. The ASIO operative will, no doubt, think you have impeccable journalistic ethics, and try and break you down. Lawfully, of course.
To maintain rapport with the reader, it is important that you do not disturb society's sense of proper proportion - tragedies that happen to our people are capital "T" tragedies. The following opening line is obligatory for any book on the right side of the War on Terror: "The Tragedy of 7/11". Make sure you engage a proofreader to spot embarrassing mistakes.
Finally, don't worry about being caught out for being shallow, ignorant and a poseur - this has not hurt the careers of some prominent professors.
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